Ballot Mail for Federal Elections

Supportive comments emphasized several themes. Some discussed voter fraud as a significant problem and lauded the proposed rule for helping to restore voters' confidence in election integrity. One letter, submitted by an Alabama-led coalition of thirteen state attorneys general, contended that the proposed rule would facilitate efforts to combat voter fraud while shoring up public confidence in ways that states could not achieve on their own

initiative. That coalition further emphasized that states retain full control of ballots until they are transferred to the Postal Service, and that the proposed rule would help mitigate weaknesses in the chain of custody of Federal Ballot Mail.

Supporting commenters also appraised the proposed rule as enhancing election security by improving the visibility of Federal Ballot Mail in the mailstream; approved of the ballot envelope design standards it would normalize; emphasized the benefits of creating reconcilable data (through the state-specific Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists (“Lists”)) that offers a neutral administrative check which strengthens confidence in elections; and predicted that the rule would reduce uncertainty as to whether ballots have reached their intended destination.

Supporting commenters further evaluated the actions that state and local election officials may need to take to comply with the proposed rule's standards. The Alabama-led coalition of state attorneys general, for instance, acknowledged that the proposal would impose certain burdens but characterized them as “plainly justified by the security and accountability benefits of the proposed rule,” concluding that the rule “addresses real vulnerabilities inherent in mail-in voting, responds to legitimate and widespread public concerns about federal election integrity, and equips States with tools that strengthen their own oversight capabilities without displacing their authority.”

Finally, many supporting commenters affirmed the Postal Service's statutory and constitutional authority to enact the rule. Some cited Article II, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution (requiring the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”) as legal grounds for the rule, while also endorsing the analysis of authorities set out in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. There, the Postal Service cited authority to regulate the mail as embodied in 39 U.S.C. 401 and 404 and described the proposed regulations as setting forth “mailpiece preparation and data reporting standards that can provide information regarding the sending of ballots through the mail that would be available for use by law enforcement, and are consistent with title 39 of the U.S. Code.” The Postal Service addresses the legal authority to promulgate the final rule at greater length in the “Legal Authority” section below.

Finally, some commenters urged the Postal Service to adopt additional measures, including citizenship-verification requirements, as part of a final rule.

Comments received in opposition to the proposed rule generally urged the Postal Service to withdraw the rule or to delay its implementation until after the November 3, 2026, general election. Several commenters argued that the rule should be withdrawn in light of an injunction entered by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (California v. Trump, 2026 WL 1826490 (D. Mass. June 25, 2026)) and a now-stayed injunction issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in litigation arising out of a 2021 settlement with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (NAACP v. U.S. Postal Serv., 2026 WL 1893762 (D.D.C. July 1, 2026)).

Concerns raised by opposing commenters largely fell into three broad categories, each of which is addressed in greater detail below:

The alleged legal deficiencies of the proposed rule;

Concerns regarding the purported practical implementation challenges;

Concerns about the proposed rule's alleged broader political and social impact.

With respect to legal objections, opposing commenters argued that the Postal Service lacks legal authority to adopt or implement the proposed rule. Commenters further argued that, even if the Postal Service possesses the requisite authority, adoption of the proposed rule would be arbitrary and capricious. These legal objections are addressed at length in the “Legal Authority” and “Impact of the Final Rule” sections below.

With respect to the substance of the proposed rule, opposing commenters frequently focused on the Portal, the acceptance (or verification) provisions, and the fact that the Postal Service would refuse to accept certain ballots for federal elections that states tender without satisfying the data-entry obligations that the rule would impose. Although these provisions were uniformly opposed by commenters not otherwise supportive of the rule, some expressed greater openness to the envelope-design requirements, asserting that such requirements would fall more squarely within the Postal Service's sphere of authority. Thus, in the opinion of some commenters, the envelope design provisions for Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail in DMM 705.24.3 could be retained while the verification, Portal, and optional notice provisions should be removed. In a similar vein, at least one commenter signaled conditional support for the proposed rule so long as all mandatory provisions were made voluntary. Comments raising specific implementation concerns--arising from asserted costs and burdens associated with implementation before the 2026 general election, as well as those costs and burdens that would purportedly be incurred on an ongoing basis; the potential risk of administrative or data errors leading to ballot rejection; and the Postal Service's perceived lack of readiness--are addressed at length in the sections below.

A number of commenters urged the Postal Service to publish a system of records notice (“SORN”) under the Privacy Act and raised questions addressable through the SORN, including whether personally identifiable information will be collected and stored, how long such information will be retained, which entities and personnel will have access to it, whether it will be shared with other federal entities or contractors, what cybersecurity safeguards will be implemented, and what remedies will be available in the event of improper disclosure. The Postal Service published a SORN on July 17, 2026. 91 FR 44880. The public was invited to submit comments relevant to the SORN and related Privacy Act considerations in that proceeding.

The Postal Service also received a significant number of comments that fall outside the scope of this proceeding.

First, many commenters described voting by mail as an effective means of exercising their franchise due to their individual circumstances. Other commenters, by contrast, criticized mail-in voting as a general practice and urged the Postal Service to cease delivering ballot mail altogether. The Postal Service takes no position on whether, or the extent to which, states should utilize the mail as part of the administration of their elections. Indeed, the Postal Service does not advocate for or against voting by mail. Instead, the Postal Service collects, processes, transports, and delivers mail and packages, and remains fully committed to transporting all types of mail, including Federal Ballot Mail that conforms with the Postal Service's mail preparation, data reporting, acceptance, and entry standards. As discussed

further below, under the proposed rule, and as retained in the final rule, the states retain full authority to decide whether to utilize the U.S. Mail as part of their electoral systems, and to determine who should be eligible to vote by mail.

Second, comments that comprehensively address state and local election administration or the Postal Service's election mail procedures fall outside the scope of this proceeding. By way of example, one commenter raised concerns regarding the accuracy of voter registration rolls, recounted their experience of observing purported irregularities during the 2020 election cycle, and urged the Postal Service to undertake a comprehensive review of all mail-in ballot procedures. Comments in this vein, which concern the entire system of election mail administration, rather than the DMM provisions set forth in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, will not be addressed below.

Third, numerous comments raised concerns influenced by partisan political speculation. This included conjecture about the underlying intent of the Order and the impact it may have on voter turnout or election outcomes. Such remarks are speculative and exceed the scope of this proceeding. In any event, as explained further below, this rule does not--nor is it intended to--facilitate any form of voter suppression, affect election outcomes, or target particular demographics, districts, or states.

Fourth, a number of comments raised issues that fall outside both the scope of this proceeding and the Postal Service's authority generally, extending the rule's logic beyond election mail and/or invoking executive branch entities not involved in Postal Service operations. Some, for example, proposed that ballots be accepted only if they arrive by election day; demanded that mail-in voting be discontinued; urged Congress to enact the Safeguard American Voter Eligibility (SAVE) Act; and weighed in on sections of Executive Order 14399 that do not concern the Postal Service. Comments addressing election deadlines, the policy of mail-in voting, other election administration changes, pending legislation, and other entities' law enforcement priorities are not relevant to this proceeding.

Fifth, some commenters raised broad issues of service performance and operational decision-making. Such issues include which facilities process particular mail classes; postmarking practices; service performance complaints; the scope of Postal Police Officers' authority; operational changes or service commitments for ballots mailed to and from military and overseas voters; and collateral consequences to the Postal Service's brand reputation or revenue if a final rule is issued. Such comments are beyond the scope of this proceeding and will not be addressed below.

Sixth, the Postal Service received numerous comments addressing matters unrelated to election mail or to the matters discussed in this proceeding. These included comments expressing personal opinions of the President; remarks concerning nominees to the Postal Service Board of Governors and criticisms of the Board's leadership; objections to postage and stamp prices; requests for congressional action; appraisals of judges who have issued decisions concerning election mail; appraisals of the current and former Postmaster General; comments aimed at postal management and staff; comments on postal reform and privatization; comments on voter intimidation; comments regarding the role of public election auditors and observers; opinions about the impact of the Supreme Court's recent decisions dealing with the Voting Rights Act; comments regarding the Federal Election Commission's Clearinghouse on Election Administration; and feedback on other administrative proceedings, including a Department of Justice (“DOJ”) rulemaking concerning the review of state bar complaints and allegations against DOJ attorneys and a separate Postal Service rulemaking concerning the mailability of firearms. Such comments are also beyond the scope of this proceeding and will not be addressed below.

Ballot mail presents unique considerations, given the role it plays in the electoral process. This role has also grown in importance in recent years, as many states have expanded eligibility for mail-in voting, with some states moving to universal mail-in voting. The number of voters using the mail to receive and cast their ballots has commensurately increased. The Postal Service's policies regarding election mail in general, and ballot mail in particular, have evolved to reflect these unique considerations. From an operational standpoint, the Postal Service deploys special practices on a nationwide basis for the processing and delivery of ballot mail to ensure that such mail is prioritized across the postal network and timely delivered. These practices include the use of extraordinary measures during the period surrounding federal general elections to accelerate the delivery of return ballot mail beyond the Postal Service's typical operations when its employees are able to identify a mailpiece as a ballot. In recognition of the importance of ballot mail, the Postal Service regularly issues nationwide guidance documents in federal election cycles, has dedicated points of contact to coordinate with election officials, and has created a dedicated election mail group tasked with overseeing the Postal Service's election mail procedures nationwide. The Postal Service also amended DMM 703.8.0 in 2022 to add its longstanding best-practices recommendations concerning ballot mail to facilitate efficient handling and prompt delivery and to improvemailpiece visibility. Some jurisdictions have adopted those recommendations.

The use of the U.S. Mail to vote also implicates federal interests regarding whether the postal system is being used in a manner that is consistent with federal law, including those laws governing who is allowed to vote in federal elections. Executive Order 14399 emphasizes the constitutional obligation of the Executive Branch to take care that these laws are faithfully executed, and discusses the importance of applying additional measures concerning the use of the mail to vote in federal elections, in order to facilitate enforcement of federal law, reduce the risk of fraud, and help protect the integrity of federal elections--a point subsequently echoed by some comments supporting the rule. It is fully appropriate for the Postal Service, as an establishment of the Executive Branch, to take actions deemed necessary to ensure the faithful

execution of federal law and enhance the efficiency of postal operations. As discussed below, the Postal Service has the statutory and constitutional authority to take such actions.

The Postal Service received many comments expressing differing views on the incidence of voter fraud and its impact on election integrity. Some commenters, in voicing support for the proposed rule, portrayed voter fraud as a significant problem, while commenters opposing the rule argued that it is not a problem, and disputed the Postal Service's legal authority and rationale to impose preparation requirements for Outbound Federal Ballot Mail.

While the Postal Service acknowledges the range of disagreement on this point, the incidence of voter fraud does not impact the proposed rule's legal grounding. As discussed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and in further detail below, the rule will afford significantly enhanced visibility into the sending of Federal Ballot Mail, and this will in turn facilitate law enforcement efforts by enabling law enforcement to better detect potential issues meriting further investigation. Such enhanced visibility will help identify potential issues that would have otherwise gone undetected; at the very least, it will provide increased assurance that any potential issues are more capable of being effectively identified and investigated. Cf. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 196-97 (2008) (noting the propriety of taking steps designed to detect and deter potential electoral fraud, which also has the benefit of “safeguarding voter confidence” in elections). Whether or not voter fraud is common or uncommon, the Postal Service has the legal authority to take the measures in this rule to facilitate enforcement of federal law, reduce the risk of fraud, and help protect the integrity of federal elections.

Numerous commenters argued that the Postal Service, through the proposed DMM provisions, would supplant the states' authority to administer elections. Some of these comments characterized the proposed rule as inconsistent with the Elections Clause of the Constitution, Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 (vesting authority over the “manner of elections” with the States and Congress), and with the 10th Amendment (reserving all non-enumerated powers to the states). According to many of these comments, the proposed rule would allegedly recast the Postal Service as an “auditor of state voter rolls and an arbiter of ballot validity,” a “gatekeeper of who can vote by mail,” or a “checkpoint for voting.” In a similar vein, commenters asserted that the proposed rule contravenes the separation of powers by arrogating powers that lie with Congress. Finally, at least one commenter argued that, by requiring that states expend resources to comply with the standards mandated by the Postal Service, the proposed rule would unconstitutionally commandeer State resources.

These comments are fundamentally erroneous. The rule does not recast the Postal Service as an election administrator, nor dictate the manner of elections in the states. On the contrary, it sets forth mailpiece design and data reporting standards tied to the use of the mail. States maintain complete control over their own voter registration rolls, deciding who within their jurisdiction is eligible to vote by mail. States also retain complete autonomy to determine the extent to which they utilize the postal system as an aspect of their elections. The rule is plainly consistent with the Elections Clause, the 10th Amendment, and the separation of powers, as well as the Postal Service's statutory and regulatory authority.

Some commenters acknowledged the Postal Service's authority to impose general standards governing the dispatch of election mail, including ballot mail. For instance, election mail must today conform with the DMM provisions that apply to the class of mail in which it is entered, and users of such mail must pay the required postage. The requirement to follow federal mail regulations if states choose to use the federal postal system, then, cannot inherently violate the Elections Clause, nor would it in any way “commandeer” state resources. The Postal Service is not constitutionally obliged to defer to a given state's Outbound Federal Ballot Mail design preferences or accept a given state's decision not to use barcodes. On the contrary, establishing a standardized set of mailpiece design requirements for Outbound Federal Ballot Mail--requirements that, being tailored to enable more efficient handling of Outbound Federal Ballot Mail, improve such mail's visibility in the mailstream, and Postal Service operations--lies within the Postal Service's authority. These requirements do not amount to election administration, nor do they usurp state resources; rather, they regulate the use of the mail to improve operational efficiency and support the faithful execution of federal law. In this regard, as a general matter, states do not have to use the U.S. mail to conduct their elections, and the Postal Service can take steps to ensure that if states do use the mail, that use occurs in a manner that achieves these legitimate purposes.

Similarly, the requirement to report mail piece-level data into the Portal is not tantamount to election administration. States retain full control over who within their jurisdictions is (or is not) eligible to vote by mail in federal elections; they would, moreover, determine who is enrolled in their respective Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists. DMM 705.24.4 only requires that states provide to the Postal Service certain information inscribed on the Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes that they mail to voters, prior to or at the time of the outbound mailing. This information, which necessarily lies in the states' possession, would not be subject to revision by the Postal Service. Eligible voters will therefore be listed by and at the discretion of election officials, and the Postal Service will not second-guess the states' submissions. State election officials will thus retain full control over who is permitted to vote in federal elections in their state by U.S. mail.

Finally, the verification process aims only to ensure that states adhere to the mailpiece design and data reporting standards. By checking the outbound barcode, the Postal Service will be able to verify that the state or political subdivision thereof has satisfied the Portal data entry requirements (e.g., certifying that Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes have been submitted for Mailpiece Design Analyst (“MDA”) review and that feedback has been received, all required data fields have been entered). Again, the Postal Service will exercise no discretion or authority over whether an individual should or should not be on the list a state provides.

This rule does not involve or authorize inspection of a mail-in ballot's contents, review of individual voter's eligibility, or auditing of state voter rolls. It instead focuses exclusively on exterior mailpiece criteria and barcode scan data. As DMM 704.24.6 explains, “[t]his rule relates only to the use of the U.S. Mail,” leaving states “fully responsible for the contents of [their] Mail-In and Absentee Participation List.” 91 FR 32929. Specifically, DMM 705.24.1.b limits enrollment in the Portal to users authorized by a state's chief election official; accordingly, and as detailed in DMM 705.24.4.3, the Postal Service will compile and return to each state only the information that

the state itself has submitted, thus preserving the states' control over who is (and is not) able to vote by mail. It further bears emphasizing that the verification process delineated in DMM 705.24.5 would not involve voter eligibility determinations in any way; it will not entail scrutiny into, or any attempt to evaluate, individual voters. Finally, as plainly stated in DMM 705.24.5.2, “Postal Service personnel are not authorized to open mail sealed against inspection.” In short, the rule adds a layer of security and accountability while leaving the administration of elections firmly in the hands of the states.

Some commenters raised First Amendment concerns, noting that the Supreme Court has long recognized that voting is a protected form of political participation and that compelled disclosure of political participation can chill the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Though some commenters correctly acknowledged that the Postal Service does not propose to disclose voting choices, numerous commenters nevertheless alleged that the rule would compel the creation and maintenance of records identifying citizens who engage in mail-in or absentee voting; speculated that such records may be subject to future disclosure, misuse, breach, or political targeting; and advised against collecting personally identifiable election-participation information absent a compelling need and robust safeguards.

Other commenters invoked the Privacy Act, and 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7) in particular, as a statutory bar on the maintenance of records “describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity[.]”.

These First Amendment concerns are misplaced. First, the Postal Service reiterates that it will not collect or record party affiliation and will not inspect ballot contents. Postal Service personnel are not authorized to open mail sealed against inspection. Instead, through the Portal the Postal Service will maintain data of the sort that is routinely generated for mail from the exterior of the mailpiece, including addressing and barcode information.

The rule's enactment will not entail “compelled disclosure of political participation.” Supreme Court cases on “compelled disclosure” in the electoral context address compelled public disclosure of personally identifiable election participation information, such as a public records law making the signatures on a referendum petition publicly available upon request. John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 192 (2010). The rule, by contrast, neither directs nor contemplates the public disclosure of Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists or the underlying Portal data.

The Postal Service recognizes the importance of ensuring that the Lists are protected from “future disclosure, misuse, breach, or political targeting.” The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking indicated that “steps necessary for the creation of a new SORN in accordance with the Privacy Act” would be initiated. 91 FR 32971. On July 17, 2026, the SORN was published in the Federal Register. The SORN provides details regarding retention periods, access, disclosure, notification, and contest procedures under 39 CFR 266.5. 91 FR 44880. The notice specifies the categories of records covered, a five-year retention period, encryption of online data transmissions, and badge- and log-on- controlled access limited to personnel whose duties require it. The Postal Service can therefore confirm that no data will be collected through the Portal until a system of record (SOR) is in effect, and that records will be disclosed and maintained consistently with any final SOR, which does not allow public disclosure of the Lists.

The proposed rule is also consistent with 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7), which applies only to records revealing “how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Courts have interpreted this “how” to mean gathering and recording the “content” of expressive activity under the First Amendment. E.g., Reuber v. United States, 829 F.2d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a letter reprimanding an employee for privately published essays did not depict “how” he had exercised First Amendment rights under the Privacy Act because it did not discuss “the content” of his privately published essays and made “only vague allusions to the manner in which he expressed his views”).

This section of the Privacy Act could only be invoked here if the Postal Service were gathering and maintaining records indicating the “content” of an individual's exercise of their First Amendment rights (i.e., the content of an individual's ballot, and thus the candidate for which an individual voted). That is not the type of information being collected under the rule. The state-specific Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists indicate whether a state planned to mail a blank ballot to any given individual. This information does not describe “the content” of expressive activity under the First Amendment, but simply indicates the specific means by which an individual may have chosen to receive or return their ballot.

Furthermore, Section 552a(e)(7)'s prohibitions are operative “unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity”--and as stated above, this rule is enacted to assist in the faithful execution and enforcement of federal law. See Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272, 280 (6th Cir. 1982) (Section 552a(e)(7) “does not bar the maintenance of records describing how a person exercises First Amendment rights if there is a direct nexus to an authorized criminal, civil or administrative law enforcement activity”). The applicability of Section 552a(e)(7)'s law enforcement exception to DMM 705.24.4 is further confirmed by the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel's recent memorandum opinion, “Authority to Obtain and Share Statewide Voter Roll Data.” 50 Op. OLC _(May 12, 2026), Slip. Op. at 25-29 (explaining that Section 552a(e)(7)'s law enforcement exception permits retention of statewide voter-registration lists when a SORN is published).

Some commenters argued that once a state provides for absentee voting, the state has enabled a qualified individual to exercise their fundamental right to vote in a way that was previously unavailable; and that, as a result, the state must afford appropriate due process protections, including notice and a hearing, before rejecting an absentee ballot. Commenters analogized this principle (which applies via the Fourteenth Amendment to the states) to the Fifth Amendment, which, in their view, requires the federal government to provide adequate due process before restricting voters' use of otherwise permissible voting methods.

The Postal Service reiterates that the rule adopted herein does not determine any individual's eligibility to vote and thus does not raise the specter of a due process violation. The verification procedures set forth in DMM 705.24.5 are instead designed to ensure that states sending Federal Ballot Mail have transmitted to the Federal Ballot Mail Portal the information required for each state-specific Mail-In and Absentee Participation List. Such information lies with the states, which already fully control who is, and who is not, included on the Lists; voters themselves cannot provide all of that information (e.g., unique Intelligent Mail barcode (“IMb”) on the outbound and return envelope), and the Postal Service cannot correct or amend it. While the verification process may identify missing data or other errors between Outbound Federal Ballot mailings and the Portal data, the states themselves control the information that they transmit (as they do already, even in the absence of this rule), and any procedural protections attaching to such information must accordingly be provided by the states. Ultimately, with or without this rule, states are responsible for managing their own voter rolls, and deciding who is or is not eligible to vote by mail.

Some commenters raised concerns regarding the guarantee of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment (and subsequently incorporated into the Fifth Amendment by Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)). For example, at least one commenter asserted that the exemption for ballots covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”) affords unequal legal protection (on the mistaken grounds that UOCAVA covers military personnel but not overseas civilians). Moreover, at least one commenter argued that by creating the possibility of noncompliance, the rule's envelope-design standards and verification process might restrict some voters' ability to vote by mail, thus withholding equal protection under the law.

However, another commenter reasoned that uniform national standards--far from raising equal-protection issues--resolve these constitutional concerns. Relying on Jones v. U.S. Postal Service, 488 F. Supp. 3d 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), the commenter explained that Fifth Amendment equal-protection claims were likely to succeed where there were no standards or uniformity for handling election mail; this inconsistency can result in intrastate and interstate disparities in citizens' voting power. The proposed rule, the commenter argued, eliminates such concerns by setting a single, nationwide standard for Federal Ballot Mail.

The Postal Service agrees with this commenter that the rule safeguards, rather than abrogates, equal protection. The rule is neutral on its face and uniform in application: DMM 705.24.3 applies objective requirements to all Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes without distinction, and the data entry and verification processes delineated by DMM 705.24.4 and 705.24.5, respectively, likewise apply to all states equally. Furthermore, as noted, the rule promotes multiple rational objectives through nationwide standards and implementation, including the enhancement of Federal Ballot Mail visibility in the mailstream, Postal Service operations, and the facilitation of law enforcement objectives. Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 734 (1987) (holding that facial challenges to statutes “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid”); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1993) (extending the Salerno standard to federal agency regulations). The rule's exemptions also rest on a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis. Congress, for example, created in UOCAVA a separate federal statutory scheme with its own requirements, including different timing constraints and deadlines. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969) (allowing exceptions within an absentee ballot voting scheme provided “some rational relationship to a legitimate state end”). Furthermore, as indicated, UOCAVA coverage does in fact extend to non-military U.S. citizens who reside outside the United States. 52 U.S.C. 20310(5)(B)-(C).

Multiple commenters argued that, as a general matter, the Postal Service lacks the statutory authority to implement the proposed rule. Along similar lines, some commenters alleged specifically that, because no provisions in title 39 explicitly contemplate mandatory standards regarding Federal Ballot Mail, title 39 impliedly bars the Postal Service from implementing such standards.

These statutory arguments are unavailing. As explained in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 39 U.S.C. 401(2) authorizes the Postal Service “to adopt, amend, and repeal such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this title, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions under this title and such other functions as may be assigned to the Postal Service under any provisions of law outside of this title,” and further grants the Postal Service “all other powers incidental, necessary, or appropriate to the carrying on of its functions or the exercise of its specific powers.” Id. Sec. 401(10). Furthermore, Section 404 grants the Postal Service specific powers, including the power “to provide for the collection, handling, transportation, delivery, forwarding, returning, and holding of mail, and for the disposition of undeliverable mail.” Id. Sec. 404(a)(1).

Setting preparation and data-reporting standards for a defined category of mail falls squarely within that statutory authority. Supreme Court precedent confirms the Postal Service's expansive rulemaking authority. As noted by one commenter, in U.S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh, the Court explained that under 39 U.S.C. 401 “the Postal Service is broadly empowered to adopt rules and regulations.” 453 U.S. 114, 122 (1981). This commenter further argued that the Postal Service has long managed election mail as a distinct category under its authority. In Rider v. United States, the commenter explained, the Claims Court recognized that the Postal Service issues “detailed regulations and management instructions concerning the various classes of mail and types of postal services in its Domestic Mail Manual” pursuant to Section 404(a), and that its Postal Operations Manual establishes “special operating procedures” to ensure that election and campaign mailings “are processed properly,

delivered with equitable care and attention and that proper records are maintained.” 7 Cl. Ct. 770 (1985). Courts have recognized the Postal Service's broad regulatory authority in other contexts as well. See Grover City v. U.S. Postal Serv., 391 F. Supp. 982, 986 (C.D. Cal.1975) (finding postal regulations setting mail receptacle standards to be valid exercises of Sec. 404(a)(1) delivery power and Sec. 401(2) rulemaking authority); Rockville Reminder v. U.S. Postal Serv., 480 F.2d 4, 7 (2nd Cir. 1973) (upholding postal regulations prohibiting mailbox installations facilitating private delivery of advertising circulars under the Postal Service's broad rulemaking authority); Egger v. U.S. Postal Serv., 436 F. Supp. 138, 142 (W.D. Va. 1977) (upholding the Postal Service's interpretation of its regulations governing mail addressed to people at school).

The Postal Service has the statutory authority to set forth mail preparation, acceptance, and entry standards that are necessary to achieve the functions assigned to it by law--functions that include investigation into the potential misuse of the mail and coordination with other federal law enforcement entities. See 39 U.S.C. 401(2); cf. 18 U.S.C. 3061(b) (authorizing the Postal Service to investigate crimes regarding “the use of the mails” and other appropriate crimes as determined by agreement with the Attorney General); 52 U.S.C. 10307, 20511. The rule sets forth tailored requirements regarding the use of the mail--the design of Federal Ballot Mail envelopes and the provision of mailpiece-level data concerning such ballot mailings--to help ensure the faithful execution of federal law; and the information yielded by these requirements would be available for use by law enforcement. Additionally, the rule would implement the Postal Service's longstanding best practices for ballot mail, thereby advancing execution of a key Postal Service function: processing and delivery of the Nation's mail. Contrary to commenters' arguments, achieving such purposes is within the scope of the Postal Service's authority to take “necessary” action to regulate the use of the mail and achieve its assigned functions.

There is also no basis to conclude that the Postal Service's broad statutory authority regarding the postal system encompasses all types of mail except ballot mail, and specifically Federal Ballot Mail. On the contrary, the Postal Service has acted pursuant to its existing authority to take many actions regarding ballot mail, reflective of the unique considerations raised by such mail, including by establishing special operational procedures and issuing best practice recommendations. While the Postal Service is now taking additional action to make some of these recommendations mandatory, and to add a requirement that states provide mailpiece-level detail about their mailings, such additional steps equally fall within the Postal Service's authority to execute on functions as assigned.

Multiple commenters contested the state-specific Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists' grounding in law enforcement objectives, on the theory that the Lists, and the purposes to which they will allegedly be put, exceed the Postal Service's authority to investigate crimes involving election fraud. In general, these comments assert that the criminal statutes cited by the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking either have nothing to do with voting or are related to voting but are not enforceable by the Postal Service. Specific arguments include:

The U.S. Code does not confer on the Postal Service authority to enforce election statutes. Commenters asserted that 52 U.S.C. 10307 and 20511 do not expressly name the Postal Service, and as such cannot be taken to confer enforcement or investigative authority on the Postal Service with respect to voter intimidation and fraudulent registration or voting. Conversely, 39 U.S.C. 404(a)(6) confers on the Postal Service the power “to investigate postal offenses and civil matters relating to the Postal Service,” not election law per se.

The investigatory and enforcement powers conferred by statute on Postal Inspectors are limited. Some commenters averred that 18 U.S.C. 3061(b) grants only limited law enforcement powers to Postal Inspectors, which are confined to “the enforcement of laws regarding property in the custody of the Postal Service, property of the Postal Service, the use of the mails, and other postal offenses,” and to any offenses subject to interagency agreement with the Attorney General. This grant of authority, some asserted, does not authorize the Postal Service to collect data on voters. Similarly, the regulations in 39 CFR 233.1(b) do not expressly grant Postal Inspectors authority to administer elections, determine voter eligibility, maintain voter registration databases, or conduct election fraud investigations unrelated to postal offenses.

The proposed rule lacks a factual predicate. To initiate an investigation, the Postal Service requires either direct, visible evidence of a crime or reasonable grounds to suspect that a crime is or has been committed. Some commenters characterized voter fraud, including through use of the mail, as rare. Commenters contended that the proposed rule nevertheless assumes that every mail-in voter may cast a fraudulent vote and must be placed under surveillance.

Lack of a clear statement conferring investigative or enforcement authority. Commenters argued that if Congress had intended to deputize the Postal Service as an adjunct of federal election law enforcement, it would have said so clearly.

Each of the above arguments is unpersuasive. The proposed rule establishes mailpiece preparation and data reporting standards that will significantly enhance the visibility of Federal Ballot Mail. The information generated by the implementation of those standards would be available for use by appropriately authorized law enforcement entities to help ensure the faithful execution of federal law. The determination of whether to investigate, refer, charge, or prosecute any matter relating to illegal voting, voter fraud or voter intimidation rests, and will continue to rest, with the entities to which Congress has assigned such functions. Moreover, as noted above, the rule does not dictate the administration of elections, the determination of voter eligibility, or the maintenance of voter registration databases--all of which is controlled by the states-nor does the rule authorize the Postal Service to conduct investigations unrelated to postal offenses.

Concerning the proposed rule's factual predicate (or alleged lack thereof), claims regarding the empirical incidence of voter fraud do not, as explained above, affect the Postal Service's authority to adopt these regulations. The Postal Service further emphasizes that, under the rule, it will not surveil mail-in or absentee voters. Under the rule's plain terms, information generated at acceptance is embedded in exterior mailpiece indicia and barcode scan data; Postal Service personnel are not authorized to open mail sealed against inspection; and no provision in DMM 705.24 authorizes review of any ballot's contents.

Concerning the implied clear statement rule discerned by some commenters, the Postal Service does not purport to discover “transformative power” in a “long-extant” statute. Rather, the envelope design, automation, barcoding and design review standards set forth by DMM

705.24.3 are similar to mail preparation requirements routinely applied across other mail categories. The rule, therefore, does not introduce new and unsettled “major questions”--a point explained in greater depth below.

Some commenters asserted that the proposed rule would violate the “major questions doctrine,” which applies to agency actions purporting to “discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power representing a transformative expansion in its regulatory authority.” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 724 (2022). Such comments theorized that as the right to vote is a fundamental political right, and as the Postal Service has no authority to adopt rules regulating voting in federal elections without express congressional authorization, the proposed rule would derive from its stated sources of statutory authority just such “transformative” powers.

As an initial matter, it bears repeating that this rule does not regulate the right or eligibility to vote, voter registration, or the manner by which states administer elections. States will retain full autonomy to decide whether (and to what extent) they utilize the U.S. Mail as part of their electoral systems and who can use ballot mail to cast a vote. The rule instead imposes modest data and mail preparation requirements on Federal Ballot Mail envelopes. The preparation requirements have for years been issued as best-practice guidance--and are substantively similar to the standards already employed to varying extents by some election officials. And the data standards require that states provide information regarding the exterior of Federal Ballot Mail envelopes that they will already have available as part of their ballot mailings. The verification procedures simply help to ensure these standards have been met prior to accepting an Outbound Federal Ballot mailing. Furthermore, the Postal Service is authorized to regulate certain mail preparation requirements in furtherance of federal law enforcement and to advance its ability to efficiently handle the mail. On its face, then, the rule does not represent any “transformative expansion” of regulatory authority, rendering the “major questions” doctrine inapplicable.

By way of further explanation, major questions arise when agencies claim to “discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power representing a transformative expansion in its regulatory authority.” West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 724. Per West Virginia, “the history and breadth of the authority that [the agency] has asserted” distinguishes “extraordinary cases” from ordinary ones. Such cases, which “provide a reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress meant to confer such authority,” typically involve an agency reaching beyond its area of expertise. Id. at 721; see also, e.g., Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. HHS, 594 U.S. 758, 764 (2021) (the Centers for Disease Control regulating landlord-tenant relations); NFIB v. OSHA, 595 U.S. 109, (2022) (OSHA regulating a public health risk rather than workplace hazards). By contrast, in United States v. White, 97 F.4th 532, 540 (7th Cir. 2024), the Seventh Circuit refused to apply the major questions doctrine in a case plainly lacking “the hallmarks of the truly extraordinary cases,” with no claim to “unheralded power.” In Nebraska v. Su, 121 F.4th 1 (9th Cir. 2024), the Ninth Circuit likewise held the major questions doctrine not to apply to a federal contractor minimum wage mandate which, following a history of presidents setting federal contractor rules, constituted neither a “transformative” nor an “unheralded” expansion of regulatory power. Id. at 14.

Similar to the facts in White and Su, envelope preparation and data transmission and verification requirements of the sort contemplated here fall well short of an “unheralded transformation” of regulatory authority, lack “the hallmarks of the truly extraordinary cases,” and do not derive “unheralded power” from a “long-extant statute.” Indeed, the Postal Service has for years conditioned eligibility for certain rate levels on specific requirements, including barcodes and Mailer IDs, and has done so under the same statutory authority that underlies this rule. For example, the Full-Service Intelligent Mail program, described in DMM 705.23, offers automation discounts for commercial mailers in exchange for end-to-end mail tracking, electronic documentation, and address corrections. Participation in this program is mandatory for automation pricing. See 78 FR 23,137 (Apr. 18, 2013) (requiring the use of “full-service” Intelligent Mail “to qualify for automation prices for postcards (First-Class Mail[supreg] only), letters, and flats when mailed using the following services: First- Class Mail, Standard Mail and Periodicals; and for flats mailed at Bound Printed Matter prices”). If the Full-Service IMb regime is lawful under Sections 401 and 404, and it is, then the proposed rule cannot be said to effect an “unheralded transformation” of the regulatory prerogatives embedded in those statutes. Barcode, logo, automation-compatibility, design review, and electronic documentation conditions on defined mail categories constitute normal exercises of Postal Service authority; they have, moreover, in large part, long been included in the Postal Service's guidance to state Boards of Elections.

Other major-questions cases focus on the “economic and political significance” of the authority at issue. Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. 229, 246 (2026); see also, e.g., Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 502 (2023). Here, the economic significance of the rule is slight as compared to prior major-questions cases. See Learning Resources, 607 U.S. at 246 (“could be worth $15 trillion”); Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 502 (“between $496 billion and $519 billion”). And although actual changes to eligibility of voters to vote by mail might fairly be described as having political significance in some sense, this rule makes no such changes--it instead leaves voter-eligibility unchanged, requiring only certain modest envelope-design and data reporting standards, most of which have long been recommended by the Postal Service (and are voluntarily complied with by some jurisdictions already). It follows that the rule's incorporation of these practices does not raise any “major question” in the relevant sense.

Some commenters noted that, in 39 U.S.C. 3001-3018, Congress specified categories of nonmailable materials with robust protections for all forms of mail not included. These commenters then argued that the rule effectively creates a new category of “nonmailable matter,” and thereby exceeds title 39's statutory scheme. On this basis, they contended that the rule and the verification process that it establishes is ultra vires.

The rule does not create a new category of “nonmailable matter” into which Federal Ballot Mail as a class may generally fall. Rather, it is designed to ensure that Federal Ballot Mail envelopes meet certain preparation standards consistent with operational best practices and to condition acceptance on the provision of certain mailpiece-level data regarding those ballot envelopes--both of which support the execution of federal law. The rule does not prohibit federal ballots from being mailed altogether. While it is true that outbound mail-in ballots may be rejected from the mailstream as a consequence of noncompliance with the rule's

requirements, conditions on the acceptance of mailable matter are distinct from a determination that the matter is nonmailable. Moreover, compliance is straightforward: states need only provide information that is inscribed on the outside of Federal Ballot Mail envelopes, which will necessarily be in their possession. And ample resources are available to assist states with ballot mail envelope design, should such assistance be required. Compliance is verified by checking a single data point (IMb) on Outbound Federal Ballot Mail prior to acceptance. Although Outbound Federal Ballot mailings that fail the verification process may be temporarily rejected (and thus not permitted to enter the mailstream), any errors may be corrected and the mailpieces will thereafter be accepted for mailing.

Rather than usurp Congress's authority to create new categories of “nonmailable matter,” then, the Postal Service will impose mailpiece design and reporting standards to promote a rational and legitimate objective. As discussed below, to support this proposal, the Postal Service has reasonably determined that the mailpiece design requirements will help ensure proper handling, efficient processing, and timely delivery of such ballots to and from voters. See 90 FR at 9843 (special conditions are appropriate for “sensitive matter” where such conditions “will improve visibility and enhance handling methods”). Moreover, requiring the submission of a consolidated list of data concerning Federal Ballot Mail will assist law enforcement authorities in investigating crimes, including those involving the mails, as is consistent with the Postal Service's regulatory authorities. See 39 U.S.C. 401(b) (noting that the Postal Service can issue regulations to support functions assigned to it by law); 18 U.S.C. 3061(b) (authorizing Postal Service to investigate crimes “regarding the use of the mails” and other appropriate crimes as determined by agreement with the Attorney General).

The Postal Service has previously relied on its authority under 39 U.S.C. 401(2) to establish standards applicable to the acceptance and transmission of certain unique articles in furtherance of specific Postal Service operational interests where those articles raise special handling concerns, even where the articles are not dangerous. For example, cremated human and animal remains must be transported through specific types of USPS-provided boxes, and must be trackable via barcode. See Cremated Remains Packaging Requirements, 90 FR 9843 (Feb 19, 2025) (implementing rules concerning the sending of cremated remains in specific types of USPS-provided boxes because the Postal Service understands such remains are “sensitive matter and believes this will improve visibility and enhance handling methods throughout processing and transportation”). Similarly, replica explosives--which, although not dangerous, also require special handling to prevent operational disruptions--rather than being prohibited from the mail altogether must be mailed in certain ways, including in-person presentation to a retail counter and shipment via Registered Mail. Restricting the Mailing of Replica or Inert Explosives, 75 FR 282 (Jan. 5, 2010) (noting that “[t]his process will ensure that packages containing these items remain separate and easily identifiable during the mailing process”).

Although ballot mail does not present precisely the same operational issues as cremated remains or replica explosives, it is unquestionably sensitive mail that raises unique operational considerations, as discussed above, and the Postal Service's authority under Section 401(2) is sufficiently expansive to encompass mail-entry conditions that further the effective execution of federal law and advance operational best practices. 39 U.S.C. 401(2) (noting that the Postal Service can issue regulations to support functions assigned to it by law). And incidental to the ability to impose standards in furtherance of such legitimate objectives is the ability to restrict mailings that do not meet those conditions from being accepted. Cf. id. Sec. 401(10) (Postal Service is granted “incidental” and “necessary” powers to effectuate its responsibilities).

Commenters also argued that the proposed rule is inconsistent with various title 39 provisions, i.e., 39 U.S.C. 101(a), 403(c), 404(e), and 412. Other commenters averred that, prior to implementing these provisions, the Postal Service must request an advisory opinion from the Postal Regulatory Commission (“PRC”) under 39 U.S.C. 3661(b).

The Postal Service disagrees with these assessments and addresses each of the above-cited title 39 provisions in turn.

Section 101(a) establishes the Postal Service's foundational legal mandate to bind the nation together by providing reliable, efficient, and regular mail services to all communities. This obligation coexists with federal laws determining what is mailable, and the Postal Service abides by several statutory and regulatory directives regarding items that are not mailable, such as hazardous substances or explosives, or (as here) mailable with conditions imposed on preparation and data reporting. The existence of these directives does not negate the foundational legal mandate, and neither would Federal Ballot Mail envelope design standards and electronic documentation requirements that align with preexisting guidance. Furthermore, the Postal Service will continue to coordinate with state election officials and other officials regarding the transmittal of election mail and will maintain its longstanding election mail practices concerning the processing and delivery of ballots that enter the mailstream, including completed ballots mailed by voters to election officials. Indeed, consistent implementation of longstanding best practices recommendations will enhance, rather than hinder, these efforts.

Section 403(c) mandates that, in providing services, “the Postal Service shall not . . . make any undue or unreasonable discrimination among users of the mails, nor shall it grant any undue or unreasonable preferences to any such user.” The PRC has noted that a violation of section 403(c) requires that (1) a user of the mail is receiving less favorable services than those provided to one or more other postal customers, (2) the user is similarly situated to those postal customers receiving more favorable service, and (3) there is no rational or legitimate basis for denying the user the more favorable service currently being provided to those similarly situated postal customers. PRC Order No. 718, Advisory Opinion (AO) on Service Changes Associated with First-Class Mail and Periodicals, July 20, 2021, Docket No. N2021- 1 at 170.

The rule adopted herein sets forth neutral, uniform, and non- discriminatory mailpiece design and data reporting standards that apply uniformly to all Federal Ballot Mail; thus, no “preferential mail service” is granted to one class of mail-in voters over another. Nor does the Postal Service violate Section 403(c) by requiring that Federal Ballot Mail meet these uniform standards, since given the unique considerations raised by such mail, Federal Ballot Mail is not “similarly situated” to other types of mail. Indeed, the Postal Service already accords to election mail special operational treatment that is unavailable for other mail matter sent as First-Class Mail or Marketing Mail (the postal products typically used to send ballot

mail), and there is no basis to conclude that this special operational treatment constitutes undue discrimination against any users of the mail. Finally, Section 403(c) does not prohibit all distinctions among mail users, but only preferences that are “undue” or “unreasonable.” Given the reasonable and legitimate objectives of the new standards, they are neither “undue” nor “unreasonable”--even assuming arguendo that users of Federal Ballot Mail are “similarly situated” to users of other mail classes not covered by those standards, and even if those standards were conceded to somehow provide “less favorable” terms (and they do not).

The Postal Service also notes an issue flagged by several commenters: namely, that not all states can implement the rule's requirements with the same facility. By way of example, one comment noted that states with universal mail-in voting can more readily implement the new electronic documentation requirements than can states that do not mail absentee ballots unless requested by the voter--since the states in the former category can submit their entire list of enrollees in one session through the ballot portal, while states in the latter category must submit names in a more piecemeal fashion and only for those individuals requesting to receive a ballot through the mail. The Postal Service acknowledges the existing variations in state mail- in voting practices, which may require different levels of process changes in order to comply with the rule; however, as noted, the rule itself sets forth neutral, uniform, and non-discriminatory mailpiece design and data reporting standards that apply equally to all Federal Ballot Mail. Compliance with these standards is straightforward and facilitated by existing resources (in some cases, free of charge). Furthermore, the nature and degree of states' prospective compliance efforts reflect the states' own policies, not the uniform standards adopted by the Postal Service. Such discrepancies, therefore, do not implicate Section 403(c).

Section 404(e) generally prohibits the Postal Service from providing any new “nonpostal service.” The term “service” is not defined in title 39; the statute directed the PRC to review the “nonpostal services” offered by the Postal Service as of January 1, 2006, to determine whether each such service may continue. Id. Sec. 404(e)(1). In carrying out that responsibility, the PRC defined the term “service” by regulation as “any ongoing, commercial activity offered to the public for the purpose of financial gain.” PRC Order 154, Review of Nonpostal Services Under the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, Dec. 19, 2008, Docket No. MC2008-1 at 14. Because the creation and distribution of the Mail-in and Absentee Participation Lists are not “commercial” in nature, are not offered to the public, and are not offered “for the purpose of financial gain,” it would not qualify as a “service” for the purposes of Section 404(e).

In any event, the creation of such lists is “postal” in nature, as it would involve “delivery of letters, printed matter, or mailable packages, including acceptance, collection, sorting, transportation, or other functions ancillary thereto.” 39 U.S.C. 102(5); see also id. Sec. 404(e)(1) (“the term `nonpostal service' means any service that is not a postal service defined under section 102(5)”). As noted above, these provisions set forth preparation and data standards that are tailored to the sending of ballots, and hence to the use of the mail.

Section 412 provides in part that “no officer or employee of the Postal Service shall make available to the public by any means or for any purpose any mailing or other list of names or addresses (past or present) of postal patrons or other persons.” Some commenters theorized that unless state law shields postal-provided state-specific Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists from disclosure, furnishing the state's chief election official with a list containing the names and addresses of those receiving a mail-in ballot likely violates this section. However, 39 U.S.C. 412(a) addresses lists of “postal patrons” or “other persons” compiled from postal data, and provides that the Postal Service shall not make such a postal list available to the public. The information on which the Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists will be based is provided by the states themselves, and specifically the states' records of individuals to whom they (or their authorized election officials) plan to mail blank ballots. Because the lists involve information furnished by the states, 39 U.S.C. 412(a) is not applicable; and in any event, the Postal Service will not make the lists public.

Certain commenters nevertheless argued that the exception structure created by Section 412(a) (allowing disclosure of information “as specifically provided by subsection (b) or other law”) in tandem with Section 412(b) (stating that “[t]he Postal service shall provide to the Secretary of Commerce for use by the Bureau of the Census such address information, address-related information, and point of postal delivery information . . . as may be determined by the Secretary to be appropriate for any census or survey”), impliedly excludes the provision of Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists to state officials. It therefore bears emphasizing that even if Section 412(a) were applicable to Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists, it would not bar the provision of such lists to state elections officials.

First and foremost, the provisions of these lists to state election officials does not constitute such disclosure of protected information “to the public.” (Emphasis added.) Indeed, at least one court has interpreted disclosure to state law enforcement officials under 39 U.S.C. 412 as not being tantamount to an impermissible disclosure to the public. See, e.g., People v. Pearson, 169 Cal. App. 3d 319, 323 (1985) (holding that an individual “had no reasonable expectation of privacy of his name and residential address given to the United States Postal Service when applying for a post office box”; noting that “the information was not made available to the public” under 39 U.S.C. 412 “but rather to a law enforcement officer conducting an official investigation”).

Second, Section 412(a) allows disclosure of information “as specifically provided by subsection (b) or other law.” (Emphasis added.) Postal Service regulations accordingly make clear that disclosure of information under Section 412 to the Secretary of Commerce for census-related purposes is not exclusive, countenancing such disclosure pursuant to certain contracts and interagency agreements, by written request and with the prior consent of the individuals, or as “otherwise expressly authorized by federal law” See 39 CFR 266.3(b)(3). As noted, the rule's Mail-In and Absentee Participation List disclosure provisions are adopted pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 401 and 404 with the aim of supporting the faithful execution of federal law, and disclosure would occur in accordance with an established SOR.

Third, federal legislation serves as both a precedent and a template for the sharing of information by the Postal Service with state election officials, in the context of voting. Specifically, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”) requires each state to manage a voter list maintenance program, and to make reasonable efforts to remove ineligible voters from voting rolls. 52 U.S.C. 20507(a)(4). The NVRA includes a safe harbor provision, whereby a state can comply with its obligation to have a voter list maintenance program if “change-of-address information supplied by the Postal Service through

its licensees is used to identify registrants whose addresses may have changed.” 52 U.S.C. 20507(c)(1)(A). In 2018, the Supreme Court determined that it was “undisputedly lawful” for a state to utilize the Postal Service national change-of-address data for voter list maintenance purposes, as described in the NVRA. See Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 584 U.S. 756, 765 (2018) (citing 52 U.S.C. 20507(c)(1) and referring to the NVRA safe harbor as “the Postal Service option”). As a general matter, then, the Postal Service's sharing of information with government officials is not exclusively limited to providing information to the Secretary of Commerce under Section 412(b).

Section 3661(b) provides that, when the Postal Service “determines that there should be a change in the nature of postal services which will generally affect service on a nationwide or substantially nationwide basis,” it must request an advisory opinion from the PRC before implementing the change. Some commenters reasoned that a change touching Federal Ballot Mail is a nationwide change in postal services within the meaning of Section 3661--one requiring pre-filing conferences with affected stakeholders and a formal request filed with the PRC at least 90 days before implementation (39 CFR 3020.110- 3020.112).

As an initial matter, 39 CFR 3020.110-3020.112 are regulations binding the PRC, not the Postal Service. It is therefore incorrect to suggest (as some commenters did) that the Postal Service's adoption of this proposed rule would violate its own regulations.

More importantly, the changes contemplated by the proposed rule do not trigger any obligations under Section 3661. As noted, the obligations attendant to Section 3661 arise in the event of “a change in the nature of postal services which will generally affect service on a nationwide or substantially nationwide basis.” Implementation of this rule does not constitute such a nationwide change in postal services. As the leading case on this issue explains, Section 3661 must be read within the context of the overall statutory scheme of title 39, which is designed to give the Postal Service “broad authority in postal management” to ensure that management is not “unjustly hampered in its efforts to administer the Department in a businesslike way.” Buchanan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 508 F.2d 259, 262-63 (5th Cir. 1975). Section 3661(b) therefore comes into play only in limited circumstances, if (1) there is a change that has a “meaningful impact on service,” (2) the change is “in the nature of postal service,” and (3) the change affects service “on a nationwide or substantially nationwide basis.” Id. “These three factors combine to demonstrate that Congress intended the safeguards of 3661 to apply only when changes of significance were contemplated.” Id. at 263.

As to the first Buchanan factor, a proposed change triggers the Section 3661 advisory opinion requirement when that change is “meaningful” rather than “minor” from a quantitative perspective. See Buchanan, 508 F.2d at 262. Alterations that have a minimal effect on the general class of postal users therefore do not fall within the scope of Section 3661. Id. Here, the rule's requirements apply only to Federal Ballot Mail--a subset of election mail--and only in connection with federal general, special, or runoff elections (and not state elections or primary elections). To put this in context, in 2020 the Postal Service delivered roughly 400 million pieces of mail per day, and election mail in the 2020 general election accounted for only a small fraction of a percentage (roughly 0.1%) of that total mail volume. The standards being imposed on this exceedingly small subset of overall mail volume do not constitute a change of sufficient scale and scope to implicate Section 3661, but will instead have only a de minimis effect on the nature of postal services available to ordinary Postal Service users.

Moreover, whether a proposed action constitutes a change in the “nature of postal services” within the meaning of Section 3661(b) “involves a qualitative examination of the manner in which postal services available to the users will be altered.” Buchanan, 508 F.2d at 263. In that regard, the PRC has held that “in determining whether an initiative involves a change in the nature of postal services `[i]t is the experience of the individual postal consumer, the recipient of the complex of services provided by the Postal Service and the intended beneficiary of the policies incorporated by Sec. 3661, that must be assayed.' ” Pennsylvania v. DeJoy, 490 F. Supp. 3d 833, 885 (E.D. Pa. 2020). Here, the changes contemplated by this rule do not directly affect the provision of postal services; rather, they encompass preparation and documentation requirements that are within the control of the states and, if adhered to, will not disturb the acceptance, processing, transmission or delivery of Federal Ballot Mail. The rule contemplates no changes to how the Postal Service processes and delivers election mail. In other words, as long as the rule's conditions are met, Outbound Federal Ballot Mail will enter the mailstream as usual, will transit as usual to its intended destination, and will in the usual manner be delivered: no discernible difference in the nature of postal services will arise. Indeed, as explained more fully below, the Postal Service will work closely with Boards of Elections to facilitate that very outcome. And, once the Outbound Federal Ballot Mail reaches a voter, the voter will experience no change. Voters may complete and return their ballot as they do now. It further bears noting that even if a state declined to submit the information required by the rule, the resulting acceptance refusal would not implicate Section 3661 any more than would a large- scalemailer's decision to opt out of the mail system: the nationwide availability of postal services would remain unchanged.

Finally, some commenters argued that it was unlawful for the President to issue an Executive Order directing action by the Postmaster General. To be sure, Executive Order 14399 was relevant to the Postal Service's consideration of this subject and began the deliberative process that is now resulting in this rule. While the Executive Order did not mandate a final rule, the Postal Service has determined that, to help achieve the goals articulated by the Order as necessary to faithfully execute federal law and also to advance the Postal Service's operational interests, it is appropriate to exercise its statutory authority to promulgate these provisions. Considerations of Postal Service independence are not relevant to this rulemaking.

M. 2021 Settlement With the NAACP

In a 2021 settlement with the NAACP, the Postal Service agreed to take certain actions regarding mail-in voting in future federal elections, including prioritizing monitoring and timely delivery of election mail through 2028. Some commenters argued that the enactment of new mail preparation and electronic documentation requirements, particularly immediately, would deprioritize the timely delivery of election mail and, thus, violate that settlement agreement. In doing so, some commenters pointed to a recent judgment by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granting NAACP's motion to enforce the settlement agreement, and enjoining the proposed rule's implementation. See NAACP v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 1:20-cv-2295 (D.D.C.).

On July 17, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stayed the

district court's injunction, concluding that “even if adopted, that proposed rule likely would not violate . . . the parties' settlement agreement.” NAACP v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 26-5257 (D.C. Cir. July 17, 2026). As the government has explained in that litigation, implementation of this proposed rule is not inconsistent with the terms of the settlement agreement: nothing in the rule adopted herein deprioritizes the timely delivery of election mail. To the contrary, implementation of these standards will, in fact, facilitate the Postal Service's efforts to deliver Federal Ballot Mail in a timely manner. Furthermore, the Postal Service will continue to work closely with stakeholders, and will deploy an array of special operational procedures (including so-called “extraordinary measures”) to ensure the timely delivery of election mail, as it has done in prior election cycles.

Some commenters argued that NVRA (intended primarily to facilitate the registration of voters) and the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”) (establishing a funding program to support state administration of elections) neither grant the President authority to identify the additional measures outlined in Executive Order 14399, nor authorize the Postal Service to adopt the rule as proposed. Commenters further argued that implementation of the proposed rule, and in particular the refusal to accept Outbound Federal Ballot Mail mailings that do not comply with the acceptance standards embodied in DMM 705.24, would violate the Voting Rights Act. As background, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act to protect citizens' constitutional right to vote and to move freely across state lines, providing that no U.S. citizen shall “be denied the right to vote” in federal elections “because of the failure of such citizen to be physically present in such State or political subdivision at the time of such election,” so long as the citizen has “complied with the requirements prescribed by the law of such State or political subdivision” concerning absentee ballots. 52 U.S.C. 10502. The enforcement provisions of the Voting Rights Act, id. Sec. 10307(a), further establish that “[n]o person acting under color of law shall fail or refuse to permit any person to vote who is entitled to vote under any provision of chapters 103 to 107 of this title or is otherwise qualified to vote[.]” In these commenters' view, the rule as proposed would violate these statutes by adding a new enrollment requirement as a necessary precondition to the delivery of absentee ballots. Other commenters argued that the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”), not the Postal Service, is the federal entity tasked to act as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information with respect to administration of Federal elections; if the EAC cannot impose any requirement on any state or local unit of government, the Postal Service cannot do so through its proposed rule either.

As discussed above, under the rule, states retain full control over how to utilize the mail in their electoral systems, including by determining who is registered to vote and who is eligible to receive and send a mail-in ballot. The rule requires only that Federal Ballot Mail envelopes meet certain mail preparation requirements and that states provide mailpiece-level data regarding their Outbound and Return Federal Ballot mailings. As such, this rule simply regulates the use of the mail, and does not interfere with or supplant the schemes established under NVRA, HAVA, or the Voting Rights Act. The Postal Service's rule complements, rather than replaces, these statutory responsibilities by supporting the accurate distribution of ballots after states have determined who is eligible to receive them. Similarly, the Postal Service is not usurping the authority vested in the EAC. This rule concerns the mail, not election administration; voting systems and other election administration tasks remain squarely within EAC's scope. The Postal Service will continue (as before) to provide change of address information to state and local officials; and state and local officials will continue (as before) to maintain their official voter registration lists. Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists will be based entirely on data in the possession of, and provided by, the states, and the Postal Service will not change the content of those lists. In this regard, it bears repeating that the Portal is not in any way a federal voting database; instead, it establishes a mechanism whereby states can provide data, which is fully within their possession and control, regarding Federal Ballot mailings.

To begin, the Postal Service is continuing to accept and deliver ballot mail, including Federal Ballot Mail, from election officials and voters. The proposed rule does not end or prevent mail-in or absentee voting, contrary to the mistaken claims raised in comments. As explained above, the Postal Service is continuing to carry out its core statutory mission in a uniform, neutral, and nondiscriminatory manner. Nothing in this rule need prevent that outcome, as states will retain full control over who is (or is not) permitted to vote by mail in their jurisdiction.

The rule introduces new mailpiece preparation requirements and data reporting standards for Federal Ballot Mail that must be satisfied prior to presenting Outbound Federal Ballot Mail for acceptance into the mailstream. Thus, the final rule regulates Federal Ballot Mail, consistent with the Postal Service's core statutory function, not the franchise. Eligibility for mail-in and absentee voting will continue to be governed by state law; state and local election officials will still determine which individuals are eligible under these laws; and state and local election officials will determine whether completed ballots are eligible to be counted. To repeat, the Postal Service will not play any role in determining voter eligibility, maintaining voter rolls, or counting ballots. The Postal Service will not open ballot mail, including Federal Ballot Mail; will not know the contents of a ballot; will not know how an individual voted; and will not know an individual's political party affiliation.

However, as many commenters acknowledged, and consistent with the stated authority above, the Postal Service will generally not accept Outbound Federal Ballot mailings unless compliance with the rule's new standards has been verified, as further detailed below and in the final rule.

Section 705.24.2 of the rule creates an optional process through which a state's chief election official (including those representing DC and U.S. territories) may alert the Postal Service of the state's intent to allow mail-in or absentee ballots to be transmitted by the Postal Service. This notice may be given 90 days prior to a federal election. This provision does not require a response from the state official, and also does not require preparation of a list of individuals to whom a ballot will be mailed or coordination with local officials (although the state official may choose to do so).

Some commenters misunderstood the purpose of this optional notice. For instance, one comment from a former election official stated that the Postal Service is already well aware of whether a state intends to use its services. The purpose of this provision, however, is to facilitate pre-election planning, as some commenters accurately recognized. When the Postal Service knows that a state plans to send ballots for a federal election using the mail, it can conduct outreach on mail preparation, provide resources related to IMbs, and offer guidance on how to access and use the Federal Ballot Mail Portal. While the process to enroll in the Portal is straightforward, beginning this process sooner--as the 90-day notice would allow--will be logistically beneficial.

Alternatively, the chief state election official can provide no notice at all. This does not preclude the state from using the Postal Service to transmit mail-in and absentee ballots for federal elections. Ballots for federal elections may still be sent through the mail so long as the chief state election official, and any other Federal Ballot Mail Portal User, creates a Portal account, satisfies the rule's mail preparation requirements, enters the required information into the Portal, and successfully completes verification prior to their Outbound Federal Ballot Mail being accepting for mailing.

The chief state election official may also provide notice that they do not intend to transmit ballots using the mail or that they do not intend to use the Portal. This also provides the Postal Service with valuable information to plan its resources and may inform internal training.

It should also be emphasized that these notices are not binding. For example, if the chief state election official initially informs the Postal Service that they do not intend to use the Portal, they may later change their mind and send ballots using the mail by following the steps outlined above.

The rule makes several of the Postal Service's longstanding mailpiece design preparation recommendations required elements for Federal Ballot Mail. As many commenters recognized, these elements--the Official Election Mail logo, automation-compatible envelope design, uniquely serialized IMbs on outbound and return envelopes, and mailpiece design review--are not novel. Each of these design elements is already recommended in the Postal Service's Official Election Mail Guide (“Kit 600”) and included as a best practice in DMM 703.8.0. Some jurisdictions have, on their own initiative, already opted to implement these recommendations to varying degrees. However, nothing in the rule prevents or discourages election officials from including envelope design elements required by state law, such as printed affidavits. Nor does anything in the rule prevent states from complying with accessibility laws or including unique envelope design elements intended to accommodate voters covered by these laws. The rule will not create a single, uniform ballot envelope design across all states; variation will remain. Rather, as one commenter explained, what the rule adds is uniformity: it makes these proven measures a consistent baseline for every jurisdiction that mails federal ballots, closing the patchwork that today inhibits mailpiece visibility and can make it more difficult to process and deliver ballot mail.

The rule's design requirements help to ensure timely processing and delivery of Federal Ballot Mail. As explained in the proposed rule and as echoed by many commenters, envelopes built for automation move through processing with less manual intervention and fewer chances for error. A consistent, recognizable election mail logo helps postal employees distinguish ballot mail from other mailpieces and facilitates proper handling, in accordance with existing Postal Service policy. And unique IMb data helps facilitate the tracking of individual pieces of Federal Ballot Mail to and from individual voters as the barcodes are scanned on the Postal Service's mail processing equipment.

Some commenters, including election officials and election-related organizations, appeared confused about how to generate IMbs. Unique IMbs can be generated for any type of address, including P.O. Boxes and nontraditional addresses. Generating and printing unique IMbs does not require specialized equipment or expensive software. It can be done by election officials of any level of technical sophistication, including those jurisdictions that manually print and stuff their own ballot envelopes, using

free tools and common office equipment.

The Postal Service offers a number of tools and resources to make generating unique IMbs simple, quick, and cost-effective. For example, the Postal Service's Intelligent Mail for Small Business Tool (“IMsb Tool”) is a free (voluntary) online tool specifically designed for small-volume mailers that do not use Business Reply Mail, allowing such mailers to generate unique IMbs for printing on address labels or envelopes. The IMsb Tool is a web-based program that does not require any software or downloads. It allows small mailers to create mailings and documentation without making the investment of engaging software providers. Customers can upload their mailing list into the Tool to create and print address labels, envelopes, inserts or card stock and also generate the associated postage statements. The printing can be done from a regular printer. Some in the election community have printed the IMbs themselves using this tool for several years. More information about getting started in the IMsb Tool is available on PostalPro: https://postalpro.usps.com/node/2266.

The Postal Service also anticipates making modifications to the IMsb Tool to further enhance its functionality for Federal Ballot Mail. For instance, the Tool will be able to create lists for Portal submissions that contain a file with the name, address, and unique outbound and return IMb of individuals on the election official's mailing list. This file can be uploaded directly to the Portal by Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users. Another change for Federal Ballot Mail in the IMsb Tool will allow election officials to generate a unique IMb even where the address cannot be verified using Delivery Point Verification (“DPV”). Although DPV helps to identify issues that may hinder delivery, this modification will reduce the chance of an administrative or technical issue that could prevent an election official from generating a unique IMb.

Alternatively, if an election official prefers to work with a vendor, as many do, the Postal Service provides a list of certified vendors and Mail Service Providers (“MSPs”) at https://postalpro.usps.com/certifiedmsps/. It is a basic function of MSPs to print mailings with unique IMbs. To the extent they arise, printing issues, including jams, are surmountable and do not prevent proper implementation of the rule.

The Postal Service's Managers of Customer Relations (“MCRs”) are also available to provide guidance and support on mailpiece design as election officials work to comply with the rule. MCRs serve as dedicated points of contact for each election jurisdiction, including territories. They regularly educate election officials on the benefits of using unique IMbs and can direct election officials to available postal resources to help them get started. Election officials can contact their local MCR directly or by following this link: https://electionmail.usps.com/s/contact-local-mcr. Election Officials can also contact the Mailing & Shipping Solutions Center (“MSSC”) for support regarding IMbs by email at [email protected] or by phone at 1-877-672-0007 (Monday-Friday, 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. CT).

Once election officials or their vendors have designed the Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail envelope to include the required elements, as set forth in DMM 705.24.3, the mailpiece must be submitted to the Postal Service for review by one of its MDAs. The envelope design must be reviewed each election cycle. If a state uses a single design, each political subdivision thereof does not need to separately submit the envelope for review. Mailpieces do not need to be reviewed prior to each separate mailing.

The mailpiece design review referenced in 705.24.3 is the existing MDA review process that many in the election community already utilize. MDAs are specially trained postal employees who can answer questions about mailpiece design, including IMbs and automation compatibility. Consulting with Postal Service MDAs will help ensure election officials have a well-designed Federal Ballot Mail envelope that is compatible with Postal Service guidelines and regulations, including the provisions of this rule. Although MDAs are already trained to assess the design elements included in this rule, the Postal Service will provide supplemental training to MDAs on Federal Ballot Mail and will offer additional resources as necessary to ensure customers receive consistent, accurate advice.

The rule does not change the process for submitting a mailpiece for review, receiving feedback, or contesting an MDA's advice. Customers can receive assistance from an MDA by submitting a design review request to [email protected], through the Postal Service's Election Mail website at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/election-mail-review, or by calling 877-672-0007 (select option 3 for mailpiece design) (Monday- Friday, 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. CT).

MDA review is generally a quick process. MDAs typically aim to provide feedback to mailers within 2 business days after receiving the mailer's request and necessary information and samples.

More information about the MDA review process is available in Kit 600 or at https://postalpro.usps.com/node/773.

Under 705.24.4, Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users, including state and local election officials and other authorized users, such as MSPs, must submit certain data into the Federal Ballot Mail Portal prior to presenting an Outbound Federal Ballot mailing for acceptance. Chief state election officials are not required to enter this data themselves or to consolidate data for all political subdivisions within their state before data can be entered into the Portal. The chief state election official of each state does, however, authorize access for other Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users within their state. The rule also allows other individuals to enter information into the Portal if authorized, such as staff members, MSPs, or other vendors, thereby minimizing any potential administrative burden on election officials.

The Postal Service recognizes that many states have decentralized election administration. It is important that the state, through the chief state election official, maintain ultimate control over access to the Portal because they will have more visibility into their own election structures than will the Postal Service.

Voters themselves will not enroll with the Postal Service, and are not responsible for verifying Portal information or correcting information provided by Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users. In part, this is because voters do not design ballot mail envelopes and, consequently, do not have the relevant data elements for the Portal. Instead, that responsibility lies exclusively with election officials and their authorized MSPs.

Once Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users have set up a Portal account, they will be prompted to certify that their Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes have been submitted for MDA review and that they have received feedback. Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users will not be able to upload any data into the Portal until the certification is complete. This will ensure compliance with DMM 705.24.3.1 and 705.24.3.2 and reduces the information that is verified prior to acceptance of an Outbound Federal

Ballot mailing. Business Mail Entry Unit (“BMEU”) technicians and Retail clerks will not perform a separate review of this information.

After completing the certification, Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users must provide: the name and address of the voter as found on Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelope; the issuing state; and the IMbs on the Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes. This information must be uploaded to the Portal prior to presenting Outbound Federal Ballot Mail for acceptance. These data help to ensure that the rule's preparation standards have been satisfied, can provide valuable insight to election officials and law enforcement, and facilitate the verification process. This type of information is regularly collected by the Postal Service, including on mailing manifests. No other voter information, such as birthdate, social security number, or other voter registration details, will be uploaded to the Portal. As described further below, the Postal Service is developing this Portal with appropriate cybersecurity and privacy safeguards to protect Portal data, consistent with applicable law.

The required information can be uploaded into the Portal using an Excel template specifically formatted for Portal submission. Uploading and generating the necessary information is similar to submitting a manifest for bulk mailings, which larger election offices and their MSPs routinely complete. For smaller jurisdictions, the (free and optional) IMsb Tool can be used to generate a file that can be uploaded directly into the Portal. This will help minimize any data entry burden. The Postal Service does not anticipate that providing Portal data should require any change to statewide systems or databases. States must necessarily already maintain lists or databases with the relevant name and address information, otherwise it would never have been possible to mail those ballots in the first place. These systems are intended to remain separate, and do not need to be interconnected with the Portal. One commenter mentioned that states may wish to update their databases to include IMb data. States are free to undertake such actions, but it is not required by the rule.

Under the proposed rule, there is a flexible timeline for uploading data into the Portal. Initial mailing lists should be entered into the Portal at least 30 days before the election, if possible, or by the date on which ballots must begin being mailed under state law. This 30- day timeline, retained without modification in the final rule, is not a rigid deadline for completing Portal data entry. Although Executive Order 14399 contemplated a proposal in which states would submit such lists “no fewer than 60 days before the election,” the flexible 30- day timeline accommodates variations in state law.

The Postal Service does not expect these initial lists to be complete or final. States may continue to add, amend, or remove data from the Portal to account for new voters, new mail-in or absentee ballot requests, replacement ballots, addressing administrative errors, and other changes consistent with their state's law. These changes can be made as a new separate entry or by updating prior entries. This flexibility is intended to facilitate--not constrain--voters' ability to access mail-in or absentee voting as permitted by their own state's voting law, none of which are altered by this rule.

Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users can update the information submitted through the Portal as frequently as needed, consistent with state law. This process is designed to be flexible to account for variation in state law. For example, as one commenter explained, California Elections Code Section 3000.5(a) dictates when county election officials are to mail ballots to registered voters. Section 3005.5(a) provides, in part: “for each election, the elections official shall, no later than 29 days before the day of the election, begin mailing the materials specified in Section 3010 to every registered voter. The elections official shall have five days to mail a ballot to each person who is registered to vote on the 29th day before the day of the election and five days to mail a ballot to each person who is subsequently registered to vote.” Under California law, a voter may also register as late as 15 days before an election and will subsequently be sent a ballot via mail. Even after the 15th day before an election, voters may request a replacement mail ballot upon request to their county election official. This state statutory scheme is consistent with the rule. California election officials could submit initial mailing lists into the Portal 30 days (or sooner) before the election and present Outbound Federal Mailings for acceptance “no later than 29 days before the day of the election,” consistent with state law. California election officials may continue to add Portal entries for Outbound Federal Ballot Mail destined for voters who register after that time and until the 15th day before the election, and even after the 15th day before the election may continue to make supplemental entries for any replacement requests.

The ability to add and amend lists also allows Authorized Ballot Mailers to enter Outbound Federal Ballot Mail in batches, consistent with the current practice for many in the election community. Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users may continue to supplement the Portal data as permitted by state law, potentially up until Election Day. The only constraint imposed by the rule in this regard is that the information for a particular mailing must be uploaded into the Portal prior to the Outbound Federal Ballot mailing being presented to the Postal Service for acceptance. Thus, the Portal and verification process accommodate election officials who (for example) may do one large mailing and multiple smaller mailings. It also accommodates election officials who prepare many ballots for mailing at once but enter them into the mailstream in multiple installments.

Portal data will be updated as soon as it is submitted by the Federal Ballot Mail Portal User, and there should be minimal to no delay between Portal upload and a mailer's ability to present the mailing for acceptance. Portal data will also be available for verification purposes on a nationwide basis. If an Outbound Federal Ballot mailing is presented for acceptance outside of the issuing state, Postal Service employees would still have access to the necessary Portal data to perform verification under DMM 705.24.5.

Within the Portal, the Postal Service plans to confirm that the required data fields are completed (i.e., they may not be left blank) prior to Outbound Federal Ballot mailings being presented for acceptance. This includes verifying the unique IMb on Return Federal Ballot Mail has been uploaded into the Portal. Aside from confirming that the required data has been uploaded, however, the Postal Service will not otherwise verify, correct, or amend any data entered into the Portal. It will not determine whether an individual's name is accurate; so, for example, married women changing their names or potential mismatches for misspellings will not prevent a ballot from reaching a voter under the rule. Likewise, the Postal Service will not assess the accuracy of the address entered, such as to determine whether there is a Change of Address or whether the address is otherwise invalid. Moreover, the address uploaded into the Portal should be the address used on the Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelope. Nontraditional addresses, such as tribal addresses, college dormitories, and long-term care facilities, can and should be entered into the Portal if that is the address on the Outbound Federal Ballot envelope. Voters who may move often,

like students, the homeless, the elderly, renters, or people whose mailing addresses do not match identically with government records, should not experience delivery issues under the rule so long as their state or local election official has their current mailing address.

The Postal Service will not be comparing any data entered into the Portal against state voter rolls as part of the verification process or otherwise. This means that state election officials will maintain full control over managing their own voter rolls and determining voter eligibility without any interference or involvement from the Postal Service.

All data or changes submitted by Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users will be accepted. The possibility that the Portal may, therefore, be overinclusive does not undermine the purposes of the rule as the State Mail-In and Absentee Participation List, which compiles all Portal data for a state and is not intended to serve as a replacement for official voter rolls.

Finally, shortly after the effective date of the final rule, the Postal Service will make additional guidance documents available, including a User Guide for the Portal and Technical Specifications for the Portal. These resources will explain how to create a Portal account, how to assign and approve Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users, the file format for Portal uploads, and how to resolve errors and make new submissions; these documents will be available in accessible formats. The Postal Service has an established process for communicating new or updated technical requirements that it will deploy to inform election officials, MSPs, and others in the mailing community about the Portal and these resources. This process includes familiar communications channels, including Industry Alerts and Mailers Technical Advisory Committee User Group notifications, which help to ensure that the information reaches the appropriate audience. MCRs are also available to assist individual customers by email and phone. The Postal Service will also directly engage with election officials, MSPs, and other stakeholders to answer questions and provide guidance related to implementation of the rule.

When preparing Outbound Federal Ballot mailings, Authorized Ballot Mailers must segregate Outbound Federal Ballot Mail from other types of ballot mail, such as primary ballots, UOCAVA ballots, or ballots for state or local elections only. Comingling non-federal ballot mail with Outbound Federal Ballot Mail may impact the verification process and could prevent or delay proper acceptance of mailings. For ballots that have both federal and state issues on the ballot, the mailing will be treated as Outbound Federal Ballot Mail and will be subject to the rule. At entry, mailers should inform the BMEU technician or Retail clerk if a ballot mailing contains non-federal ballots. Timing differences (between primaries and general elections or between federal and state elections) and external indicia may also help alert postal employees to the presence of non-Federal Ballot Mail.

The Postal Service is also working on establishing Federal Election Mail and Non-Federal Election Mail Service Type Identifiers (“STIDs”). Specifically, the Postal Service is planning to convert the current Election Mail STIDs to Federal Election Mail STIDs. New STIDs will be developed for non-Federal elections. This approach will assist jurisdictions that may have already finalized the printing process for their 2026 general election envelopes relying on the existing STID table, and will support their ability to comply with the final rule. Having unique STIDs for Federal and non-Federal elections will help to further distinguish Federal Ballot Mail from other ballot mail. Prior to finalizing and releasing the new STIDs, the Postal Service will publish a notice in the Federal Register.

As stated in the proposed rule, Outbound Federal Ballot mailings must be entered at a Post Office retail counter, including manual post offices, or a BMEU. A locator tool for Postal Service locations is available here: https://tools.usps.com/locations/. These mailings may not be entered into blue collection boxes, collection boxes in retail lobbies, or through other means. While the rule makes this restriction mandatory, it is also consistent with the Postal Service's general guidance for outbound ballot mailings. Commercial mailings must meet applicable DMM requirements. Mailings paid at single-piece First Class Mail rates are not required to meet commercial mailing standards.

Verification under 705.24.5 will be performed at a BMEU or Post Office retail counter when an Outbound Federal Ballot mailing is presented for acceptance. Conducting verification prior to acceptance is intended to obviate confusion and provide a clear, immediate identification of potential issues. Either a BMEU technician, if the mailing is presented at a BMEU, or Retail clerk, if the mailing is presented at a Post Office or other Postal Service retail location, will perform the verification. Both BMEU technicians and Retail clerks will receive training on this process.

The verification process is straightforward. The Outbound Federal Ballot mailings will be verified using the IMb on the outside of the Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelope. Relying on existing scanning technology and devices, the Postal Service will confirm the presence of scanned barcodes in the Federal Ballot Mail Portal. Portal data will be available for verification purposes on a nationwide basis. Therefore, if a state uses an MSP located in a state different than the issuing state of the ballot, the Postal Service will still be able to conduct verification.

This process can be completed promptly. Scanning a barcode generally takes less than a minute per mailpiece. Depending on how many barcodes are scanned, the verification process should take no more than a few hours for larger mailings, and potentially only a few minutes for smaller mailings. Authorized Ballot Mailers should remain at the BMEU or postal retail location during the verification process.

If the Outbound Federal Ballot mailing meets the verification standards, it will be accepted by the Postal Service. No further action is needed by election officials or voters under the rule.

Authorized Ballot Mailers will be informed of the escalation procedures should they decide to challenge a rejection; relevant Postal Service employees will also receive training about these procedures. The ability to cure rests not with the voter, as the franchise itself is not impacted, but with the officials responsible for preparing the envelope and entering Portal data. This approach is consistent with how election mail works now, where election officials and mailers are responsible for preparing the ballot mail, addressing the mailpieces properly, ensuring that they are going to the proper individual, and correcting any error that may occur or prevent delivery to the intended recipient. Thus, the Postal Service will continue to resolve issues consistent with our current approach, rather than creating a new “appeal” process for voters, as many commenters urged, that would impose a direct burden on voters and increase the risk of confusion and concern.

Once Outbound Federal Ballot Mail is accepted by the Postal Service, it will enter and move through the mailstream as it has in prior elections. It will not be intercepted, returned, or delayed due to the rule.

The verification process does not entail scrutiny into, or any attempt to evaluate, individual voters. The Postal Service is not verifying addresses, names, voter eligibility, or citizenship status as part of this verification process. As noted above, Portal data will be regularly refreshed to minimize the risk that the verification process incorrectly flags, delays, or disrupts lawful federal ballot materials.

Verification under DMM 705.24.5 is done only for Outbound Federal Ballot mailings. If a voter chooses to return their completed ballot by mail, they should use the Federal Return Ballot Mail envelope provided by their state; and they may continue to mail from a residential mailbox, a blue collection box, or any retail counter. Once the Federal Return Ballot Mail enters the mailstream, it will be processed and delivered consistently with current operational practices. This includes generating scan data from the unique IMb on the outer return envelope when the mailpiece is processed on the Postal Service's automated equipment subject to certain limitations, including extraordinary measures that may remove ballots from normal operational processes to expedite delivery.

The Postal Service also wishes to clarify two provisions of the proposed rule, which are adopted without change in the final rule. First, the Postal Service would like to clarify the meaning of Section 705.24.5.2, which provides in part that “[t]he Postal Service's acceptance of Outbound Federal Ballot Mail does not constitute verified compliance.” This provision was included in recognition of the fact that, despite the Postal Service's best efforts, some Outbound Federal Mail may enter the mailstream that does not meet the preparation or data standards set forth in the rule. For that reason, DMM 705.24.5.2 is intended to acknowledge that acceptance (and ultimately delivery) of an outbound federal ballot does not, in and of itself, evidence compliance with the rule's provisions.

Second, commenters expressed concern over 705.24.5.3.d, which states that “[t]he Postal Service assumes no responsibility for any outbound ballot mailing presented until it is accepted into the mail. The Postal Service is not responsible for service delays when the Ballot Portal User or Authorized Ballot Mailer does not meet the applicable preparation or entry standards.” The Postal Service notes that comparable statements appear throughout the DMM, and that the provision reflects the longstanding principle that the Postal Service is not responsible for a mailing until the mailing is in its custody-- that is, until it has been accepted. For example, DMM 608.11.3 (Postmarks and Postal Possession) describes the point at which the “Postal Service accept[s] custody of a mailpiece,” and the Plant- Verified Drop Shipment provisions of DMM 705 provide that such shipments “are freight until deposited and accepted as mail at the destination facility.” The specific language in 705.24.5.3.d is similar to a provision discussing the effects on service for Metered Mail Drop Shipments, which also must satisfy specific preparation conditions to be accepted for mailing. DMM 705.19.1. That provision states: “The USPS assumes no responsibility for the material presented until it is accepted into the mail. The USPS is not responsible for service delays when the mailer does not meet the applicable preparation or entry requirements.” This language is included in the rule to ensure that mailers know that they must remain in control of an Outbound Federal Ballot mailing until it has been accepted by the Postal Service.

On or about Election Day, the Postal Service will generate a state- specific Mail-In and Absentee Participation List, which compiles all Federal Ballot Mail Portal entries submitted for the originating state. This list will be securely transmitted to the chief election official of each state. The Postal Service will not disclose the Lists to the public. The List is in effect a manifest, and is primarily intended to assist election officials and law enforcement to understand who may have been mailed a ballot, in order to identify potentially anomalous incidents that may merit further investigation. Providing the list on or after Election Day is consistent with this purpose.

To be clear, the state-specific Lists are not intended to substitute for or supplant state voter rolls. It simply offers another data point at the chief state election official's disposal based on their own Portal data. The chief state election official is free to choose whether and how to use the state-specific list. Those decisions are not dictated by the Postal Service or this rule. States have sole responsibility for ensuring the accuracy of their voter rolls and counting ballots as permitted under state law.

The Portal data is the sole data source used to generate the Lists. These data are provided directly by election officials (and other Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users) based on the mailings they actually made or planned to make. The List will not be based on external sources of information, such as federal databases made available by the Department of Homeland Security or the Social Security Administration. Nor will the Postal Service compare Portal data to any other internal or external source (e.g., National Change of Address data, federal data lists), filter the information, or otherwise alter the Portal data on its own when compiling the state-specific List. The Lists will also not contain any scan data. As one commenter correctly stated, the rule “require[s] USPS to provide the state with the List that contained the same information that the state provided to USPS.”

In light of the above, some commenters questioned the purpose of the Lists. Other commenters recognized that the value of the List lies in the creation of reconcilable data that offer a neutral administrative check that strengthens confidence in elections. These commenters argued that credible post-election audits can rise or fall on the quality of the underlying data. The state-specific List would meaningfully sharpen that data by providing significantly enhanced visibility regarding the sending of mail-in ballots, as it will provide federal law enforcement with a list of individuals to whom states planned to mail a ballot (and who may potentially use the mail to vote), along with the associated barcode data, which the Postal Service understands will help to facilitate enforcement of federal law. Currently, law enforcement lacks such information regarding the use of the mail. The List is not intended to substitute for official election records or state mandated reconciliation procedures. In assessing the List for areas of potential further investigation, it should also be noted that some variation may exist between the List and the (separate) scan data for a variety of reasons, for example not all voters who receive a mail-in ballot will return it by mail, and as noted above the Portal data may be over-inclusive. The benefits of the rule are still achieved notwithstanding these variations.

Those commenters who supported the rule believed that the benefits to the rule are aligned with the rule's intended purpose and that the rule's policy goals are properly weighed against the potential burdens, harms, and costs. They urged the Postal Service to swiftly adopt the proposed rule, so that all federal elections could benefit from its stated improvements, including mailpiece visibility and the enforcement of federal law.

As an initial matter, these comments acknowledged that mail ballots play an important role for many voters, but also had concerns related to voter fraud. These commenters noted that even the possibility that elections are taking place in an unsecure manner due to lack of necessary visibility can undermine public confidence in the electoral process, even if no fraud is ultimately discovered. These commenters asserted that given the prevalence of mail-in voting, it would be both appropriate and beneficial for the government entity tasked with delivering ballots to and from the voter and the election office to put safeguards in place. Many of these commenters argued that by making the mailstream more reliable and more transparent on a nationwide basis, the rule would provide states with a means to combat potential voter fraud in ways they could not do acting alone. Commenters note that this would strengthen public confidence in the election system without altering any state election laws, voter registration, or eligibility requirements; or changing how ballots are issued, collected, or counted. As one comment explained: public confidence in elections is best sustained by procedures that can be verified, documented, and consistently applied.

Moreover, these commenters recognized that the rule offers efficiency and security benefits for voters and election officials, and promotes secure elections that the public can be confident in. Commenters note that a set of minimum envelope-design standards would help election officials, the Postal Service, and the public better account for Federal Ballot Mail moving through the mailstream. As several commenters explained, a ballot that can be tracked is far harder to misplace, stall, or counterfeit. Improved tracking may also help identify discrepancies between ballots mailed and ballots received, some commenters added, making it easier to detect and deter potential fraud or irregularities while protecting the integrity of mail-in voting. Even parties opposing the rule recognized that unique IMbs can provide unmatched visibility into the mailpiece's progress in the mailstream. Commenters also reiterated the importance of the Official Election Mail logo as a means for voters to recognize election mail as important and distinct from other mailings and to help Postal Service employees identify official election mail among the millions of mailpieces processed daily. Commenters further explained that advance review of ballot envelope designs would reduce operational errors, delays, and delivery issues that have sometimes affected voters and delayed delivery of their ballots. As examples, commenters pointed out that non-automation compatible ballot mail is more likely to encounter avoidable processing complications or delays, and other mailpiece design defects could prevent barcodes from being read or increase the need for manual handling. Commenters concluded that requiring design review before ballot envelopes are printed and mailed is a low-cost, high-value step that can prevent serious problems during the compressed period before an election.

Furthermore, these commenters state that the rule's other preparation and data entry requirements, particularly those involving the Portal, would support stronger coordination between state election officials and the Postal Service. For example, the rule would improve pre-election planning by allowing states to notify the Postal Service before using the postal system for ballot delivery. States would still retain full control over who receives a ballot, and the Postal Service would have better information to plan resources. Many election officials who submitted comments, including those who opposed the rule, expressed appreciation for the Postal Service's ongoing efforts to support election officials. The rule, some commenters noted, provides another avenue to strengthen those relationships. Many commenters concluded that by improving coordination between election officials and the Postal Service, the proposed rule has the potential to reduce undeliverable election mail, strengthen ballot accountability, and reinforce public confidence that election mail is being sent to the correct recipients.

These commenters further contend that applying reasonable verification procedures to federal election ballots is consistent with the Postal Service's longstanding mission of delivering mail accurately, securely, and reliably. Commenters noted that verification, as contemplated in the rule, does not alter the states' authority to determine voter eligibility or administer elections. Rather, it provides an additional administrative safeguard to help ensure that ballots approved by election officials are delivered accurately to the intended recipient. Commenters opposing and supporting the rule noted the extensive efforts election officials undertake to maintain accurate voter rolls. Those in favor of the proposed rule argue that rather than duplicating, undermining, or usurping these efforts, the rule strengthens ballot distribution procedures as a logical complement to states' election administration responsibilities.

Ultimately, these commenters reasoned that while the rule would place some administrative burdens on states, as they take advantage of the new Portal registration, barcode generation, and list submission provisions, these burdens are plainly justified by the rule's security and accountability benefits. Overall, in their view, the rule's standards would improve accountability without displacing the role of states in deciding who is eligible to vote or how elections are administered. The operational improvements that the rule mandates would benefit voters of every political affiliation because they promote accuracy, efficiency, and transparency in the administration of federal elections. These commenters explained that public confidence in elections is strengthened when every stage of ballot distribution is transparent. They also opined that the rule would help facilitate the appropriate direction of resources to law enforcement efforts.