Application for Relief From Disabilities Imposed by Federal Laws With Respect to the Acquisition, Receipt, Transfer, Shipment, Transportation, or Possession of Firearms

The Department appreciates comments received regarding the presumptive disqualification of current drug users. As explained further below, the final rule continues to include certain drug users and addicts as categories of persons presumptively disqualified from relief under this final rule. The Department, however, has amended the rule to exclude from the scope of the presumption those individuals whose unlawful drug use or addiction consists only of the use of or addiction to marijuana, in recognition of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hemani and in light of the many comments received regarding use of marijuana.\46\ Specifically, the definition of “controlled substance” in the final rule at Sec. 107.1 no longer includes marijuana, and the presumption of ineligibility for relief based on unlawful drug use or addiction at Sec. 107.50(c) now applies only to controlled substances as defined in Sec. 107.1. These changes have the effect of excluding unlawful marijuana use and marijuana addiction from the scope of conduct giving rise to a presumption of ineligibility under Sec. 107.50(c).

\46\ The Department also made technical changes to reorganize the provision regarding individuals engaging in ongoing unlawful conduct and to improve the final rule's clarity. See 28 CFR 107.50(c).

With respect to the rule's remaining drug-based presumption of ineligibility (i.e., for drugs other than marijuana), the Department notes that individuals prohibited from owning firearms based on drug use or addiction are among the class of persons who can take themselves out of the prohibited

category simply by ending their unlawful conduct and avoiding additional drug-related conduct for a period of time--thus disrupting the “pattern” of drug use. Drug-use prohibitions are documented in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”),\47\ a centralized repository of records documenting those who are under federal or state firearm prohibitions. Since 1997, NICS has viewed an individual as being a current drug user if, within the past year, the person has had a conviction for drug use or possession or has engaged in conduct that indicates drug use and, accordingly, drug-use-related records are retained in NICS Indices for only one year.\48\ As a result, individuals prohibited on the basis of drug use or addiction can regain the right to possess a firearm, assuming no other prohibitors apply to them, by abstaining from ongoing drug use and allowing 12 months to pass. For these individuals, this final rule's drug-use-related presumption of ineligibility for relief under section 925(c) is irrelevant because such individuals will not need to apply for relief under section 925(c) at all.

\47\ NICS is the system used to conduct background checks on people who want to own a firearm or explosive, as required by law. FBI, How We Can Help You, https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/more-fbi-services-and-information/nics (last visited July 4, 2026). NICS provides the primary means of identifying those who are prohibited from owning firearms, including those who are prohibited based on drug use or addiction to a controlled substance.

\48\ See FBI, Active Entries in the NICS Indices as of December 31, 2025 at 6, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/cjis/active-entries-in-the-nics-indices.pdf/view (last visited July 4, 2026) (“Active Entries”) (“Since [evidence of being an unlawful user or addicted to a controlled substance creates] a temporary prohibition (one year), an expiration date [for such evidence] is required to be established in NICS Indices.”); 28 CFR 25.9(a) (“In cases where a firearms disability is not permanent, e.g., a disqualifying restraining order, the NICS will automatically purge the pertinent record when it is no longer disqualifying.”). Documents indicating drug use could include items such as positive drug tests or admissions of use. Active Entries at 6; see also Revising Definition of “Unlawful User of or Addicted to Controlled Substance,” 91 FR 2698, 2700 (Jan. 22, 2026) (“Since ATF published the 1997 final rule, the [FBI], in operating NICS, has relied on the inference examples in the regulatory definition of unlawful user.”).

Next, ATF recently amended the regulatory definition of “unlawful user” for purposes of documentation in NICS Indices to exclude the use of controlled substances that is “isolated or sporadic or does not otherwise demonstrate a pattern of ongoing use.” \49\ Due to this change, the active number of NICS Indices entries for unlawful users and those addicted to a controlled substance dropped from 54,136 as of December 31, 2025,\50\ to 6,169 users as of May 31, 2026,\51\ making the issue moot for approximately 89 percent of those previously affected. Indeed, out of 34,744,424 prohibited category entries in the NICS Indices, this category now constitutes just over 0.016 percent of the entries.

\49\ 91 FR at 2708.

\50\ Id. at 2704.

\51\ FBI, Active Entries in the NICS Indices (May 31, 2026), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/cjis/active_records_in_the_nics-indices.pdf/view.

For these reasons, the Department has decided to retain the rule's general presumption of ineligibility for relief related to certain forms of drug use and addiction. As noted above, however, the Department has made changes to the rule in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hemani. Although that case preserved the prohibition in section 922(g)(3) as a general matter, the Court concluded that the defendant's regular use of marijuana did not necessarily establish that he posed a danger to himself or others, and hence that section 922(g)(3) could not constitutionally be applied to him. See Hemani, 146 S. Ct. at 1689, 1693. The Court's finding echoed the concerns expressed by commenters on the NPRM, who likewise focused almost exclusively on marijuana users and argued that regular marijuana use does not render the user dangerous to the public. In view of these developments, the Department has made the adjustments mentioned above to exclude marijuana use or addiction as a presumptive disqualifier under Sec. 107.50(c). And for similar reasons, the Department has amended the rule so that applicants and their character references are no longer required to affirm that the applicant is not a user of or addicted to marijuana. See 28 CFR 107.1, 107.10(g)(13)(iii)(B) & (14)(ii). The Department acknowledges that making these changes with respect to marijuana addicts (not just marijuana users) goes beyond the facts at issue in Hemani, but the Department has determined that doing so is necessary to improve the administrability of the restoration process. Whether an individual is a marijuana “user” or a marijuana “addict” is a highly fact-specific inquiry, and the Department would struggle to differentiate between the two on the basis of the kind of evidence likely to be submitted with an application for restoration. Further, attempting to collect and evaluate additional information to accurately differentiate between marijuana “users” and marijuana “addicts” would require time and resources that would defeat the administrability benefits of imposing a presumption of disqualification in the first place. Given these considerations, the Department has determined that excluding both marijuana users and marijuana addicts from Sec. Sec. 107.10(g)(13)-(14) and 107.50(c) best balances the relevant policy considerations. Firearms Offenses

The Department understands the concerns expressed by commenters that certain nonviolent, possessory firearms offenses may have been inappropriately included in the permanent presumptive disqualification list proposed in the NPRM. The Department agrees that certain possessory and nonviolent firearms convictions may have involved a strict-liability application of the law, where no malicious intent or violence was evidenced; where the individual had little or no prior criminal history; or where the individual may have been authorized to possess a firearm in circumstances outside the scope of the statute's specific prohibition, such as when lawful firearm-permit holders are nonetheless prohibited from possessing firearms in certain sensitive locations. Also, there is evidence that those who are most likely to be convicted of a strict-liability, possessory offense without any aggravating conduct--those with little to no prior criminal history or those who may otherwise lawfully possess a firearm outside of the restrictions of the statute--have significantly lower rates of both committing criminal offenses and recidivating.\52\ In these cases, permanent presumptive disqualification is too severe a result.

\52\ See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Recidivism of Federal Firearms Offenders Released in 2010 39 tbl.19 (2021), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2021/20220209_Recidivism-Firearms.pdf (identifying recidivism rates below 40 percent for those who were convicted only of a federal possessory, prohibited weapons offense, such as possession of a National Firearms Act firearm, and who were in the lowest criminal history category) (“Recidivism of Federal Firearms Offenders”); K. Alexander Adams A State-by State Analysis of Concealed Carry Permit Revocations 4 Firearms Rsch. Ctr., Coll. of L., Univ. of Wyo., Working Paper No. 2025-9) (Nov. 19, 2025), https://firearmsresearchcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/2025-9-K_Alexander_Adams.pdf (“The data demonstrate that [firearms] permit holders can be described as extremely law abiding.”) (“State-by-State Analysis”). Researchers identified the revocation of firearms permits as a close proxy for assessing the rate of violent conduct for firearms users and found that the “[r]ates of overall [revocation] are 12 times lower than rates of violence among the general population.” State-by-State Analysis at 14.

Conversely, the Department also recognizes that many firearms offenses are accurately prosecuted and charged as either independently violent crimes or as crimes accompanying other violent

offenses. Further, violent firearms offenders have been found to carry higher recidivism rates than other categories of offenders. The Recidivism of Federal Firearms Offenders study by the U.S. Sentencing Commission found that over two-thirds of all firearms offenders were rearrested within an eight-year period following their release (compared to approximately 45 percent of all other offenders), and that the likelihood of recidivism was particularly high for persons with lengthy and serious criminal histories.\53\

\53\ Recidivism of Federal Firearms Offenders at 6, 13-14, 16-18 (assessing recidivism for individuals convicted under federal firearms statutes, primarily comprised of convictions for prohibited persons in possession of a firearm (section 922(g)), career offenders (U.S. Sentencing Guidelines section 4B1.1), armed career criminals (section 924(e)), possession of a firearm related to drug trafficking or a violent offense (section 924(c)), and other miscellaneous provisions, including straw purchasers of firearms; unlawful sales of firearms; and possession or sale of dangerous firearms, such as sawed-off shotguns or machine guns). The study further noted that for offenders with the most serious category of prior criminal history offenses, recidivism was at nearly 83 percent. Id. at 7.

To complicate matters even more, the statutes that are used to prosecute these distinct types of conduct--nonviolent, strict- liability, possession offenses, on the one hand, and violent firearms offenses, on the other--are often the same, and there may be no simple way to distinguish these disparate kinds of conduct on the face of the conviction. For example, both possession of a firearm on school property (potentially a nonviolent, possessory offense) and discharge of a firearm on school property (an offense of violence), are prosecuted federally under 18 U.S.C. 922(q), albeit different subsections. Although the precise subsection applicable to an offender might, in some small subset of cases, be discernable from specific documents in the record of the criminal proceeding, the Department's experience in reviewing convictions as part of the pardon process and in other contexts indicates that it would be difficult in most cases to determine with accuracy the specific subsection at issue. Federal jurisdictions can have widely differing practices, making it difficult to find any document that uniformly records the type of detailed information the Department would need to differentiate between convictions under different subsections of statutes. The Department's difficulties would be compounded by the divergent practices that states and localities have adopted in charging and documenting convictions. Further, the Department recognizes that, in the case of older convictions, relevant documents may be inaccessible or destroyed due to age. Thus, the records that the Department is consistently likely to receive from applicants or to be otherwise able to access during the section 925(c) application process may very well lack the detail necessary to understand the full scope of conduct in the case.

Recognizing the complex scenarios involving disparate risks and fact patterns associated with similar convictions, while still endeavoring to promote efficient processing of relief applications, the Department at Sec. 107.50(b)(1)(iv)-(v) has shifted the presumptive disqualification for firearms offenses from a permanent disqualification to a 10-year presumptive disqualification. This time- limited presumption will promote the Department's goal of focusing its resources initially on those applicants who--by virtue of not being subject to a presumption--are most likely to be able to establish that they satisfy the standard for restoration in section 925(c). At the same time, imposing only a time-limited presumption recognizes that not all persons convicted of firearms offenses of the sort described in this section will necessarily have engaged in the violent conduct that makes a permanent presumptive disqualification appropriate. Importantly, the Department is not obligated to grant an applicant's restoration upon the expiration of the presumptive disqualification period, and would be statutorily barred from doing so if it finds that the restoration of firearms rights to the applicant is likely to cause a danger to the public or would be contrary to the public interest. Thus, the shift to a 10-year presumptive disqualification would not, on its face, be more likely to result in unwarranted restorations than the proposed permanent disqualification.

The shift to a 10-year presumption will preserve the Department's ability to consider statements by applicants seeking to demonstrate that the particular circumstances of their conduct qualify as extraordinary and hence overcome the presumption that they should be disqualified from relief for that full 10-year period. The shift to a 10-year presumption will also help the Department properly identify other potentially strong applicants immediately upon the expiration of the 10-year presumption. (By contrast, if the permanent presumption of disqualification for firearms offenders remained in place, these applicants might never be considered.) For all these reasons, the Department believes the 10-year presumptive disqualification best balances the competing policy interests associated with the firearms offenses discussed in this section. The Department suggests that individuals who seek to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances overcoming the 10-year presumption for past firearms convictions explain in their applications the extent to which their offense conduct was nonviolent, merely possessory, may have been lawful but for the location or circumstance of offense, or resulted solely from a strict- liability application of a statute. Explosives

Similar to past firearms convictions, convictions related to the possession, manufacture, transfer, or use of explosives could be deemed independently violent offenses or offenses closely associated with substantive violent conduct, or they could be mere strict-liability violations that do not indicate the applicant is likely to pose an ongoing threat to public safety. For example, charges of carrying an explosive during the commission of a felony under 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(2) could involve substantively violent intent but also could include individuals who are legally carrying explosives at the time they are engaged in unrelated and nonviolent conduct. Further, the definition of explosives at section 844(j) includes combustible materials that have uses beyond their mere explosive capabilities, such as kerosene and types of fertilizers.\54\ Details regarding the culpability of a person convicted under section 844 are not facially apparent from the records the Department is likely to receive in the initial stages of its review. Accordingly, standalone explosive offenses have also been moved from a permanent to a 10-year presumptive disqualification period. See 28 CFR 107.50(b)(1)(iii). The Department similarly suggests that people who seek to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances overcoming the 10- year presumption for past explosives convictions explain in their applications the extent to which their underlying offense conduct was nonviolent, merely possessory, may have been lawful but for the location or circumstance of offense, or resulted solely from a strict- liability application of a statute.

\54\ See e.g., U.S. v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 277 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“My problem with the Court's interpretation is that it would permit conviction of any individual who legally carries explosives at the time that he engages in a totally unrelated felony. `Explosives' . . . encompasses such commonplace materials as kerosene, gasoline, or certain fertilizers.”).

The Department declines to remove aliens subject to disability under 922(g)(5) from the presumptive disqualification because this group is not “part of `the people' to whom the protections of the Second Amendment extend.” \57\ Further, even though there may be an argument that lawfully present nonimmigrants do not fall within the group excluded from the protection of the Second Amendment by Sitladeen, the Department declines to divide the category of individuals subject to section 922(g)(5) on the basis of whether an alien is lawfully or unlawfully present. The establishment of a presumptive disqualification for all persons who fall under section 922(g)(5), whether lawfully or unlawfully present, is consistent with Executive Order 14206, 90 FR 9503, (Feb. 7, 2025) (“Protecting Second Amendment Rights”), which directs executive agencies and departments to assess any ongoing infringements of the Second Amendment rights “of our citizens” and to create a plan of action to protect the Second Amendment rights “of all Americans.” The order also emphasizes that the Attorney General should pay particular attention to previous presidential policies that may have impaired the rights of “law- abiding citizens,” highlighting that the Department should prioritize protection for citizens rather than aliens, regardless of whether the aliens are in the country lawfully or unlawfully.

\57\ Sitladeen, 64 F.4th at 987.

In the Department's view, the presumptive disqualification of all individuals prohibited from owning firearms under section 922(g)(5), regardless of whether the individual is lawfully or unlawfully present, will support the preservation of limited resources and better enable the evaluation of applications from citizens. The Department emphasizes that the presumption is rebuttable, and the presumption thus does not preclude any aliens from having their firearms rights restored. In addition, aliens can take themselves out of both the presumptive disqualification and the underlying prohibited category by adjusting their status, further indicating the appropriateness of restricting section 925(c) relief for unadjusted alien applicants. But, the Department expects this permanent presumption will enable it to direct more resources towards applications from citizens, consistent with Executive Order 14206. Self-Defense Claims

Finally, the Department disagrees with the commenter's proposal that individuals with valid self-defense claims should be excluded from the presumptive disqualification that applies to those with convictions for violent crimes. A person facing prosecution for a violent crime has the opportunity to raise a self-defense claim in the criminal proceedings. That the person was ultimately convicted despite that opportunity supports the conclusion that the claim was not credible. Further, nothing prevents an applicant from raising self-defense as a potential “extraordinary circumstance” for the Attorney General to consider when deciding whether the presumptive disqualification against violent offenders should be overcome.

In sum, the Department strongly disagrees with the assertion that permanent presumptive disqualifiers are overbroad or arbitrary, as they are grounded in the GCA itself, case law, and research indicating a likelihood of violence or abnormally high recidivism rates among certain categories of offenders. The Department appreciates several commenters' requests to expand the categories of presumptively disqualified persons, but it concludes that the proposed additions generally already fit within the NPRM's proposed permanent presumptive disqualifier list and that further expanding the list could result in unduly disqualifying too many applicants. Conversely, reducing the number of permanent presumptive disqualifiers in ways other than those discussed above--i.e., excluding marijuana use and addiction from the presumptive disqualification under Sec. 107.50(c) and shifting certain offenses from the permanent to time-limited category--would be under- inclusive. The Department believes that the final rule, with the adjustments described in this section, will allow for efficient review of applications while fulfilling the Attorney General's statutory obligation to restore firearms rights in a manner consistent with public safety and the public interest. In the event any individual applicant's circumstances are not well captured by the final rule's presumptions, the Department invites an explanation from the applicant regarding those extraordinary circumstances. In this way, the final rule provides sufficient mechanisms that allow the applicant to attempt to show extraordinary circumstances to overcome the presumption, thus allowing the Attorney General to make an individualized determination of whether the person applying for restoration is likely to act in a manner that will endanger the public and whether the restoration is contrary to the public interest.

Comments Received: Another topic that generated robust discourse was the time-limited presumptive disqualifications in the NPRM, i.e., the 10-year presumption for drug trafficking or domestic violence offenses, the 5-year catch-all presumption for offenses leading to a prohibition under Sec. 922(g)(1) that do not fall into the other presumptive disqualification categories, and the 5-year presumption for reapplication. Many commenters were generally in favor of these presumptions, and some had, even before the NPRM's release, expressed their preference for a “waiting period” or a mandatory “good conduct” period in some or all cases. Commenters in favor generally pointed to studies showing that recidivism rates are highest in the years immediately following release from custody but then fall after 5 to 10 years. Others described a 5-to-10-year presumption of ineligibility as “sensible” and a “reasonable timeframe for applicants to demonstrate rehabilitation.” A few commenters pointed to their own successful return to society after similar

timeframes, and some who supported time-limited periods of ineligibility also supported automatic restoration at the end of the relevant timeframe.

Some commenters agreed with imposing a “waiting period” before an application could be made but proposed an alternative number of years or alternative methods of calculating the delay. For instance, some commenters argued that, “[b]y counting the indictment-to-sentence time toward these limits, the law continues to protect the public while also ensuring individuals are not punished beyond what is necessary[,]” whereas other commenters contended that “[a]ll waiting periods should be POST RELEASE FROM CUSTODY, NOT PROBATION.” A few commenters proposed requiring waiting periods for additional categories of applicants, including those found not guilty by reason of insanity, or moving some permanent presumptively disqualifying offenses--such as assault, battery, stalking, or terrorism--into a time-limited presumption. At least one commenter proposed longer waiting periods of 20 years or 15 years. The 16 states' attorneys general proposed a 15- year presumption of ineligibility for domestic violence offenses, citing a greater public safety risk than the risk posed by individuals with drug trafficking convictions.

Conversely, a minority of commenters were opposed either to the time-limited presumptions altogether or to the particular terms of years identified in the rule. Those who believed some shorter presumptions were appropriate proposed alternative options, such as one-year presumptions for nonviolent felonies and five-year presumptions for nonviolent drug offenses, or incremental restoration, whereby offenders could possess or otherwise handle different types of firearms at different intervals. One commenter proposed further dividing misdemeanor domestic violence convictions between those that involve firearms and those that do not and reducing the length of the presumption for non-firearms cases to five years. Another commenter observed that some misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence can result from even “the smallest of reasons . . . . [where n]o guns, weapons, or physical force were involved” and opined that a five-year presumption was more suitable in that instance. Several commenters suggested the Department offer a more tailored approach that “allows applicants to demonstrate extra ordinary rehabilitation after shorter intervals, especially for non-violent crimes.” Some commenters described the time-limited presumptions as “arbitrary.”

A few commenters remarked on the NPRM's five-year presumption of ineligibility for relief for all “other” felony convictions, arguing that it “undermine[d]” the purpose of section 925(c) and overlooked important individual circumstances. Alternative proposals included a three-year presumption of ineligibility, with commenters citing the recidivism study in the NPRM as identifying major drops in recidivism after three years.\58\

\58\ See Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 24 States in 2008 at 1.

Department Response: The Department appreciates the many thoughtful comments on this topic. However, the Department firmly believes that imposing a system of time-limited presumptions of ineligibility for relief is a measured and carefully tailored approach that will enable the efficient processing of applications and the prioritization of individuals who are most likely to successfully demonstrate that their federal firearms rights should be restored. The Attorney General requires evidence upon which to make his determination that an applicant does not pose a likely risk to public safety and that granting relief is not contrary to the public interest. The best evidence that a person is not a danger is a period of successful adjustment and reintegration into society after the guardrails of incarceration, probation, and supervision are removed. The final rule thus makes use of this evidence.

The particular time-limited presumptions identified in the final rule are calibrated to the nature of the relevant offenses and the likelihood for recidivism as outlined in the various studies cited in the NPRM. See, e.g., 91 FR at 34396-97 & nn.18-20. Based on such research, and for the other reasons outlined in this preamble, the Department in this final rule has decided to impose a permanent presumption of disqualification for the most violent offenses; a 10- year presumption for drug trafficking and misdemeanor domestic violence, which have high recidivism rates; a 10-year presumption for firearms or explosives offenses, which encompass unusually complex and diverse conduct that could include crimes associated with high recidivism rates; a 10-year presumption for offenses involving threatened, rather than actual, violence; and a 5-year presumption for certain other offenses. The 10-year presumptive disqualification period for drug trafficking offenses helps to keep guns out of the hands of chronic drug offenders who, because of their high recidivism rates, are unable to maintain the 10-year period of good conduct necessary to demonstrate they have reformed. That same presumption helps keep guns out of the hands of large-scale drug traffickers whose lengthy incarceration sentences, when combined with the 10-year presumptive disqualification period following the end of the incarceration, make them unlikely to be able to obtain relief through the process outlined in this rule.\59\ Next, the 10-year presumption that applies to those convicted of firearms or explosives crimes strikes an appropriate balance by helping to keep guns away from offenders who are likely to be violent and have high recidivism rates, while still acknowledging that the recidivism risk posed by nonviolent weapons offenders (who may have been lawfully allowed to possess firearms or explosives in circumstances separate from those at issue in their convictions) is appreciably lower, thus making a permanent presumptive disqualification inappropriate.

\59\ The high likelihood of recidivism in this population makes it likely that additional presumptions against relief based on further disqualifying conduct will accrue for many individuals in this population, thus impairing their ability to obtain relief. See e.g., id. at 5 (noting that almost two-thirds of drug offenders released in 2008 were arrested within 3 years, while 81 percent were arrested within 10 years). Further, even for those individuals who do not commit additional crimes, the individuals' lengthy prison sentences and the 10-year presumption will make it difficult for such individuals to obtain relief simply because of the passage of time.

Further, the 10-year presumption applicable to misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence recognizes that not all individuals who commit such offenses demonstrate a long-term propensity to continue engaging in such conduct. The final rule not only establishes a 10-year presumption of disability following the commission of a domestic violence offense but also mandates (at Sec. 107.50(b)(2)) that the 10- year period reflect good conduct without further arrests or law enforcement reports. That means that an individual with a prior misdemeanor domestic violence conviction who has demonstrated a period of post-conviction good conduct but incurs an arrest for a violent offense in year 9 would restart the 10-year clock at that point. This provision should help to address any concerns from commenters that the 10-year period for those with misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence is insufficient to ensure that an applicant is unlikely to pose a danger to public safety and that granting relief is not contrary to the public interest. By

contrast, for commenters concerned that a 10-year period is too lengthy, particularly in instances of minor, isolated conduct, federal law already provides for the removal of firearms disability after 5 years where a minor offense took place in the course of certain relationships.\60\ And even if the offender's minor conduct falls outside the scope of this already existing remedy for any individual applicant, the applicant can still seek to overcome the presumption of ineligibility by pointing to the specific circumstances of his or her case.

\60\ 18 U.S.C. 921(33)(C) (“Provided, That, in the case of a person who has not more than 1 conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence against an individual in a dating relationship, and is not otherwise prohibited under this chapter, the person shall not be disqualified from shipping, transport, possession, receipt, or purchase of a firearm under this chapter if 5 years have elapsed from the later of the judgment of conviction or the completion of the person's custodial or supervisory sentence[.]”).

The 10-year presumption applicable to crimes involving threats of violence likewise recognizes that, although threats of violence are often a precursor to actual violence or are accompanied by it, convictions involving threatening conduct, such as verbal threats, do not always require that the person committing the offense intends to engage in actual violence. Thus, presumptively denying applications from people with this offense history for a period of time will help to ensure that Department resources are directed toward applications with a strong likelihood of success and will mitigate the risk that those with a high propensity of violence will receive firearms rights, while also accounting for the fact that offenders in this category may not pose the same public safety threats as those convicted of physically violent offenses.

As to commenter concerns regarding the blanket five-year presumptive waiting period for all other prior felony convictions, the final rule carefully establishes an appropriate length of time to assess an applicant's adjustment back into society after a disabling conviction. One study cited in the NPRM showed that almost 13 percent of released state prisoners incur their first post-release arrest during the fifth year following their release.\61\ An earlier study identified that over three-quarters, or 76.6 percent, of individuals released from prison had been rearrested within five years of their release.\62\ These studies illustrate that, although five years following a release does not necessarily reflect the peak recidivism risk--which likely occurs earlier than that point--there still remains a substantial risk of reoffending at year five that diminishes in years thereafter. Due to this recidivism risk, the Department concluded that applicants less than five years removed from the completion of their sentences are presumptively likely to pose a danger to public safety and that granting them relief would presumptively be contrary to the public interest.

\61\ Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 24 States in 2008 at 17.

\62\ U.S. Dep't of Just., Bureau of Just. Stats., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010 7 (Apr. 2014), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf.

Moreover, a general five-year waiting period is commensurate with the regulations governing eligibility to petition for pardon after completion of a sentence, see 28 CFR 1.2, and the pardon process is one of the only mechanisms currently in existence that can provide similar relief from a federal firearms disability. The five-year period established in the pardon regulation, which can be waived for good cause, was determined to be an appropriate point at which a person could demonstrate readjustment to society, and the restoration process outlined in this final rule benefits from adopting a similar waiting mechanism.

Comments Received: Commenters opining on mental health were split between those who worried about the public safety implications of restoring rights to individuals who lost firearms rights because of mental health determinations; those who believed that the final rule should contain a sufficient means to restore firearms rights without overly burdening this subset of individuals; and those who sought clarity on how decisions regarding mental health issues would be made. Those commenters primarily worried about public safety suggested provisions that they deemed essential to the final rule, including requiring “an independent psychological evaluation” or requiring evidence that a person has been restored to mental competency. At least one commenter urged the Department to require a mental health certification for all applicants as a public safety measure. Conversely, some commenters worried that the NPRM's requirement that applicants provide records of decisions regarding restoration of mental competency would be too burdensome for applicants from states where no process for such restoration exists; these commenters noted that some long-term mental health conditions are manageable and that the person does not pose a danger after the condition is under control. Instead of the provision described in the proposed rule, these commenters preferred relying solely on the current certification from a mental health professional.

Several commenters also worried about the interaction of state restoration programs with the federal process, asking that the final rule clarify whether an applicant should exhaust available remedies through state ATF-certified relief programs before applying federally. At least one commenter expressed concern that the final rule would require states with ATF-certified relief programs to expend additional funds to meet new certification requirements.

Department Response: The Department appreciates the public comments on this topic. The Department recognizes the importance of balancing the restoration of firearms rights for those who no longer pose a danger to the community with the need to protect the public from individuals who continue to pose an ongoing danger to the community due to their mental health. The final rule provides a sound methodology to achieve this goal.

In response to commenters' concerns, the final rule makes clear that the remedy available through this rule's process is open only to those individuals with current disabilities under 18 U.S.C. 922(g). With respect to mental health disabilities, those individuals who already have received relief from a section 922(g)(4) disability imposed by either a state or territory that has adopted a relief from disability program implemented in compliance with 34 U.S.C. 40915, or from a federal department or agency that has adopted a relief from disability program or other administrative process, are no longer subject to the disability in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4). No one in this position is eligible for, or will need to utilize, the process established in this final rule.

Next, Sec. 107.60(b) of the final rule requires individuals who have available alternate remedies through either a federal agency process or a state restoration process (regardless of whether the state process is certified by ATF) to exhaust that process before pursuing federal relief. This exhaustion requirement directs many people with current section 922(g)(4) disabilities to established and effective resources that may be able to provide them with the relief they are seeking. The alternate processes are well-suited to address the specific needs of these applicants because they are overseen by the same state or other entity that first imposed

the disability. Thus, reliance on already-existing processes should be preferred over the newly established federal process in these instances.

The final rule further establishes at Sec. 107.60(b) presumptive disqualifications for individuals who have exhausted the available state or alternative processes, but who have been denied the requested relief by those entities. The Department expects it would rarely overturn the state or other entity's decision after a full review of the facts before it, but the final rule does not completely foreclose the applicant from raising arguments that would allow the applicant to overcome the presumption.

The Department also notes that limiting applications from individuals with alternative remedies will allow it to focus resources on a smaller pool of applicants seeking relief. This smaller pool will consist primarily of individuals from states where no relief mechanism is available and individuals who are ineligible to obtain relief from the state or entity that imposed the prohibition. The final rule also clarifies the documentation needed from the applicant. Importantly, the final rule does not impose an additional burden on states. The rule relies on processes already in existence without requesting modification, and the rule does not require those states without a process to create one. Also, the rule does not change the certification requirements of the current ATF-certified relief program for mental health prohibitions.

As to commenters' specific concerns regarding public safety, the Department agrees that, for persons without alternative state processes and who are not presumptively disqualified from relief, requiring the applicant to provide an independent mental health evaluation is a prudent measure to protect public safety, and the final rule at Sec. 107.10(g)(5) requests a functionally similar document: a current certification from a licensed mental health professional regarding the potential danger the applicant may pose to public safety.

Finally, as to the concern that requiring documentation of restoration is too burdensome to individual applicants whose states do not have a formal restoration process, the final rule provides two remedies. First, it defines the required documentation as that showing “discharge from commitment, restoration of mental competency, or restoration of rights” (at Sec. 107.10(g)(5)), which is a broad definition that captures a wide range of applicant scenarios. Second, the final rule (at Sec. 107.10(f)) provides the opportunity for an applicant who is unable to obtain such documentation, due to reasons beyond the applicant's control, to submit a sworn statement in its place.

Many comments on the IFR received prior to the release of the NPRM suggested application requirements that have been obviated or superseded by the release of the NPRM. For example, some comments urged the quick release of a complete rule and a mechanism for applying for relief from disabilities. By issuing this final rule, the Department is providing such a mechanism. 1. Proposed Application Procedures

Comments Received: Commenters on the NPRM were broadly supportive of a formal application process and were eager to start the process as soon as possible. The majority of commenters on this topic preferred an online application form that is transparent, streamlined, and readable so that applicants can navigate it without excessive confusion or unnecessary legal costs. For example, one commenter stated: “Please make an online submission process as easy as possible.” Commenters supported various design elements, such as check boxes to enable quick review and fast-tracking of certain cases or status trackers so applicants can monitor progress. Many individual commenters were excited for the initiation of the process, stating “I [would] like to be informed when the application is available,” and “[H]ow do I get the ball rolling with an application?”

Department Response: The Department agrees with commenters who suggested an accessible online portal for applicants to use to submit their applications. The Department anticipates launching a portal following the issuance of this rule, but the final regulations do not include any specific language regarding a web portal, thus allowing for appropriate flexibility in the means of accepting applications. 2. Potential Burden of Application

Comments Received: Many commenters focused on the particular requirements outlined in the NPRM, opining that many of the items required of applicants are too burdensome. For example, one commenter said the proposed rule's “extensive documentation, $20 fee, and lack of expungement eligibility create undue obstacles.” Some commenters suggested that requiring three character references was an undue burden on applicants who are introverted or prefer to protect their privacy, and that such a requirement exceeds the Attorney General's authority under 925(c). At least one commenter suggested that requiring character references to provide the detailed information listed in the affirmations and to submit those references under penalty of perjury would dissuade many individuals from serving as references or prove an insurmountable barrier to many applicants. Some commenters expressed their belief that the complexity of the rule would necessitate the assistance of counsel, leaving individuals who lack the means to hire representation without a remedy, and at least one proposed the establishment of a relief fund to help indigent applicants. Several commenters opined that the required documentation would be duplicative of records already maintained by law enforcement, with one stating that the proposed rule “requires applicants to search for duplicative records . . . even though the Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, and U.S. Probation already maintain this information.” Another commenter expressed a related concern regarding the requirement that court documents be certified, stating, “DOJ should lift its certification requirement for those documents the federal government already maintains virtually, and to which DOJ already has access via its own PACER system.”

Department Response: The Department disagrees with those comments stating that the documentation requirements are unduly burdensome. To meet its statutory obligation to safeguard the public and make decisions consistent with the public interest in this process, the Department must ensure that its restoration decisions are based on accurate and sufficient evidence. All of the information requested from the applicant in the final rule is closely related to achieving this goal. Section 925(c) requires the Attorney General to review “the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant's record and reputation” in making his determinations. 18 U.S.C. 925(c). The statute thus requires a broad inquiry into the person's character and circumstances, and it is accordingly well within the authority of section 925(c) to require documentation of a person's prior disabling offenses or any other offenses demonstrating dangerousness and unlawful conduct; the circumstances surrounding the disability; the person's current status, propensity for violence, mental state, current or potential substance abuse,

and other criminal conduct; and other requested information.

Similarly, the collection of character references is an effective and appropriate means of assessing the applicant's record and reputation. The burden of identifying and persuading individuals to serve as references mirrors the requirements of a pardon application, one of the few other means of restoring an individual's federal firearms rights. In that context, the Department has viewed character references as a useful and effective means of assessing a person's adjustment following a return to the community after a conviction and the threat, if any, that individual poses to the community. For similar reasons, character references will prove to be an important part of the present process, and the Department has concluded that any burden associated with requiring such references is outweighed by the highly probative information those references can provide.

Next, although some commenters opined that the Department already has some or all of the potential applicant's relevant information in its possession, or can access the information more easily through other methods, this belief is incorrect regarding much of the information that is needed for the investigation. Although the Department may have access to certain federal records, many of the records needed for the restoration process are held by state, local, or tribal governments or authorities; other federal agencies or the federal courts; or foreign governments. The Department cannot necessarily access or easily obtain those records. Although the Department may have access to some small portion of records, efficient administration of this process will be better achieved if the Department collects this information from all applicants uniformly.

The Department must collect this information for the purposes of this process. The proposed collection conforms to the applicable law regarding information collection under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. chapter 35, and the Department intends to use the information received only for its allowable purposes.

In response to the comment regarding the burden of records certification, the Department appreciates the difficulty of obtaining certification of every single record required under the rule and acknowledges that not all localities may provide a certification option to the public. In recognition of this fact, the Department has amended the proposed rule; thus, the final rule at Sec. 107.10(d) now allows for submission of digital copies of both certified documents and true copies of uncertified documents as provided by the court or other government entity or official to the applicant. Further, the Department provides the opportunity at Sec. 107.10(f) for an applicant who is unable to obtain the required documentation--e.g., documentation that has been destroyed or lost through no fault of the applicant or other similarly compelling reasons--to submit a sworn statement to that effect and continue the application. The Department expects these flexibilities to alleviate the burden identified by commenters. 3. Fingerprints

Comments Received: Commenters on this subject were split between those who supported the collection of fingerprints and those who believed that requiring fingerprints places an unreasonable burden on applicants. Those in favor of collecting fingerprints noted the usefulness of fingerprints for uncovering crimes an applicant may have committed, assessing risk, and protecting public safety. One commenter stated that, without fingerprinting, the Department would be incapable of truly determining whether an applicant poses a threat to public safety.

Those commenters opposing the collection of fingerprints described this requirement as an expensive, redundant, and burdensome barrier for those convicted of non-violent offenses to restore their Second Amendment rights: “Having to get certified copies of court documents, background checks, fingerprints and all the other stuff is too much of a process and too expensive.” Other commenters wrote that fingerprints should be required only for those individuals convicted of violent crimes. Individual commenters also incorrectly assumed that law enforcement agencies already had fingerprints on file for all people with prior convictions and reasoned that asking applicants to provide duplicate copies was onerous and unnecessary.

Department Response: The Department appreciates all commenters' concerns. The Department's primary consideration in this process is to ensure that all its restoration decisions are aligned with the obligation to protect public safety and to act in the public interest. The collection of fingerprints is an important part of this review, as fingerprints offer one of the few reliable means of establishing the correct identity of an applicant, avoiding confusion between applicants with similar names and personally identifying information, and ensuring a complete review of an applicant's criminal history that is known to the FBI. Employing these precautions before firearms rights are restored is consistent with public safety.

Further, the requirement to obtain fingerprints is no more stringent than the requirements of other federal firearms-related processes, such as the FBI's NICS Voluntary Appeal File (“VAF”), which collects fingerprints from individuals who have been denied in a NICS background check because their descriptive information matches a record that prohibits firearm possession or use.\63\ The VAF collects fingerprints to avoid the recurrence of a previous erroneous match.\64\ In addition, although ATF recently proposed eliminating the up-front fingerprint requirement for National Firearms Act (“NFA”) responsible persons applicants (who only are rarely denied pursuant to a NICS check),\65\ ATF did not propose to stop collecting fingerprints from GCA applicants because NICS denials occur when their descriptive information matches a record that prohibits firearm possession or use. ATF would still collect fingerprints from NFA applicants if there is a problem with their NICS checks. As with the VAF, ATF collects these fingerprints to avoid the recurrence of an erroneous match, thus demonstrating the utility of collecting fingerprints. Here, the Department has a strong interest in ensuring accurate identity matches at the beginning of the application process. Especially because the entire applicant pool is known to be prohibited from possessing or otherwise handling firearms, mistakes in identification that occur during this process could result in decisions based on erroneous information. Requiring

submission of fingerprints helps to reduce this risk. Further, the Department is unaware of any widespread complaints that requiring the submission of fingerprints in connection with existing Department processes makes the completion of the relevant forms unduly burdensome.

\63\ FBI, How We Can Help You: Challenges/Appeals, https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/more-fbi-services-and-information/nics/requesting-reason-for-andor-challenging-a-nics-related-denial (last visited July 4, 2026). NICS background checks compare name and descriptive biographical information of an individual seeking to own firearms to the descriptive information in the records accessed by the NICS Indices. Individuals who have been denied have been found to be a descriptive match to a record that shows a firearms prohibitor exists. Erroneous matches are a possibility, but the submission of fingerprints helps reduce the risk of such matches. See id. (“It is possible your name, date of birth, or other descriptors closely match someone else with a prohibiting record or other prohibiting information. If you believe your NICS background check was erroneously denied for this reason, you may want to provide your fingerprints for comparison.”).

\64\ See, e.g., FBI, 2025 Operational Report (2025), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/2025-nics-operational-report.pdf/view. In 2025, the FBI identified that nearly 27 percent of challenges made in the VAF process were overturned, with the primary reason being a fingerprint comparison resolved an erroneous identity match. Id. at 12.

\65\ Id. at 15.

Comments Received: Commenters focusing on Chief Law Enforcement Officer (“CLEO”) notification were either strongly in favor or strongly opposed. Those in favor opined that notification could “facilitate access to the facts and records related to” a conviction giving rise to a firearms disability that would otherwise be unknown. Other commenters suggested additional appropriate notifications be mandated as well, including notification to law enforcement in prior localities where the applicant resided or had been arrested, to prosecutors or victims of an underlying disabling offense, to parole or probation officers who had supervised the applicant, or to individuals who sought a restraining order against the applicant. In their joint letter, the 16 states' attorneys general opined that the definition of chief law enforcement officer was vague and recommended notification be made to “the state Attorney General, the local Police Chief, and the county Sheriff” to ensure an authority with knowledge of the applicant's conduct would be notified. Several commenters focused specifically on applicants with prior domestic violence offenses, opining that a notification to law enforcement “is an insufficient proxy for the [notification of the] victim of domestic violence.” At least one of these commenters encouraged the Department to offer “victims of domestic violence the opportunity to share their experiences and feedback about the impact of firearm restoration on their safety.” This commenter recognized the “challenging” logistics of victim notification, including the mobility of Americans, but recommended collaboration with state victim notification systems to achieve greater success in notifying victims.

Those who opposed notifications to the CLEO opined that notification may have a “chilling effect” for applicants or allow “arbitrary vetoes” to upset a person's otherwise strong application. Others opined on the potential bias of local enforcement, with some preference expressed for neutral, federal arbiters.

Department Response: The Department appreciates the varied views on this topic. The final rule removes the obligation of the applicant to notify the CLEO in the applicant's jurisdiction. Instead, the Department itself intends to notify these officers. Notably, the Department is currently obligated to issue similar notifications to state, local, or tribal law enforcement entities within 24 hours after a prohibited person attempts to purchase a firearm but is denied by the NICS.\66\ The Department intends to utilize these existing notification channels to send such notices to the CLEO in the ZIP Code where the applicant currently resides. The final rule, however, does not outline the specific method of notification so as to retain maximum flexibility and efficiency in the notification process.

\66\ Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, Public Law 117-103, sec. 1101, 136 Stat. 49, 919-20 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 925B).

Like the process envisioned by the NPRM, the final rule allows for the possibility of, but does not mandate, input from CLEOs on the appropriateness of restoration for the applicant. This approach should help to avoid any concern that the CLEOs are given a “veto” of an otherwise strong candidate for restoration.

Regarding public comments that additional authorities should be notified of an individual's application, the Department intends to adopt the same notification requirements that the FBI must follow when persons seek, but are denied, a firearms purchase. The Department has determined that this notice, which has been sufficient to inform law enforcement about the attempt of a person under disability to purchase a firearm, is likewise sufficient to ensure that the authorities who are likely to have the best knowledge about an applicant's conduct in the years preceding the application are the ones who are notified. Also, beyond notification, the application process provides a mechanism for the notified law enforcement personnel to submit comments to the Department on the suitability and appropriateness of firearms restoration, adding important information to the material the Attorney General may review before deciding on an application.

Next, regarding the concern that notification to the CLEO is an insufficient substitute for notification to victims who may wish to comment on the application, the Department notes that this final rule outlines only the notifications mandated by the rule; it does not bar other types of notifications from being made, which could include collaboration with state victim notification systems if appropriate. The final rule creates a floor of notification in every case, rather than a ceiling. Nothing in the final rule would prevent the Attorney General from seeking and reviewing input from a victim should he require that information in any particular case. Mandating victim input in every case where a victim is present (or even in a smaller subcategory, such as cases involving domestic violence offenses) would be logistically infeasible because victims--unlike CLEOs--do not necessarily have public contact information readily available to facilitate the notification. Also, in many cases, comments from victims would not be material to the Attorney General's review of an application--for instance, where the rest of the information in the application makes clear the application should be denied. Soliciting victim input for all applications could thus unnecessarily require victims to revisit the traumatic experiences associated with the applicant's disqualifying offense. Finally, the Department is mindful that a mandatory solicitation of input from victims, and particularly domestic violence victims, could result in inappropriate coercion or retaliation should the victim not be supportive of the applicant's request. Accordingly, the final rule suitably balances the appropriateness of victim input in certain cases with the logistical and other difficulties of seeking that input in all cases, including those in which such input may not be necessary. 5. Locality Arrest Records and Court Documents

Comments Received: Commenters noted the burden of submitting locality arrest records and records of dated convictions, citing paperwork destruction schedules, potential burdens on courts and other state agencies, and the difficulty of recalling all localities in which an arrest may have occurred. Some also noted the expense of obtaining such records. Multiple commenters restated the incorrect conclusion that this requirement is entirely duplicative of information already accessible by the Department. At least one commenter noted the difficulty of satisfying the proposed rule's requirements for individuals in the military, who may have been stationed in many locations. Finally, at least one commenter suggested there was ambiguity in the term “resided,” which the final rule should clarify.

Department Response: The Department appreciates the concerns of commenters who argued that the provision of state or locality arrest records would be expensive, time-

consuming, and unnecessary. The Department, however, disagrees that these burdens are unnecessary or that they outweigh the associated benefits. The Department's obligation to ensure public safety and act in the public interest demands that the Department collect and evaluate these records from applicants. First, the Department has confirmed that statewide criminal checks (the state equivalent of a local arrest record) are available from state officials in all states; thus, individuals in all states can obtain records of their own arrests by applying to obtain such information from a state agency. This should address many burden concerns associated with the need for applicants to request and collect criminal checks in multiple jurisdictions because an applicant will be able to quickly collect information from across different states. In the rare circumstance that an individual is unable to obtain a statewide report, the final rule allows for the submission of local reports.

Second, review of an applicant's criminal record is critical to assessing an applicant's likelihood to act in a manner dangerous to public safety. The Department does not have automatic access to all state or local arrest records. States and localities are not required, and do not uniformly volunteer, to report all criminal conduct that occurs within their jurisdiction to the federal government. As such, the Department has access only to information reported by federal entities or voluntarily reported by states and localities. Without the requirement that applicants provide records from state or local criminal checks, the Department's understanding of a person's criminal history would be incomplete.

Further, the Department has identified a need to collect materials on foreign convictions, foreign mental health adjudications, and unfavorable discharges from foreign military service. Such documentation will allow the Attorney General to reach well-informed decisions on restoration applications with the most probative available information. Thus, to facilitate the Attorney General's decision, the final rule at Sec. 107.10(e) & (g)(12) requires documentation regarding foreign conduct, as well as a translation of such documentation, as appropriate. To ensure that the Attorney General has sufficient information to reach the reasoned and informed decisions required by the GCA, while also balancing the burden on the applicant, the Department will collect and review such information as one facet of the application review.

Finally, with respect to potential burdens on state and local agencies, the Department notes that no state or local government entities submitted comments indicating that the document requirements outlined in this rule would place undue burdens on them. Instead, concerns about burdens on these agencies came from individual commenters who were speculating on potential burdens. Because no state or local government entities expressed a concern about undue burdens, the Department does not believe that any changes to the rule on that basis are warranted. 6. Additional or Alternative Procedures

Comments Received: Some commenters also proposed additional or alternative procedures for the application process. Many commenters urged the Department to include a timeline for issuance of decisions in the final rule to avoid “unnecessary” delays. Proposals included 30-, 60-, or 180-day timelines. Others urged an internal appellate process. Some, including the 16 states' attorneys general who submitted a joint letter, suggested providing more information regarding the backgrounds of the persons who will be adjudicating the decisions in these cases. This same group proposed that every decision reached by the Department be accompanied by an opinion that summarizes (1) the information reviewed; (2) the applicant's disability; and (3) and the applicant's criminal history and rehabilitation, while also recommending that the materials utilized in the review be broadly disclosed in response to appropriate Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests. One individual suggested that applicants attend firearms training courses, that the Department provide ongoing public commentary on disqualifying offenses, and that the application mandate community service before restoration is granted. Some commenters opined that a neutral review panel should arbitrate each application. Multiple commenters opined on the potential use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) to issue decisions, either in denying or granting relief, and asked the Department to ensure that any use of AI be accompanied by human review. Finally, at least one commenter requested regular reporting on decisions based on various aggregated metrics like region, type of offense, and average processing times, while also ensuring security and privacy for the individual applicant.

Department Response: Regarding the additional or alternative procedures proposed, the Department notes that many of the suggestions already align with the Department's intended internal processes. However, the Department believes that not all internal processes need to be memorialized in a federal regulation. Because this rule's version of the section 925(c) program is new, the Department anticipates that internal procedures and best practices will evolve as the Department considers efficiency, resource-allocation, and the types and frequency of factors that arise in applicants' requests. Rendering every process immutable absent a change in the governing regulations would unnecessarily prevent the Department from implementing process changes that will better serve the public going forward. To preserve an appropriate degree of flexibility in the Department's internal procedures, the Department declines to include rigid, extra-statutory processes (such as fixed timelines or specific data reporting requirements) in the final rule. As required by statute, the Department affirms that the guiding principle of this process will be the Attorney General's duty to determine that any applicant granted relief is not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that granting of relief will not be contrary to the public interest.

Nevertheless, the Department will address common suggestions from the public on this topic. The Department disagrees with commenters who suggested that an administrative appellate process is necessary. Section 925(c) explicitly includes a judicial remedy for anyone who is denied relief: “Any person whose application for relief from disabilities is denied by the Attorney General may file a petition with the United States district court for the district in which he resides for a judicial review of such denial.” The judicial process provides an adequate remedy for anyone whose application is denied, and the addition of an internal layer of appellate review would only complicate and slow an already complex administrative process.

The Department also declines to commit itself to particular timeframes for the issuance of decisions. The comments on this topic suggested that the Department may artificially delay decisions for “unnecessary” reasons. Decision times on individual applications will naturally vary significantly based on the complexity of the facts of the case; the availability of information; the completeness of an application and the responsiveness of an applicant to supplemental requests for information; the responsiveness of partner government entities; and the

volume of applications received. Many of these factors are outside of the Department's control. Also, it is to be expected that timeframes during the initial launch of the application may be somewhat lengthier. Setting a timeline for decisions at this stage would be premature and speculative.

Although the Department agrees with the 16 states' attorneys general that some written explanation regarding the basis for each decision should be issued, it disagrees with the level of specificity envisioned by that group. To properly apprise the applicant of the basis of the decision and to establish sufficient judicial record for any potential challenges, the Department will issue letters of decision in every case in which the application has been fully completed; the application has been accepted for review; and the Attorney General has rendered a decision. Inevitably, though, those letters will vary in detail and degree based on the nature of the decision. Practice and practicality demand the production of these letters of decision in cases subject to litigation, and the Department does not, at this time, find it prudent to include language in the regulation that may limit its discretion to vary the form or substance of such letters as appropriate. The Department also will follow any FOIA obligations it has regarding these records.

As to the comment the 16 states' attorneys general made regarding the publication of the backgrounds or identities of those persons tasked with assisting the Attorney General to decide applications, the Department will comply with any FOIA obligations it may have in the future regarding records of these individuals. Also, although the Attorney General will naturally require assistance in deciding on applications, any decision will ultimately reflect the opinion of the Attorney General himself. See Sec. 107.10(b) (describing the information “the Attorney General” will consider when evaluating an application). Properly appointed inferior officers within the Department may be delegated all tasks associated with the execution of the process outlined in this final rule, but nothing in such a delegation would deprive the Attorney General of his authority to oversee the process and make the final decision on any individual application.

The Department also disagrees with the commenter who suggested that applicants complete mandatory firearm training or community service prior to restoration of firearms rights. The Department reiterates that the guiding principles of the Attorney General's decision-making in this process are the statutory considerations outlined in section 925(c): whether an applicant poses a danger to public safety and whether restoration would be contrary to the public interest. It is the Department's view that training or community service requirements do not speak to those principles directly enough to warrant imposing such requirements. Said otherwise, a person may be able to demonstrate that handling firearms would not endanger the public or be contrary to the public interest even without completing a formal firearms safety course or community service project; imposing such a requirement on all applicants would thus sweep more broadly than what section 925(c) requires. Focusing on the statutory standard will enable the Department to restore individual firearms rights to applicants who satisfy the criteria set by Congress.

Regarding commenters' request that the Department publicize statistical data regarding this program, the Department may publish anonymized, aggregated data regarding applications and its decisions. However, the Department declines at this stage to commit to any particular data sets or queries to allow for flexibility as it assesses what information best facilitates transparency without creating undue administrative burdens.

Finally, the Department appreciates the many comments regarding the use of AI in this process. Consistent with the Department's obligation to ensure individual review of each application, the Department intends to utilize AI in a low-impact manner and to abide by the requirements outlined by the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) and the Administration.\67\ The use of AI will assist the Department in intake, prioritization, or other preliminary matters, and the Department will abide by OMB's requirements for use of AI in the review of any application. The use of AI will be accompanied by human review.

\67\ Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, OMB Memorandum M-25-21, Accelerating Federal Use of AI through Innovation, Governance, and Public Trust (Apr. 3, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/M-25-21-Accelerating-Federal-Use-of-AI-through-Innovation-Governance-and-Public-Trust.pdf.

Comments Received: Commenters who focused on the rule's impact on firearms licensees asked for small adjustments to the rule to achieve what they viewed as possible improvements for public safety. One group noted that the NPRM identified the Attorney General as the person making decisions on firearms operation renewal licenses, including those filed by a licensee during the pendency of a removal of disabilities application, and asked that the power to deny these renewal applications remain with ATF. Another commenter opined that, because there are no time limits for decisions on restoration applications, allowing firearms licensees to maintain operations during the pendency of a restoration application could result in effectively perpetual grace periods for operation. Finally, the 16 states' attorneys general asked that the final rule make clear that the restoration of firearms rights does not automatically include the right to become a firearms licensee or manufacturer, and that any applications to become a licensee or manufacturer will be scrutinized for risks to public safety.

Department Response: The Department agrees that decisions on federal firearms renewals for licensees should remain with ATF and has amended the final rule at Sec. 107.30(b)(4) to clarify as much. Also, the Department is cognizant of commenters' concern regarding licensees' business operations during the pendency of a relief application but notes that the plain language of section 925(c) demands such a grace period, requiring that a licensee “who makes application for relief from the disabilities incurred under this chapter, shall not be barred by such disability from further operations under his license pending final” decision on his application. The statute does not provide a timeframe for decisions in these cases, nor does it impose a requirement that the Department expedite its process in these cases. Consistent with the statute, and for the reasons stated above, the Department continues to decline to commit itself to timeframes for decisions. Nevertheless, the Department does intend to collect information regarding whether an applicant is a firearms licensee on the application itself, allowing it to identify licensee applications at the initial stages of the process, and to provide ATF with notice of the application as soon as practicable. These strategies of early identification and notice should help inform the Department's decisions regarding the resource allocation most suitable for safeguarding public safety. Finally, the Department agrees with the 16 states' attorneys general that a restoration of federal firearms rights does not automatically entitle the recipient to a license. Individuals or entities seeking

to become a firearms licensee will continue to apply to ATF for adjudication of their applications. 2. Expungements

Comments Received: Most of the commenters who discussed expungements or orders setting aside a conviction focused on their personal experiences or difficulties with the state restoration process. However, some commenters encouraged the Department to accept state expungements, pardons, or certificates of rehabilitation as evidence supporting a presumptive or automatic restoration of federal firearms rights. Other commenters asked that applicants be required to share with the Department the outcome of any similar or related state restoration of disability process as evidence relevant to the Department's adjudications. Finally, some commenters opined on the difficulty of obtaining records related to convictions that have been expunged, sealed, or set aside.

Department Response: The Department intends to ask for information regarding previous convictions that have been expunged or set aside; pardons; restorations of rights; and certificates of rehabilitation in the application for relief and may request additional information on this topic from an applicant if the information is deemed helpful to the investigation of the application. The information provided by the applicant will be considered by the Attorney General in his assessment of the appropriateness of restoration. If a document containing the information is unavailable, the final rule at Sec. 107.10(f) provides an opportunity for the applicant to submit a sworn statement in place of the required document. 3. Revocation

Comments Received: Commenters opining on the Attorney General's ability to revoke previously restored federal firearms rights were split between those who thought revocation was a sensible precaution and those who believed doing so would exceed the statutory authority granted by section 925(c) or that the power could be abused by future Attorneys General, particularly if there is no relief mechanism to challenge the revocation. Those who supported a revocation mechanism emphasized the importance of revoking firearms rights restoration for individuals who commit new offenses, become subject to a protective order, or engage in fraud in the restoration process. Another commenter proposed that the Department adopt a revocation provision like North Carolina's, which permits revocation solely for new offenses and prevents any subsequent restoration.

Regarding potential abuses, commenters expressed concern that people could be wrongfully indicted in order to effectuate revocations. Other commenters asked the Department to address potentially fraudulent activity by applicants through perjury prosecutions rather than revocation. At least one commenter posited that “a future anti- firearms administration [could] engage in wholesale revocations of relief from recipients.”

Department Response: The Department appreciates the public's comments on the topic of revocation. The final rule at Sec. 107.80 now mandates the voiding of a federal firearms restoration if it is found that the applicant “willfully subscribed as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true or willfully omitted any material requested information.” In contrast to some commenters' fears, this provision does not give a future administration the ability to implement widespread revocation of firearms rights; instead, it is a narrowly tailored remedy that supports the Attorney General's substantial interest in ensuring accuracy, completeness, and candor in the application process. The Department also disagrees that the power to void a restoration based on fraud exceeds the Attorney General's authority under section 925(c). Courts have found that Congress's grant of power to decide the outcome of applications in the first instance necessarily includes the power to reconsider those decisions, recognizing that for executive agencies, “[t]he power to reconsider is inherent in the power to decide.” \68\

\68\ Albertson v. FCC, 182 F.2d 397, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1950); see also, e.g., Macktal, 286 F.3d at 825-26; Belville Mining Co. v. United States, 999 F.2d 989, 998 (6th Cir. 1993).

The Department need not expand this fraud-based revocation provision to include revocation based on new criminal offenses or disabling conduct, such as a new conviction or a new protective order against an individual. This is because the new offense or other conduct would be an independent basis for disability that would prevent firearm possession from that point forward. Revocation in that instance would be superfluous.

Comments Received: A few commenters focused on the economic impact of the rule. They noted the rule's requirements may burden state or federal record-keeping agencies without providing for a committed revenue stream to help offset some of the cost burden. These commenters maintained that the Department should withdraw the rule to perform a full cost analysis on the burden to localities under the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act (“UMRA”) and to check for “RFA Non-Compliance.” (Presumably, the commenter was referring to the Regulatory Flexibility Act.) Others expressed concern that the reliance on user fees, without other dedicated revenue streams, will create “operational instability,” and they asked the Department to request funding from Congress for the application process. Some commenters also drew attention to the Department's estimation of both the amount of money required to fund this process in the first year ($20 million) and the number of potential applicants projected in the first year (1 million). These commenters went on to state that, if these projections were accurate, the staffing levels identified by the Department would be insufficient to investigate all submitted applications.

Department Response: The Department's conclusion regarding the final rule's impact on states and localities under the UMRA is unchanged from the conclusion offered in the proposed rule's preamble. Despite some commenters' concern that this process will require significant investment from states or localities, the Department maintains that it will not. Although the final rule requires interaction with states and localities, the burden of obtaining paperwork from these locations is on the applicant, and the locality may charge the applicant a fee to cover the cost of providing the materials requested. Further, the requirement to provide arrest records and court documents is a long-established feature of numerous other processes currently in effect, such as those undergone by job applicants, those seeking expungement of convictions, those applying for grants, those seeking pardons, those seeking firearm approval under the NFA, and myriad others. None of the final rule's document requirements is unique or novel, nor do they require additional investment or expenditure by states or localities.

Similarly, the requirement for CLEO notification does not burden states or localities in violation of the UMRA. First, this notification process is similar to notification requirements used by ATF. For example, ATF notifies CLEOs in its non-over-the-counter (“NOTC”) sales process, addressing sales in which a federal firearms licensee sells a

firearm to a person who does not appear in person at the licensee's place of business.\69\ In those notifications, a licensee will provide the CLEO with a sworn statement from the transferee of a firearm and a description of the firearm to be transferred, and allow seven days for a response before completing the transaction.\70\ Second, the final rule provides that the Department will notify the CLEO of the fact of application, but, importantly, the CLEO is not required to respond. Thus, this notification will consume only those resources the state or locality voluntarily chooses to expend on its response.

\69\ Revising Non-Over-the-Counter Firearms Transaction Requirements, 91 FR 25216, 25217 n.3, (May 8, 2026).

\70\ Although ATF recently proposed removing the CLEO notification from other processes, such as its NFA application process, see Removing CLEO Notification Under the National Firearms Act, 91 FR 24471 (May 6, 2026), the basis for that removal is unrelated to any concerns that the requirements are inconsistent with the UMRA, and, indeed, ATF previously determined that the NFA CLEO requirements do not violate the UMRA. See Machineguns, Destructive Devices and Certain Other Firearms; Background Checks for Responsible Persons of a Trust or Legal Entity With Respect To Making or Transferring a Firearm, 81 FR 2658, 2695-95 (Jan. 15, 2016) (explaining why the notification requirements did not create an unfunded mandate under the UMRA).

Comments Received: A few individuals suggested that the proposed fee was too low and that a higher fee (proposed values ranged from $100 to $300) would be appropriate. Conversely, at least one organization dedicated to defending individual gun rights argued that because the GCA specified statutory fees for other processes, the lack of such a provision in section 925(c) forecloses the imposition of a fee here. Instead, this group encouraged the Department to establish a legal aid fund to support indigent individuals seeking this relief.

At least one commenter criticized the Department's estimate in the NPRM that 1 million applications for relief within the first year of the program as unreasonable, asserting that no more than 100,000 people would apply.

Department Response: The final rule refines the fee estimates and the estimate of the number of likely applications underlying the fee structure proposed in the NPRM, as explained in the next section. The Department also acknowledges the concern regarding its legal authority to charge fees in relation to this application but disagrees that it lacks legal authority to do so. Its decision to collect fees is authorized by 31 U.S.C. 9701, which provides that the “head of each agency . . . may prescribe regulations establishing the charge for a service or thing of value provided by the agency,” so long as those fees are “fair” and are based on the costs to the government, the value of the service to the recipient, the relation to public interest, and other pertinent considerations. In issuing this final rule, the Department has chosen a fee amount that satisfies these statutory obligations.

The Department also recognizes that some commenters have expressed concerns about appropriate staffing levels to address the anticipated influx of cases. The Department recognizes that the projected estimate for incoming cases is significant. It has accordingly requested additional personnel in its upcoming fiscal year budget, is pursuing the acquisition and development of sophisticated case-management software to improve process efficiency, and is leveraging intra- Departmental resources to maximize existing infrastructures and protocols.

This rule requires individuals seeking restoration of their federal firearms rights to submit documentation to the Department to ensure that restoration of firearms rights to that individual is aligned with public safety and is not contrary to the public interest. As demonstrated by the public comments on the NPRM, the Department anticipates significant interest in this process. Predicting the likely number of applicants, however, is difficult for several reasons. First, although a process for reviewing section 925(c) applications was previously in existence, that prior process has been defunct for over 30 years. Any estimates of numbers derived from that process would have little predictive value for the current anticipated process. Second, as of May 31, 2026, there were over 31 million active NICS Indices identifying records showing a federal prohibitor.\71\ This number far exceeds relevant populations for analogous state restoration processes, so those processes are not an ideal analog from which to extrapolate how the restoration process in this final rule will operate.

\71\ FBI, Active Entries in the NICS Indices (May 31, 2026), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/cjis/active_records_in_the_nics-indices.pdf/view (identifying over 34.7 million entries in the NICS system). Please note that approximately 3 million records cited in the NICS Indices are cited as being state prohibitors. Because there may be overlap between prohibitor categories, and because people can have multiple prohibitors, it is impossible to determine precisely how many people are prohibited.

In the NPRM, the Department estimated that 1 million individuals would apply for relief based on a rough approximation of the number of NFA applications received by ATF in the course of a year.\72\ The Department chose this comparison due to the similar subject matter, even though the processes are not directly analogous. Public comments questioned this estimation, and, in response, the Department is modifying its approach as described below. The Department now estimates a total cost of approximately $74.30 million annually for individuals to review the rule and to gather, procure, and submit information to the Department; and for the Department to review the applications it receives. (This figure consists of approximately $59.8 million in costs for individuals and $14.5 million in costs for the Department.) The rule has public safety benefits in that the rule will enable the Department to ensure that applicants receive firearm restoration only if restoration would not be dangerous to public safety or contrary to the public interest.

\72\ ATF, Firearms Commerce in the United States: Statistical Update 2024 9 (2024), https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/docs/report/2024firearmscommercereportpdf/download (providing yearly applications processed).

The Department estimated the cost of ensuring that the Attorney General will grant relief consistent with his statutory obligations by: (1) estimating the time and other resources that applicants would expend to complete paperwork, obtain fingerprints, and send this information to the Department; and (2) estimating the time and other resources that the Department would expend to process, review, and investigate applications. To start, the Department estimated the cost of the time for individuals to complete these tasks using employee compensation data for June 2025 as determined by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”). See BLS, Employer Costs for Employee Compensation--June 2025 (Sept. 12, 2025), https://

www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_09122025.pdf. The BLS determined that hourly compensation (which includes wages, salaries, and benefits) is $48.05 for civilian workers and $63.94 for state and local government workers.

Although the Department believes that any estimate of the likely number of applicants will be somewhat speculative, the Department is now electing to use data from calendar year 2024 (“CY2024”) regarding the number of denials issued by the NICS Section for firearm disqualification to estimate the potential number of applications it will receive in the first year.\73\ This data is relevant because it involves a similar pool of individuals, i.e., persons who are prohibited from owning firearms but who have made attempt to purchase one; presumably, this group of people will overlap somewhat with the applicant pool for the federal restoration process.

\73\ FBI, 2024 Operational Report iii (2024), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/2024-nics-operational-report.pdf/view.

In CY2024, approximately 1.1 percent of checks processed by the NICS Section, or 110,505 checks, were denied.\74\ In the preceding two years, similar percentages of persons were denied.\75\ The Department has concluded that the section 925(c) applicant pool in the first year may be similar in size to the pool of denials issued by the NICS Section in the past three years. Accounting for data from three years of NICS checks (rather than a single year) helps account for the pent- up demand for federal firearms rights restoration that likely exists as a result of the Department not having a functioning restoration process for quite some time. Using three years of data, and extrapolating from CY2024 numbers, the applicant pool in the first year would be 331,515 applicants. Although the Department cannot predict with certainty how many applications it may receive, given the long defunct status of the prior process and the number of persons who were disabled but sought to purchase a firearm in the last three years, 330,000 is not an unreasonable estimate for the first year of the program.

\74\ Id. The NICS Section processed over 9.2 million checks in CY2024 and denied 110,505. This tally includes only checks performed by the NICS Section and does not include checks performed by state users of the NICS or checks that were overturned on appeal under the Firearm-Related Challenges (appeal) process. See FBI, How We Can Help You, https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/more-fbi-services-and-information/nics/voluntary-appeal-file (last visited July 4, 2026).

\75\ See FBI, 2023 Operational Report iii (2023), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/cjis/2023-nics-operational-report.pdf/view (reporting denial of approximately 1 percent of checks); FBI, 2022 Operational Report 20-21 (2022), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/cjis/nics-2022-operations-report.pdf/view (reporting denial of approximately 1.2 percent of checks).

Next, the Department identified the cost of complying with the final rule's requirements by estimating the cost of undertaking each of the steps necessary to complete an application. Under this final rule, an individual is required to complete the following steps before an application can be considered: (1) complete and submit the application form; (2) submit fingerprints; (3) gather and submit required documentation; and (4) solicit three character references, who must submit references on the applicant's behalf. 2. Cost to Individuals of Applying for Relief From Disability a. Time Cost of Completing an Application

The final rule requires individuals to complete and submit to the Department an application form, fingerprints, documentation of the disability and arrest records, and three references. The information requested is necessary to evaluate whether restoration of firearms rights to the individuals would be contrary to the public interest or raise public safety concerns. The Department estimated the time for familiarization and review of the rule to be 15 minutes and the time for each applicant to complete the application to be 30 minutes, exclusive of the costs of document collection and fingerprinting, assessed separately below.\76\ Based on an estimate of 330,000 applicants, the estimated time cost for applicants to familiarize themselves with the rule and complete the form is $11,892,375 (45 minutes at $48.05 per hour/60 x 330,000).

\76\ Due to the variety and types of documentation an applicant may submit, the different disabling predicates from which an applicant could be seeking relief, and other factors involved in the analysis, costs will vary from applicant to applicant; the Department based its calculations in this rule on a representative applicant with one prior disabling conviction and one locality arrest record.

In response to comments that the proposed $20 application fee is too low, and after considering the factors specified in 31 U.S.C. 9701(b), the Department has adjusted the fee to $30 to assist in funding the restoration process. The $30 fee will help supplement current and future budgetary requests from the Department office operating this process. The precise operating costs of the program cannot be calculated with certainty beforehand, given that an operative program has been defunct for over 30 years. Accordingly, within two years of the program's full operation, the Department will audit operational costs to support a more precise fee calculation. In the interim, the Department is collecting a $30 application fee to appropriately balance the need for an accessible program widely available to the public with the Department's interest in having operational costs of the program supported by fee collection. The estimated cost of the fee to the applicant pool will therefore be $9,990,000 ($30 x 330,000 applicants). This $9,990,000 fee collection is estimated to be approximately 65 to 70 percent of the $14,510,100 cost to the Department for initial processing of these applications (as identified in the “Cost to the Department” section of this analysis, below) and will be supplemented by the internal realignment of existing Department appropriations to support the 925(c) application process. c. Cost of Fingerprints

The cost of procuring fingerprints through the U.S. Postal Service (as will be required initially in the section 925(c) process), is $50.\77\ Further, the estimated time needed to obtain the fingerprints is 10 minutes.\78\ Based on an estimate of 330,000 individuals, the current estimated monetary cost is $19,142,750 ((Monetary Fingerprint Costs: $50 x 330,000 = $16,500,000) + (Time Cost of Fingerprints = 10 minutes at $48.05/hour/60 x 330,000 = $2,642,750)).

\77\ U.S. Postal Serv., USPS Fingerprinting Services Registration, https://ips.usps.com/IdentityCapture (last visited July 4, 2026). Although the U.S. Postal Service does not currently offer this service in every USPS location, services are available in every state. The Department will accept fingerprints submitted exclusively through the U.S. Postal Service when first implementing this final rule.

\78\ This estimate aligns with recent estimates of the FBI on use of similar fingerprint collections. See Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed eCollection eComments requested; Title--Friction Ridge Cards: Arrest and Institution FD-249; Applicant FD-258; Identity History Summary Request FD-1164; FBI Standard Palm Print FD-884; Supplemental Finger and Palm Print FD- 8884a; Voluntary Appeal File Fingerprint FD-1212; Firearm-Related Challenge Fingerprint FD-1211; Restoration of Federal Firearm Rights Fingerprint FD-1222, 90 FR 52703, 52704 (Nov. 21, 2025).

Individuals applying for relief from disability must provide to the Department documentation on the nature of the disability or disabilities the person is currently under. Those documents may include court records, records from state or federal agencies,

arrest records, certifications from licensed mental health professionals, and military records. The type of records an individual applicant provides will vary, and the Department acknowledges that the individual cost for some applicants, such as those with multiple disabilities from multiple jurisdictions, may be somewhat greater than for other applicants. However, calculating the total cost of producing court records based on a hypothetical world in which each applicant has one prior conviction and arrest records from one locality resulted in a total cost of $8,292,900. The Department estimated the average cost of documentation to be $12.00.\79\ (Cost of court documentation: $12.00 x 330,000 = $3,960,000). The Department further estimated the average cost of obtaining a local arrest record check to be $13.13.\80\ (Cost of arrest records: $13.13 x 330,000 = $4,332,900). The estimated cost could be lower if the individual already possesses these materials.

\79\ U.S. Courts, District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule (Dec. 1, 2023), https://www.uscourts.gov/court-programs/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule. The Department intends to accept only electronic documents to begin in this application process and so does not include costs for copying of paper records in its estimates.

\80\ The Department averaged the costs of obtaining arrest records by comparing low-end costs in four localities: $17.50 in New York State (New York State, Div. of Crim. Just. Servs., Requesting Your New York State Criminal History, https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ojis/recordreview.htm (last visited July 4, 2026)); $10 in Texas (Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, Crime Records Services FAQ's (2026), https://www.dps.texas.gov/section/crime-records/faq/crime-records-services-faqs (last visited July 4, 2026); $15 in Oklahoma (Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation, How to Request a Criminal History Background Check, https://oklahoma.gov/osbi/services/information-services-division/criminal-history-reporting-unit/how-to-request-a-background-check.html (last visited June 4, 2026)); and $10 in Montana (Montana Dep't of Just., Div. of Crim. Investigation, Background Checks, https://www.dojmt.gov/dci-home/background-checks/ (last visited July 4, 2026)).

The Department also estimated the time costs of obtaining these materials to be only 5 minutes for each document, as many jurisdictions have online portals from which applicants can easily and quickly make such requests.\81\ Based on a total of 10 minutes to obtain one court record and one locality arrest record, the Department estimated a total cost of $2,642,750 (10 minutes x $48.05/hour/60 x 330,000 = $2,642,750). The estimated cost could be lower if the individual already possesses these materials.

\81\ See supra note 80.

The Department will incur costs to process forms and fingerprints and to investigate applications. Although the novelty of the process leaves the Department unable to provide an exact estimate of the total labor costs associated with the process outlined in this rule, the Department has attempted to estimate a fee that will cover a significant portion of the anticipated costs. These costs include fingerprint processing and initial intake by staff within the Office of the Pardon Attorney.\82\

\82\ The Department did not attribute a cost to the notification of CLEOs, as this process will utilize existing mechanisms that can be adapted for this purpose, nor did the Department attribute a cost to the deliberative portions of the decision-making the process, as the deliberative process will be carried out by employees whose labor costs will not change based on how much time is spent deliberating.

The Department estimated that the cost to the FBI to process a set of fingerprints is $12.00; this estimate was based on the FBI's current fingerprint processing fee, which in turn is set on a cost-recovery basis.\83\ The estimated cost for an examiner to intake and review the application materials and determine next steps in the process is $31.97 (30 minutes x $63.94 per hour/60).\84\ Based on an estimate of 330,000

individual applications, the estimated cost for the Department to process forms and fingerprints and to conduct background checks for applications to restore firearms rights is $14,510,100 annually (Cost for processing fingerprints = $12.00 x 330,000 = $3,960,000; Cost for application review = $31.97 x 330,000 = $10,550,100).

\83\ FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division; User Fee Schedule, 89 FR 70206 (Aug. 29, 2024). The Department notes, however, that starting October 1, 2026, the fingerprinting fee will increase to $13. See FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division; User Fee Schedule, 91 FR 34655 (June 8, 2026). This will increase the cost to the Department by $330,000, for a total of $14,840,100.

\84\ Consistent with the calculations in section IV.A.1.d of this preamble, and due to the variety of documentation an applicant may submit, the different disabling predicates from which an applicant could be seeking relief, and other factors involved in analysis, the Department based its current calculation on an applicant who has one prior disabling offense that is not presumptively disqualifying and who has only one locality arrest record.

Table B--Cost to Department Under Final Rule

Number of

Process-related item Estimated cost individuals Cost

Cost to Process Fingerprints.............................. $12.00 330,000 $3,960,000 Time to Review Submission................................. 31.97 330,000 10,550,100

Total................................................. ................ ................ 14,510,100

The final rule differs in certain respects from the proposed rule. The final rule reorganizes the original content by moving paragraphs, renumbering provisions, and adding new sections to clarify the process and address commenters' confusion as to who is eligible for relief. It also adds definitions to ensure the consistent usage of terms throughout.

The proposed rule identified the types of materials applicants are required to submit to enable the Attorney General to determine whether the applicant is likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and whether relief would be contrary to the public interest. In the interest of establishing a more comprehensive record for review by the Attorney General, the final rule identifies additional materials to be submitted. Thus, the final rule (1) requires most individuals who served in the military, regardless of the underlying basis for their firearms disability, to submit a record of their service; (2) requires individuals who have renounced citizenship to provide a supplemental statement describing the circumstances surrounding the renunciation; and (3) requires individuals who have engaged in conduct outside of the United States that would be disqualifying if it had occurred in the United States to provide documentation in English associated with any foreign adjudication or conviction.

Next, the final rule recognizes that it may not be possible for individuals to obtain certified copies of all official documents; the final rule thus provides additional flexibility for submitting documents. The final rule also permits applicants to submit an explanation where required records are unavailable.

The final rule recognizes that the requirement to notify a CLEO was unlikely to achieve its purpose as contemplated in the NRPM. The purpose of the notification was for the law enforcement entity most likely to have recent information about the applicant's conduct to be able to provide such information to the Attorney General to consider in his assessment. Under the NPRM, the notification obligation fell on the applicant. Due to jurisdictional differences and the likelihood that a requirement to notify a single person might be difficult to satisfy in some cases, the NPRM permitted the applicant to satisfy the notification requirement by notifying any one of the local chief of police, county sheriff, head of the state police, or state or local district attorney or prosecutor. Based on differences in government structure across jurisdictions, however, some of these individuals might have limited policing or prosecutorial authority. The Department has accordingly determined that it will perform the notification itself, which will allow the Department to leverage its existing law enforcement authority notification capabilities. The Department believes that it is likely to be more effective than applicants in notifying the relevant law enforcement entity with authority for the locality where the applicant resides.

Next, the final rule clarifies and revises the considerations governing presumptively disqualifying events to address comments that argued that the proposed rule was unclear on these matters. The final rule explains that individuals who previously committed certain violent or otherwise serious offenses will be presumptively unable to demonstrate that they will not act in a manner dangerous to public safety. The final rule also explains that individuals who committed certain other offenses will be presumptively unable to demonstrate that they will not act in a manner dangerous to public safety for a period of 10 years following completion of any sentence. As an example, and largely in response to public comments, the final rule removes animal abuse offenses and some non-violent firearms and explosives offenses from the list of permanently presumptively disqualifying offenses and places them in this 10-year time-limited category of presumptively disqualifying offenses. The final rule explains that individuals who committed any other disqualifying offense will be presumptively unable to demonstrate that they will not act in a manner dangerous to public safety for a period of five years following completion of any sentence.

Although these categories of offenses existed in the proposed rule, comments suggested that the regulatory language should be clarified. The final rule explains that for the purpose of time-limited presumptive disqualifications, the Attorney General may consider conduct of individuals who participated

in pretrial diversion or other programs in lieu of criminal conviction. Because of the link between the propensity for violence and violent misdemeanor crimes, the final rule provides that individuals who have committed certain violent misdemeanors while otherwise prohibited by section 922(g) for any reason, will be presumptively unable to demonstrate that they will not act in a manner dangerous to public safety for a period of five years following completion of any sentence imposed for a violent misdemeanor.

The final rule identifies certain time-limited or status-related prohibitors as presumptively disqualifying because they demonstrate that the individual is engaging in ongoing unlawful conduct or has a certain criminal justice system status. Many of these statuses were included in the proposed rule, but they have been reorganized to better clarify when they apply. Criminal justice system statuses are appropriate for presumptive disqualification because they are time- limited and may be resolved through successful compliance with court requirements. In response to public comments regarding the frequency with which participation in pretrial diversion or other program is ordered by a court, the final rule amends the list of presumptively disqualifying criminal justice system statuses to include individuals who are participating in such programs in lieu of criminal conviction. The other time-limited or status-related prohibitors, such as being illegally present in the United States or unlawfully using controlled substances, are appropriate for presumptive disqualification because they can be corrected through the individual's voluntary conduct. But, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hemani, as well the many comments that expressed concern about applying a presumption of ineligibility for relief to unlawful users of marijuana, the final rule excludes from the scope of the status-based presumptions those individuals whose unlawful use of or addiction to a controlled substance consists only of the use of or addiction to marijuana.

The final rule clarifies the application process and required materials for applicants subject to the disability in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4). It explains that individuals who have received relief for an 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) disability imposed by a state or territory that has adopted a relief-from-disability program implemented in accordance with 34 U.S.C. 40915 (37 states and territories as of the date of publication of this rule) or from a federal department or agency that has adopted a relief-from-disability program or other administrative process are not currently subject to this disability and do not require relief under section 925(c). It further explains that individuals who have not yet sought relief from a state or territory or a federal agency will be presumptively unable to demonstrate that they will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety based on a lack of information necessary for the Attorney General to make a determination to the contrary. Based on comments suggesting that the rule should generally defer to adjudications as to ongoing disability by the entities that imposed the disability, the final rule explains that individuals who have been denied relief from a state, territory, or federal agency will be presumptively unable to show that they are not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety because the agency that imposed the disability has determined that the individual should remain subject to the disability.

The final rule incorporates language specifically tailored to those individuals who have a disability related to a military conviction or dishonorable discharge. The final rule adds terms to better describe these circumstances and identifies the types of documentation these individuals are required to submit.

In response to public comments regarding the link between suicide risk and gun use, the final rule adds language to both the applicant and character-reference affirmations to address potential suicide risks of applicants.

Absent extraordinary circumstances, the final rule limits successive applications from individuals who were previously denied relief based on a determination that they did not meet the statutory criteria. Finally, the rule clarifies that relief procured by fraud is void rather than voidable.

This final regulation has been drafted and reviewed in accordance with Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” sec. 1(b), The Principles of Regulation, and in accordance with Executive Order 13563, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review.”

OMB has reviewed this rule and has determined that this final rule is a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, section 3(f), but not economically significant under section 3(f)(1). It will not have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more, nor will it adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health, or safety, or state, local, or tribal governments or communities.

This final rule implements 18 U.S.C. 925(c) by providing detailed criteria to guide determinations under that section to ensure that those persons granted relief are, in fact, “not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety” and that granting such relief would “not be contrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. 925(c).

The Department estimates that this rule will have an impact on approximately 330,000 applicants per year; that the application for relief will take approximately 65 minutes for the applicant to complete; and that each of the three character witnesses will spend an additional 10 minutes to complete the witness's portion of the application. Using the same BLS cost of $48.05 per hour of labor for the average civilian laborer as was used in section IV of this preamble, the Department's cost estimates for this rule are as follows: 65 minutes of labor at a cost of $52.05 ($48.05/60 x 65 minutes) for the applicant's review of the rule, completion of the application, and associated labor x 330,000 applicants = $17,177,875; adding 10 minutes of labor ($48.05/60 x 10 minutes) for each of the 3 character references x 990,000 [3 references x 330,000 applicants] = $7,928,250; $17,177,875 + $7,928,250 = $25,106,125. Indigent applicants would be allowed to request a waiver or modification of the application fee. However, assuming this fee is imposed, and all 330,000 potential applicants pay the full fee, the fee would result in total additional cost of $9.9 million in the first year. Adding in the costs of fingerprinting ($50 x 330,000 applicants = $16,500,000), court record collection

($12 x 330,000 applicants = $3,960,000), and arrest record collection ($13.13 x 330,000 applicants = $4,332,900) raises the costs to $34,692,900. Adding these costs to the time costs outlined above (i.e., $25,106,125), equals $59,799,025 in costs to the public in the first year.

The benefit of this rule is that it would provide detailed criteria to guide determinations under section 925(c). Detailed criteria are an important part of the implementation of the 925(c) regulatory scheme because they will help avoid the pitfalls of the previous, ATF-operated process that triggered congressional action and deprived citizens of a relief mechanism for over 30 years. The rule further makes clear that certain characteristics will presumptively result in a denial of relief, ensuring that government resources are focused primarily on persons who could plausibly satisfy the dangerousness and public interest analysis necessary for relief under the statute. Without this rule, citizens will continue to be deprived of their Second Amendment rights, despite a clear statutory requirement for relief to be available.

Given congressional prohibitions on ATF's expenditure of funds, discussed above, no lesser alternatives short of withdrawal of the prior regulation and promulgation of a new regulation that addresses congressional concerns will suffice to achieve the same result. Taking no action would result in an unconscionable continuation of the status quo prior to 2025, i.e., the effective absence of any available form of relief for the millions of people who are statutorily authorized to pursue relief. Withdrawal of the ATF delegation alone, as accomplished by the March IFR, has not fully addressed congressional concerns about the adequacy and costs of investigation or provided guidance to the public regarding criteria and resource allocation. Similarly, restoration of rights under section 925(c) by the Attorney General on an ad hoc basis, see, e.g., Granting of Relief; Federal Firearms Privileges, 91 FR 8532 (Feb. 23, 2026), does not provide sufficient advance guidance to the public and cannot feasibly address the anticipated volume of potentially meritorious applications for relief. Only the promulgation of a new regulation that addresses congressional concerns and provides an avenue for relief, as this final rule does, can achieve an appropriate process for citizens to seek this relief from their government.

Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, the Acting Attorney General has considered whether this final rule would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The term “small entities” comprises small businesses, not- for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000.

The Department estimates that this rule will have an impact on at least 20 million adults in the United States and that approximately 330,000 individuals will apply for section 925(c) relief in the first year. However, only a small minority of those applicants are likely to be individuals holding federal firearms licenses and running small businesses. This minority would consist primarily of retail dealers with federal firearms licenses who fall into the North American Industry Classification System Code 459110 for gun shops or hunting equipment stores with a standard size of under $26.5 million per year.\85\ Notably, the impacted group is even smaller than this general category, as the rule does not affect all licensees or businesses in that classification category; instead, it applies only to those who have recently incurred a prohibitor pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 925(c), are seeking to avoid revocation of their licenses.

\85\ U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Table of Small Business Size Standards 22 (Mar. 2023), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/Table%20of%20Size%20Standards_Effective%20March%2017%2C%202023%20%282%29.pdf.

Based on recent data regarding the number of firearms licenses that were revoked in a given year, the Department estimates that fewer than 195 federal firearms licensees will apply for section 925(c) relief per year; indeed, 195 is almost certainly an overcount, as firearms licenses are revoked not just for section 922(g) prohibitors but also for a number of reasons that cannot be addressed through the process established in this final rule.\86\ The

Department acknowledges that there may be a preexisting pool of revocations from the years during which section 925(c) relief was largely unavailable. The final rule, however, provides that a firearm licensee has only 30 days from the date the licensee incurred the disability (or a conviction for a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year was finalized) to file for relief before licensed firearms operations must cease, the 30-day window has almost certainly elapsed for the vast majority of that pool.

\86\ See ATF, Revocation of Firearms Licenses, https://www.atf.gov/firearms/tools-and-services-firearms-industry/current-licensees/revocation-firearms-licenses (last visited July 4, 2026). ATF cites revocation for reasons such as failing to conduct a required background check, falsifying records, or refusing to permit inspection by ATF personnel, none of which is a basis to pursue relief according to this rule. The process in this rule provides relief only for those who are prohibited pursuant to section 922(g), for reasons such as previous felony conviction, fugitive status, or being subject to certain protective orders, etc.

Next, the application is estimated to take 65 minutes for the applicant to complete, including review time. Costs incurred reflect loaded wage costs: \87\

\87\ At the BLS rate of $48.05 per hour for wages and benefits, and a standard 2,080 hour per year schedule, the approximate cost for an employee per year is $100,000 ($99,944). A loaded wage also factors in an additional costs like overhead and taxes, which the Department estimates at approximately 25 percent of wages and benefits. Accordingly, the Department estimates an hourly loaded rate of $60.06 per employee, and a yearly loaded wage of approximately $125,000 ($124,930).

Labor Costs: $60.06/60 x 65 minutes of labor x 195 federal firearm licensees = $12,867.68.

Monetary Costs: Fingerprinting ($50) + Document collection ($25.13) + Fee ($30) = $105.13 x 195 federal firearms licensees = $20,500.35.

Accordingly, the cost associated with the application to small businesses is no more than $33,368.03 per year ($12,867.68 + $20,500.35) to all of industry. Put another way, the cost to the individual applicant is approximately $171.12 ($33,368.03 / 195 applicants). The cost of $171.12 per applicant means that a business would need to have a revenue of less than $17,112 for this cost to be deemed significant to its operations: ($71.12 / .01 = $17,112). Given that the SBA includes in the category small businesses that make up to $26.5 million per year, this rule is likely to have a significant impact on few if any businesses. Conversely, the Department notes that, without the remedy the rule provides for licensees to potentially avoid the revocation of their license, a licensee would be prohibited from engaging in business, which would have a negative and potentially devastating impact on the operation of a business.

By approving this final rule, the Acting Attorney General certifies that it will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.