This part covers coin makers cleared by a state. The state watchdog runs the checks. It can share the work with the Fed. In a crisis two federal bodies may step in. The part also says which state's laws apply.
The document says “shall”Who acts: State payment stablecoin regulatorsHow: statuteSec. 7 in the PDF
What the document says
“A State payment stablecoin regulator shall have supervisory, examination, and enforcement authority over all State qualified payment stablecoin issuers of such State.”
Subsection (a). The authority covers all State qualified payment stablecoin issuers of that State. Section 6(b)(6) switches off the Federal enforcement subsection for those issuers, and section 2(30) defines a State payment stablecoin regulator as the State agency with primary regulatory and supervisory authority over entities that issue payment stablecoins in that State.
What the document actually says
“A State payment stablecoin regulator shall have supervisory, examination, and enforcement authority over all State qualified payment stablecoin issuers of such State.”
That sentence, in plain words
A state watchdog runs the checks on the makers it cleared. It can also step in when one breaks a rule.
What this is about
Each state names one body for this job. It covers every maker that state cleared. Part 6 keeps the federal powers off those makers.
No action is recorded against this proposal. That is not evidence that none has been taken, and nobody has yet read it against the record. See what the tracker does not yet cover.
The document says “can”Who acts: State payment stablecoin regulators, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemHow: statuteSec. 7 in the PDF
What the document says
“A State payment stablecoin regulator may enter into a memorandum of understanding with the Board, by mutual agreement, under which the Board may participate in the supervision, examination, and enforcement of this Act with respect to the State qualified payment stablecoin issuers of such State.”
Subsection (b). The agreement is optional and mutual. Under it the Federal Reserve Board may take part in supervising, examining and enforcing the Act as to that State's qualified issuers.
What the document actually says
“A State payment stablecoin regulator may enter into a memorandum of understanding with the Board, by mutual agreement, under which the Board may participate in the supervision, examination, and enforcement of this Act with respect to the State qualified payment stablecoin issuers of such State.”
That sentence, in plain words
A state watchdog may sign a deal with the Fed. Both sides have to want it. Under it the Fed joins the work on that state's makers.
What this is about
A memorandum of understanding is a written deal between two bodies. It is not a law. Either side has to agree before it starts.
No action is recorded against this proposal. That is not evidence that none has been taken, and nobody has yet read it against the record. See what the tracker does not yet cover.
The document says “shall”Who acts: State payment stablecoin regulators, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemHow: statuteSec. 7 in the PDF
What the document says
“A State payment stablecoin regulator and the Board shall share information on an ongoing basis with respect to a State qualified payment stablecoin issuer of such State, including a copy of the initial application and any accompanying documents.”
Subsection (c). The duty runs both ways and is continuing rather than one time. The initial application and any accompanying documents are named as part of what is shared.
What the document actually says
“A State payment stablecoin regulator and the Board shall share information on an ongoing basis with respect to a State qualified payment stablecoin issuer of such State, including a copy of the initial application and any accompanying documents.”
That sentence, in plain words
The state watchdog and the Fed must keep each other informed. This goes on over time. The first request a maker filed is part of it.
What this is about
This duty holds whether or not the two sign a deal. Papers filed with the state go to the Fed as well.
No action is recorded against this proposal. That is not evidence that none has been taken, and nobody has yet read it against the record. See what the tracker does not yet cover.
The document says “can”Who acts: State payment stablecoin regulatorsHow: statuteSec. 7 in the PDF
What the document says
“A State payment stablecoin regulator may issue orders and rules under section 4 applicable to State qualified payment stablecoin issuers to the same extent as the primary Federal payment stablecoin regulators issue orders and rules under section 4 applicable to permitted payment stablecoin issuers that are not State qualified payment stablecoin issuers.”
Subsection (d). The measure of the State power is the Federal power: a State regulator may issue orders and rules under section 4 to the same extent as the Federal regulators do for issuers that are not State qualified. Section 4(h) makes the same point from the other direction.
What the document actually says
“A State payment stablecoin regulator may issue orders and rules under section 4 applicable to State qualified payment stablecoin issuers to the same extent as the primary Federal payment stablecoin regulators issue orders and rules under section 4 applicable to permitted payment stablecoin issuers that are not State qualified payment stablecoin issuers.”
That sentence, in plain words
A state watchdog may write rules for its own makers. Those rules come under part four. It may go as far as the federal bodies go.
What this is about
Part 4 holds the main duties for every maker. The federal bodies write rules there for the makers they watch. A state can do the same for its own.
No action is recorded against this proposal. That is not evidence that none has been taken, and nobody has yet read it against the record. See what the tracker does not yet cover.
The document says “can”Who acts: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemHow: statuteSec. 7 in the PDF
What the document says
“under unusual and exigent circumstances that the Board determines to exist, the Board may, after not less than 48 hours' prior written notice to the applicable State payment stablecoin regulator, take an enforcement action against a State qualified payment stablecoin issuer”
Subsection (e)(1)(A). The sentence continues that the action may also be taken against an institution-affiliated party of the issuer, for violations of the Act during those circumstances. The quotation stops before that phrase because the printer breaks the word across a line. Two conditions attach: the Board must determine that unusual and exigent circumstances exist, and it must give the State regulator at least 48 hours' prior written notice. Under subparagraph (B) the Board is to issue rules, consistent with section 13, setting out the circumstances in which it may act.
What the document actually says
“under unusual and exigent circumstances that the Board determines to exist, the Board may, after not less than 48 hours' prior written notice to the applicable State payment stablecoin regulator, take an enforcement action against a State qualified payment stablecoin issuer”
That sentence, in plain words
The Fed may act against a state maker in a crisis. It must decide that things are that bad. It must warn the state watchdog 48 hours ahead.
What this is about
This is a break from the usual split of work. A state watchdog handles its own makers. The Fed must write rules on what counts as a crisis.
No action is recorded against this proposal. That is not evidence that none has been taken, and nobody has yet read it against the record. See what the tracker does not yet cover.
The document says “can”Who acts: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemHow: statuteSec. 7 in the PDF
What the document says
“the Board may impose such restrictions as the Board determines to be necessary to address such risk during such unusual and exigent circumstances, which may include limitations on redemptions of payment stablecoins, and which shall be issued in the form of a directive, with the effect of a cease and desist order that has become final”
Subsection (e)(1)(C). The power turns on reasonable cause to believe that continuing an activity is a serious risk to the financial safety, soundness or stability of the issuer. The directive runs to the issuer and any of its affiliates and limits transactions between the issuer, a holding company and their subsidiaries or affiliates, and activities that might create a serious risk that the liabilities of a holding company and its affiliates may be imposed on the issuer.
What the document actually says
“the Board may impose such restrictions as the Board determines to be necessary to address such risk during such unusual and exigent circumstances, which may include limitations on redemptions of payment stablecoins, and which shall be issued in the form of a directive, with the effect of a cease and desist order that has become final”
That sentence, in plain words
The Fed may set limits to deal with the risk. It may even cap how many coins are handed back. The order counts as a final one.
What this is about
A limit on redemptions means holders may not get their money at once. The order can also cut off deals between the maker and firms tied to it.
No action is recorded against this proposal. That is not evidence that none has been taken, and nobody has yet read it against the record. See what the tracker does not yet cover.
The document says “shall”Who acts: Office of the Comptroller of the CurrencyHow: statuteSec. 7 in the PDF
What the document says
“under unusual and exigent circumstances determined to exist by the Comptroller, the Comptroller shall, after not less than 48 hours' prior written notice to the applicable State payment stablecoin regulator, take an enforcement action against a State qualified payment stablecoin issuer that is a nonbank entity for violations of this Act.”
Subsection (e)(2)(A). The provision runs in the same terms as the Board's, with two differences: it reaches only a State qualified issuer that is a nonbank entity, and it is written as a duty rather than a power. Where the Comptroller then finds reasonable cause to believe an activity is a serious risk, subparagraph (C) likewise says the Comptroller shall impose restrictions, which may include limitations on redemption. The Comptroller is to issue rules, consistent with section 13, on the circumstances in which it may act.
What the document actually says
“under unusual and exigent circumstances determined to exist by the Comptroller, the Comptroller shall, after not less than 48 hours' prior written notice to the applicable State payment stablecoin regulator, take an enforcement action against a State qualified payment stablecoin issuer that is a nonbank entity for violations of this Act.”
That sentence, in plain words
The Comptroller must act against some state makers in a crisis. Those are the ones that are not banks. It must warn the state watchdog 48 hours ahead.
What this is about
The Fed's version of this is a choice. This one is written as a duty. Both reach only what the law calls odd and urgent times.
No action is recorded against this proposal. That is not evidence that none has been taken, and nobody has yet read it against the record. See what the tracker does not yet cover.
The document says “shall”Who acts: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the CurrencyHow: statuteSec. 7 in the PDF
What the document says
“If, after 10 days after the receipt of a response described in subclause (I), the Board does not affirm, modify, or rescind the directive, the directive shall automatically lapse.”
Subsection (e)(1)(D) and, in the same terms, subsection (e)(2)(D). The issuer or an institution-affiliated party subject to a directive may present to the Board or the Comptroller in writing the reasons the directive should be modified or rescinded. If the agency affirms or modifies it, any affected party may then petition the United States district court where its main office is located, or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, to stay, modify, terminate or set aside the directive. On a showing of extraordinary cause a party may go to court without first exhausting the administrative route.
What the document actually says
“If, after 10 days after the receipt of a response described in subclause (I), the Board does not affirm, modify, or rescind the directive, the directive shall automatically lapse.”
That sentence, in plain words
A firm can write back to say why an order is wrong. The agency then has 10 days. If it does nothing, the order falls away.
What this is about
The agency can keep the order, change it or drop it. If it keeps it, the firm can go to court. In a rare case it may go straight there.
No action is recorded against this proposal. That is not evidence that none has been taken, and nobody has yet read it against the record. See what the tracker does not yet cover.
The document says “shall apply”Who acts: CongressHow: statuteSec. 7 in the PDF
What the document says
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the laws of a host State, including laws relating to consumer protection, shall only apply to the activities conducted in the host State by an out-of-State State qualified payment stablecoin issuer to the same extent as such laws apply to the activities conducted in the host State by an out-of-State Federal qualified payment stablecoin issuer.”
Subsection (f). Where a host State law is determined not to apply, the laws of the issuer's home State govern its activities in the host State. The subsection applies only to an issuer chartered, licensed or otherwise authorized by a State that has a certification in place pursuant to section 4(c), and it excludes host State laws governing chartering, licensure or other authorization to do business. Except for those laws, nothing in the Act preempts State consumer protection laws, including common law, and the remedies available under them.
What the document actually says
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the laws of a host State, including laws relating to consumer protection, shall only apply to the activities conducted in the host State by an out-of-State State qualified payment stablecoin issuer to the same extent as such laws apply to the activities conducted in the host State by an out-of-State Federal qualified payment stablecoin issuer.”
That sentence, in plain words
A maker cleared in one state may work in another. The second state's laws reach it only so far. They reach it no further than they reach a federal maker.
What this is about
The state where a firm is cleared is its home state. Another state it works in is a host state. If host law does not apply, home law does.
No action is recorded against this proposal. That is not evidence that none has been taken, and nobody has yet read it against the record. See what the tracker does not yet cover.
Each distinct thing the section provides: the State regulator's supervisory, examination and enforcement authority, the option of a memorandum of understanding with the Federal Reserve Board, the duty to share information, the State rulemaking power, the Board's power to act in unusual and exigent circumstances and the restrictions it may impose, the Comptroller's matching power over a nonbank State issuer, the review of a directive, and the effect on host and home State law.
The administrative and judicial review of a directive is recorded once, in the proposal on review, rather than twice, because the Board's version in paragraph (1)(D) and the Comptroller's version in paragraph (2)(D) run in the same terms. Where they differ, the difference is noted.
Paragraph (2)(D)(i)(I), inside the Comptroller's provisions on a State qualified payment stablecoin issuer that is a nonbank entity, refers to the applicable Federal qualified payment stablecoin issuer. Subsection (f)(3)(A) refers to a certification in place pursuant to section 4(c) of this Act. The site records both cross references as printed and does not resolve them.
