Impose a long cooling off period on drug regulators
What the document says“Regulators should have a long “cooling off period” on their contracts (15 years would not be too long)”
The chapter says the revolving door between government and pharmaceutical companies should be shut and locked, that executives should likewise be restricted from moving into regulatory agencies, and that regulators at the health agencies should be entirely free from private biopharmaceutical funding, which it calls agency capture and a thin veneer for corporatism. It cites a finding that more than two-thirds of FDA reviewers later joined companies whose products they had reviewed.
What the document actually says“Regulators should have a long “cooling off period” on their contracts (15 years would not be too long)”
Regulators should have to wait a long time. Fifteen years would not be too long.
People who regulate drug firms often go to work for them later. The book says that is a problem. It says they should have to wait many years.
Read against the documents indexed here on August 26, 2026, and nothing was found that answers this. Nothing indexed imposes a cooling off period on officials who regulate drugs, or restricts industry executives moving into the health agencies. The nearest candidate by wording, rule-2026-06947, bars bank regulators from using reputation risk in supervision, which has nothing to do with the revolving door the passage describes. That is a record of a search, not a finding that nothing has happened: an act this site does not hold, or one that answers the proposal in words unlike its own, would not be caught by it.