Ballot Mail for Federal Elections

Separate from arguments, discussed above, about the legal authority for the rule, numerous commenters opposing the rule also criticized it for purportedly failing to account for the potential burdens and other alleged harms it would impose on voters and election officials, not addressing associated reliance interests, and not adequately demonstrating a connection between the proposed rule's provisions and its stated goal. These commenters asserted that a rule of this nature should be based on detailed study, should be gradually rolled out, and should move forward only after election officials and the Postal Service are fully prepared for implementation. In particular, these commenters argued that a rule of this nature should not be issued roughly three months before an election. These commenters contended that the Postal Service should not finalize this rule without a reasoned explanation, a full implementation analysis, and an

assessment of foreseeable civil rights impacts. Commenters strongly urged the Postal Service not to finalize it. Voters

Those opposed to the rule expressed concern about the possibility of disenfranchisement. They contended that voters may be omitted from the Portal with no recourse, that an administrative or technical error may result in an otherwise lawful ballot being rejected by the Postal Service, or that voters may not receive a ballot at all if their state government chooses not to provide data in the Portal. Any of these scenarios, commenters argued, could result in voters having their mail- in or absentee ballots withheld or delayed, without any recourse or viable alternative to cast a ballot. Commenters asserted that some voters may be especially impacted should their ability to vote by mail be altered in any way, including those who are disabled, are elderly, have limited English proficiency, live in rural-dwelling, or are financially distressed. According to commenters, voters would bear the practical consequence of any delivery delay, even if the delay was caused by an administrative process outside the voter's control. Commenters asserted that the rule would discourage individuals from voting by mail. Other commenters argued that any policy that could result in the delay, rejection, segregation, or differential treatment of mail ballots raises concerns regarding voter access, election administration, and public confidence in the democratic process.

Commenters also discussed the risks of confusion that the rule would purportedly create, particularly because voters may not know if their state has complied with or will be able to comply with the rule. These commenters claimed that the potential for voter confusion due to the rule is a harm in and of itself.

Others expressed concerns for their privacy and did not want voter information included in a Portal run by the federal government or their identity linked to uniquely serialized IMbs on Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes. Election Officials

Among the most frequently raised concerns from commenters opposing the rule was the purported burden imposed on election officials, specifically if the rule were implemented immediately. Commenters, particularly election officials, secretaries of state, governmental officials, and voting organizations, stated that it would be difficult if not impossible to implement the rule in time for the 2026 general election. Election officials asserted that their preparations for the 2026 election are already underway and that they lack the time, funding, and staff to implement the proposed rule. Some commenters asserted that they have already purchased envelopes for the 2026 election cycle, and that generating unique barcodes for both outbound and return ballot mailings in some cases would require significant changes to their ballot envelope design, as well as procurement of those redesigned envelopes on an expedited timeline, which they assert would not be possible. Other commenters explained that in some cases, legislative action, Attorney General guidance, or state board approval are needed before such changes could be made. Some commenters posited that smaller and more rural counties with limited technology would be disproportionately affected, while others thought complying with the rule would be more onerous for election officials in states that have universal mail-in voting compared to states that do not mail absentee ballots unless requested by the voter.

Commenters also argued that the rule would impose new and recurring costs and administrative burdens for future elections cycles that do not currently exist. In this regard, commenters note that election systems are designed around state law, existing technology systems, vendor contracts, staffing structures, election calendars, and operational procedures that have been developed over time, and introducing new reporting, certification, and verification processes for Federal Ballot Mail would, in their view, require significant modifications to existing workflows and systems. Having previously relied on current procedures in structuring their budgets, staffing, and election timelines, commenters note that states would have to absorb any new costs, which those plans never contemplated.

Complying with the mail preparation and data-reporting standards, commenters asserted, would require them to divert resources away from processing voter registration applications and mail-in or absentee ballot applications, and in some instances the staffing necessary to implement the proposed rule may not be available at all. Election officials also asserted that there will be additional costs for direct voter contact, and other voter education efforts required to explain the rule to voters and to respond to related inquiries, including an increase in support calls. Reliance Interests

Other commenters argued that, when a federal entity issues new standards, it must assess whether there were reliance interests, determine whether these interests were significant, and weigh any such interests against competing policy concerns, and alleged that the Postal Service has failed to do so. Commenters argued that the rule would create a “one size fits all” federal policy that would displace established state and local practices driven by the needs of different localities and grounded in reliance on the Postal Service's dependable transmission of mail-in and absentee ballots. As noted above, commenters further focused on reliance interests related to preparations for the 2026 election cycle. Relationship of the Rule to Its Intended Purpose

Commenters argued that the proposed rule was not sufficiently tied to its stated purpose--namely to help ensure election integrity, fraud prevention, and facilitation of federal law enforcement. In their view, the proposed rule provides no empirical evidence or other explanation to articulate why existing election mail procedures are deficient, what operational problem would be solved by the Portal, or how IMb data would help mitigate or investigate election crimes. Numerous commenters also argued that, the proposed rule would not provide any material new information to law enforcement.

Some commenters who opposed 705.24.4 and 705.24.5 were supportive of the mailpiece envelope design provisions of 705.24.3. However, those commenters noted that many of the envelope design best practices the rule would mandate are already available and used voluntarily. Commenters argued that converting these recommendations into federal requirements adds cost and operational risk for election officials without counterbalancing benefits. Evaluating Less Restrictive Alternatives

Several commenters also argued that the Postal Service should evaluate less restrictive alternatives. For example commenters suggested: voluntary pilot programs, phased implementation after the 2026 election cycle or a capacity-adjusted implementation timeline, aggregate or post-mailing reconciliation, data minimization, hashed or non-voter-identifying records, safe harbors for minor or correctable defects, mandatory acceptance during Portal outages,

making the data entry standards optional, and emergency escalation procedures for replacement ballots, late-added voters, court-ordered ballots, and small-volume local mailings. Other commenters argued that rejection of Outbound Federal Ballot Mail for failure to satisfy preparation and data entry standards is a disproportionate consequence compared to the monetary penalties imposed elsewhere in the DMM for failing to meet other preparation or eligibility standards after an administrative review. See DMM 607.

After careful consideration of these various viewpoints, and the comments discussing these issues, the Postal Service is moving to finalize the proposed rule, subject to certain modifications explained in “Revisions Adopted in the Final Rule.”

The Postal Service has thoroughly explained the rationale for imposing mail preparation and data reporting requirements as set forth in the proposed rule, which are necessary to help promote the faithful execution of federal law and advance the Postal Service's ability to efficiently handle Federal Ballot Mail. While the Postal Service's existing processes are designed to support the timely delivery and smooth processing of ballot mail, it has long recognized that across- the-board compliance with its longstanding recommendations would further improve efficient handling, processing, and delivery. This would benefit the Postal Service, election officials, and voters alike. Moreover, while the Postal Service currently does obtain scan data for some ballot mail that could be useful for law-enforcement purposes, mandating compliance with the data reporting and mail-preparation requirements for all Federal Ballot Mail would significantly improve the quality of that data. This visibility will, in turn, put law enforcement in a better position to identify any potential issues regarding compliance with federal law that may merit further investigation.

Weighing these benefits and the operational needs of the Postal Service, the rule is intended to minimize the burden and impact on voters and election officials, while still achieving the rule's purposes. Under this rule, states will retain complete autonomy to determine voter eligibility to use the mail to vote, as they do today. If their state complies with the rule's relatively modest mail preparation and data entry standards, voters should not experience any difference from the status quo. The Postal Service anticipates that all states will make a good faith effort to comply with the rule, consistent with the belief expressed by some commenters, thereby enabling eligible voters to continue to use the mail to vote. Overall, the rule imposes requirements that are rationally and carefully tailored to the underlying purposes of the rule. The Postal Service would also reiterate that the rule does not mandate that states administer elections in a “one size fits all” manner; on the contrary, state election laws and practices will continue to vary in accordance with state law, as states will retain control over the manner of their elections, unaltered by the rule. The rule requires merely that states that choose to use the U.S. mail as part of their elections adhere to certain standard mailpiece design and data reporting standards when sending Federal Ballot Mail.

The Postal Service also notes that some commenters narrowly focused their concerns on the purportedly substantial costs and practical challenges that election officials would presently face in attempting to comply with the rule for the November 2026 general election. The Postal Service recognizes that the rule would require states to adjust their processes and adapt to the changes imposed by the rule, potentially incurring new costs. While the Postal Service has weighed these considerations, including the possibility that some jurisdictions would need to order new ballot envelopes and devote resources to complying with the new envelope-design standards and reporting requirements, those considerations have to be balanced against the benefits of the rule, and in particular the fact that these standards are necessary to ensure the faithful execution of federal law. Given that mail-in ballots subject to this rule are generally mailed in September or thereafter, an immediate effective date ensures the maximum possible time for election officials to adjust their ballot mail envelopes to meet the new preparation standards if necessary, and to prepare to submit data to the Portal once it becomes active. This promotes states' and political subdivisions' ability to successfully implement the rule prior to the 2026 general election with good faith efforts and the available postal resources, notwithstanding the comments that described this task as “impossible.” And despite any logistical or financial difficulties states may face complying with the rule, including some claims that immediate implementation would prove impossible, the visibility and law-enforcement benefits of the rule, including for this election cycle, are such that there is no compelling reason for any delay. In recognition of the potential burdens on election officials and the timeline involved, the Postal Service will make available considerable educational and other support resources discussed above to assist election officials with implementation and help facilitate timely compliance with the rule.

The Postal Service has also considered alternatives to the proposed rule, including both more and less restrictive options. The Postal Service received comments proposing a number of alternatives including: using registered mail to transmit ballots; performing verification of additional forms of data (including name, address, or Return Federal Ballot Mail envelope IMb); expanding the rule to cover primaries or all voters; making all of the rule's provisions optional; eliminating verification and rejection procedures; and not requiring a unique IMb on return ballot envelopes.

As explained above, the Postal Service believes the proposed rule, as modified in the final rule, is appropriate in scale and scope. A more restrictive approach is unnecessary to achieve the goals of the rule and realize the related benefits. At the same time, the sensitivity of Outbound Federal Ballot Mail, the importance of voter confidence and election security, and the ability to support law enforcement purposes that are necessary to ensure the faithful execution of federal law require the inclusion of the verification and rejection procedures as set forth in 704.24.5 in order to fulfill the purposes of the rule. A less restrictive approach would not achieve all of the rule's benefits. For example, scans from unique IMbs provide a level of visibility into individual mailpieces that is not possible using non-serialized IMbs. The Postal Service agrees with commenters that this visibility is dependent on the mailpieces being scanned, and believes that the potential for improved visibility made possible by the use of unique IMbs on both Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail better serves the intended goals of the rule than if a unique IMb were only on Outbound Federal Ballot Mail. Moreover, if the rule were not applied in a consistent, nationwide fashion (e.g., if its provisions only applied to some ballot mail, were optional, or if there were a phased roll-out), it may prevent the full benefits of the rule from being realized, prove unadministrable, and could potentially cause confusion and delays.

The final rule creates an appropriate balance of the purported burdens

imposed by the rule against its intended benefits. As one commenter explained, election integrity and voter access are complementary goals. Any regulatory changes should strengthen public confidence while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the timely and reliable delivery of election mail. This rule properly balances those considerations.

Numerous commenters expressed concern over the Postal Service's ability to successfully implement this rule. They expressed concern over whether the Postal Service had the necessary financial resources and staffing capacity and conjectured that proposed rule would saddle the Postal Service with election administration functions; require additional clerks, mailpiece design personnel, information technology support staff, and other human resources; and impose new obligations on retail offices and field operations.

Other commenters sought clarification about the training that postal employees would need to perform the new processes set forth in the rule. Other commenters, including some postal employees, questioned whether postal employees could satisfy their obligations under the Hatch Act and to the public under the rule.

The Postal Service is prepared to implement the rule, consistent with its legal obligations and available resources. The Postal Service already possesses the necessary staffing capacity at BMEUs and retail locations as well as mail acceptance infrastructure necessary to administer the rule: wholly new institutional capacity does not need to be built from scratch. The Postal Service currently operates nationwide digital systems through the Business Customer Gateway and PostalOne!, and business mailers must already submit mailing documentation electronically. The Postal Service also maintains centralized support channels, including the MDA help desk. Furthermore, as stated in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Postal Service has available or will soon publish resources to assist election officials with compliance, including technical instructions on barcode creation, service type identifiers, acceptance processes, file preparation, documentation submission, and entry of data into the proposed portal. The addition of a new compliance review for a small subset of overall mail volume is not expected to require additional staff or be a significant burden on employees. Since the rule builds on processes already in place for election mail, its implementation should not prove inordinately costly. The Postal Service is able to balance the cost of implementing the rule, including developing the Portal, with the costs required to fulfill its other core operational responsibilities.

As explained above, there are only a few categories of employees who will be directly responsible for verifying compliance with the rule under 705.24.5, namely BMEU technicians, Retail clerks, and discrete support functions like employees in the PCSC. For employees in direct operational roles, the new pre-acceptance verification measures are similar to, and are no more onerous than, other mailing manifest reviews. With respect to other provisions in the rule, the Postal Service also recognizes that MDAs will see an increase in mailpiece design review requests under the rule. The Postal Service is committed to ensuring this process is completed in a timely manner, consistent with current customer expectations.

The Postal Service agrees that proper training to ensure nationwide consistency is important. The Postal Service is developing specific training for employees who will be directly responsible for conducting verification under the rule. Retail clerks and BMEU technicians will be trained on how to identify Federal Outbound Ballot Mail and what the scanning verification process requires. The training will be rolled out and conducted consistently with the Postal Service's usual processes. Additionally, MDAs will receive training on the rule's design requirements and recordkeeping requirements.

It is important to remember that the vast majority of employees will not experience a change in their responsibilities as a result of the rule. For example, letter carriers and employees in delivery and processing functions will not have any new responsibilities. These employees will continue to process and deliver ballot mail, including Federal Ballot Mail, and all other election mail, consistent with existing Postal Service processes, procedures, and guidance. Letter carriers and employees in processing and delivery functions will not validate, withhold, delay, or remove ballots in the mailstream.

The rule's requirements should not impact how the Postal Service processes and delivers Federal Ballot Mail. Longstanding processing and delivery practices for completed ballots that enter the mainstream will remain unchanged. As noted, designing automation compatible mailpieces, inclusion of the Official Election Mail logo, serialized IMbs on both the outbound and return ballots, and MDA mailpiece review have long been key components of the Postal Service's best practices guidance for ballot mail. Ensuring compliance with these longstanding recommendations, together with verification processes for IMbs on Outbound Federal Ballot Mail, lie within the Postal Service's zone of competence, and can therefore be incorporated into the Postal Service's normal course of operations.

The Postal Service would also note that the rule does not implicate the Hatch Act, as it neither directs nor authorizes any partisan political activity as defined by that Act by Postal Service employees.

The Postal Service received a number of comments concerned that creating a centralized data repository with voter information would make elections less secure. These comments argued that creating a centralized Portal establishes a high-value target for state-sponsored cyberattacks, other data breaches, and election disruption, and that the recent rise of AI-enhanced hacking technology increases these risks. For these commenters, the value of the Portal is minimal because it is, they argue, largely duplicative of existing state systems, and, in their view, does not justify the risk. Commenters contend that decentralized election systems improve election security.

Some commenters were concerned about the Postal Service's ability to maintain and protect data in complex, public-facing systems, with a few commenters suggesting technology, services, and other resources that the Postal Service could use to create the Portal. Commenters noted that system outages, technical malfunction or cyberattacks impacting the Portal could impact, or potentially halt, Outbound Federal Ballot mailings across multiple states simultaneously. Others emphasized that neither the Portal nor any related technical specifications are currently available; as a result, these commenters questioned whether election offices (especially those in small or under-resourced jurisdictions) would have the time and technical capacity to build the required data files immediately.

The Postal Service has extensive experience in developing, maintaining, and safeguarding public-facing data systems. The Postal Service faces ongoing cyberthreats and challenges

that could directly impact customers, partners, and employees, and it is well prepared to defend against these threats. The Postal Service's Corporate Information Security Office (CISO) protects its critical stakeholders by safeguarding the postal network, monitoring threats, and responding to incidents. As with comparable organizations in the government and private-sector, cybersecurity is a top priority for the Postal Service.

Against this backdrop, the Postal Service maintains a vast commercial public-facing website and has a number of existing systems for mailers to enter data to satisfy other mail preparation standards. It also has experience in quickly developing and deploying public- facing websites, like the website created to facilitate ordering and distribution of COVID-19 test kits. These are high-volume systems that maintain sensitive data. The Postal Service has specific guidelines and protocols in place for protecting and handling the sensitive and critical data contained within these systems. In short, contrary to commenters' claims and concerns, the Postal Service has meaningful experience developing and operating a system like the Portal.

The Portal will contain multi-layered security controls, including encrypted data transmission and storage, strict access management with multi-factor authentication, and role-based permissions. The system will be protected by enterprise-grade network defenses, real-time monitoring, and comprehensive audit logging, ensuring that sensitive data is accessible only to authorized officials and is retained securely.

As discussed above in “Operation of the Final Rule,” there are free, optional tools available that can assist election officials and Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users in generating the data files necessary to satisfy the rule's data reporting requirements and ensure that the necessary information for Outbound Federal Ballot mailings is available to satisfy verification and be accepted into the mailstream. Jurisdictions using a vendor may already have such data files prepared as part of other mailing documentation. In either case, the burdens are modest and can be timely satisfied.

Commenters, including election officials, raised concerns about the ability of election officials to satisfy the requirements of the rule while also complying with various state laws. For example, some comments argued that the obligation to provide Portal data for inclusion on a state-specific List could require election officials to choose between complying with state privacy laws or the rule. Other commenters questioned election officials' ability to satisfy the rule's requirements while also complying with state statutory timing requirements for requesting, processing, and issuing ballots. And others argued that the rule would impact state and local elections where consolidated ballots are used.

The decision of how to arrange ballots is a matter for the states. Ballots that contain both federal and state or local elections are covered by the rule. States can easily avoid any effects on their state elections by either complying with the rule's requirements or by separating their federal ballots to exclude any non-federal elections. Either is permissible under the rule and would eliminate any impact on exclusively state or local elections.

The rule is also not facially incompatible with the various timing provisions in state election law. The envelope design review, data entry, and verification processes set forth in the rule should be relatively quick to complete and should not significantly alter the timeline for election officials. The rule's requirements will permit an election official to prepare and send Outbound Federal Ballot Mail near election day, as they do now. And, once Outbound Federal Ballot Mail is accepted into the postal network, the Postal Service has a strong track record of promptly delivering ballots to and from voters.

The rule also does not require that sensitive voter information be made public, like birthdates or social security numbers that may be protected from disclosure by state law. For one thing, the Portal and the Lists will not contain this kind of sensitive information; they include information that appears on the outside of the ballot mail envelopes. For another, the Lists and the underlying Portal data will not be made publicly available. There are existing statutory and regulatory protections against the disclosure of customer addresses and other sensitive information. For example, while 39 U.S.C. 410 provides that the Postal Service is subject to the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, it limits the scope of access to certain kinds of postal records. In particular, Section 410(c)(1) provides that neither law requires the Postal Service to release “the name or address, past or present, of any postal patron.” Similarly, postal regulations provide that disclosures of address information may be made to state and local governments and law enforcement agencies, but generally prohibit disclosure of an individual person's mailing address to a non- government individual except in limited, enumerated circumstances. 39 CFR 265.14(d)(2)-(5), (9). Furthermore, as discussed above and reiterated below, many of these privacy concerns may be resolved by the information contained in the SOR for the Portal, which was published in the Federal Register on July 17, 2026.

The Postal Service received a small number of comments arguing that the proposed rule did not meaningfully address how the rule's requirements would affect tribal communities. Commenters were concerned about the ability of election officials to generate unique IMbs for nontraditional mailing addresses used by many Native American households, and about the impact of the rule more broadly given the unique mail delivery challenges that can impact these communities. Other commenters advocated for tribal consultation prior issuance of a final rule. In particular, one commenter argued that the rule should not be finalized until the Postal Service conducted formal consultation with federally recognized tribes pursuant to Executive Order 13175.

As the Postal Service has explained, the rule does not require any change to existing addressing practices. It only requires that the address uploaded into the Portal be the address used on the Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelope. Election officials may continue to address ballots to nontraditional addresses and may generate unique IMbs for these addresses to comply with the rule. As discussed above, election officials may be able to use the free IMsb tool to generate a unique IMb even if these addresses cannot be validated through DPV.

With respect to consultation, the Postal Service will continue to work with tribal stakeholders as part of its broader outreach, education, and implementation efforts. However, Executive Order 13175 does not require the Postal Service to engage in such consultations. Only agencies covered by the Paperwork Reduction Act are subject to that Executive Order and, as noted above, the Postal Service is outside the Paperwork Reduction Act's scope. Shane, 658 F. Supp. at 915; accord Kuzma, 798 F.2d at 32. Therefore, consultation under Executive Order 13175 is not required prior to finalizing the rule.

In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Postal Service specifically invited comments on the exemption in the proposed rule for UOCAVA voters. Many commenters supported this exemption. Other commenters, while supporting the exemption, believed that the rule's express exclusion of UOCAVA ballots was insufficient to exclude or protect UOCAVA voters. These commenters asked for more assurances and safeguards to ensure UOCAVA ballots would not be impacted by the rule, as errors could occur that would accidentally apply the rule's standards to UOCAVA ballots.

Some commenters opposed the exemption for UOCAVA ballots. These commenters argued that “[a]pplying the E.O. 14399 framework”--such as enhanced tracking and participation lists--to UOCAVA ballots would strengthen integrity without undermining access, while aligning with existing Postal Service special handling for election mail to and from military and overseas voters. Excluding them, in the opinion of some commenters, leaves a significant portion of ballot mail for federal elections outside the new security measures, and including UOCAVA ballots would create a more comprehensive, uniform system that better serves all eligible voters while deterring unlawful use of the mail.

The Postal Service finds that the proposed rule provides sufficient safeguards for UOCAVA voters as drafted and declines to make additional changes. Further safeguards and assurances are unnecessary because these voters will experience no change as a result of proper implementation of the rule given its exemption of UOCAVA ballots. At the same time, the exemption does not create an anomaly or otherwise undermine the stated purpose of the rule. Rather, it reflects the unique logistical circumstances that overseas and military voters and their family members face, consistent with the statutory scheme enacted by Congress.

Separately, other comments sought clarification on how the Postal Service would distinguish between ballots sent pursuant to UOCAVA and other mail-in or absentee ballots. Existing postal regulations require that ballots sent to and from UOCAVA voters include unique identifiers on the exterior of the envelope that are not present on the ballot envelopes for non-UOCAVA voters. Specifically, DMM 703.8.8.5 requires that envelopes for mailing and receiving absentee ballots under UOCAVA must contain the following words: “No Postage Necessary in the U.S. Mail--DMM 703.8.0.” Additionally, balloting envelopes for UOCAVA voters contain the statement: “U.S. Postage Paid 39 U.S.C. 3406.” These indicia enable the Postal Service to distinguish between UOCAVA ballots and ballots that fall within the scope of the rule. As explained above, UOCAVA ballots should be segregated from Outbound Federal Ballot Mail when presented for mailing. This will help ensure that both UOCAVA ballots and Outbound Federal Ballot Mail covered by the rule are properly accepted under applicable rules. Therefore, revisions to the proposed rule are unnecessary to ensure that UOCAVA ballots are distinguishable from Federal Ballot Mail.

As some commenters pointed out, survivors of domestic and sexual violence and/or stalking may experience significant privacy concerns related to the voter registration process. The fear of being located may deter such victims from voting in person, and even from registering to vote. Furthermore, as commenters noted, survivors of domestic violence, sexual violence, and/or stalking often relocate multiple times and/or postpone updating public records until adequate safety measures are in place. For these reasons, commenters concluded, many survivors rely crucially on the ability to vote by mail.

According to commenters, to assist such survivors, forty-seven states have instituted Address Confidentiality Protection programs (“ACPs”)--confidential mail forwarding services available to survivors of domestic violence, stalking, sexual violence, child abduction and/or human trafficking who have recently relocated to a location unknown to their abuser or stalker. To ensure participant safety, commenters explained, ACPs typically shield participants from appearing in public voter files, usually by substituting alternative addresses or keeping records entirely offline. Often, ACP registration is entered manually in a locked file and not entered into the state's typical voter registration system. The ballot is then mailed to the state's substitute address, which, by design, differs from the voter's confidential actual address. In some instances, even an individual's name is protected under ACPs. Some commenters also noted that other states have additional privacy protections in place for participants.

Some commenters voiced concern that including information about these voters in the Portal and the contemplated exchange of this information through the state-specific Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists would compromise ACP and other confidentiality programs and may call into question compliance with certain state requirements. One commenter noted a lack of guidance as to whether states would be required to upload survivors' actual physical addresses to the Portal, or whether the Postal Service (or other entities within the federal government) would question mailing ballots to a potentially large number of voters registered to a single alternative mailing address. Other commenters criticized the proposed rule for allegedly increasing risks to survivor safety. One commenter cited recent large- scale privacy breaches affecting government agencies and suggested that Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists in the Postal Service's custody (including, presumably, the private information of voters protected under ACPs) could fall prey to such a breach.

The Postal Service clarifies that the rule requires that the name and address used on the outside of a ballot envelope be submitted to the Portal; it would not require that confidential information known only to the state be provided. The information in the Portal would also not be publicly disclosed, and the Postal Service has taken appropriate cybersecurity measures with respect to the Portal cybersecurity as discussed above. For these reasons, the proposed rule is compatible with state ACP programs.

Very few comments included recommended changes to the rule itself. The Postal Service received several suggestions that would result in a more expansive final rule ; however, these suggestions fall outside the scope of this rulemaking and the Postal Service's authority. For instance, a few commenters encouraged the Postal Service to add provisions into the rule to verify a voter's citizenship status as a condition of mail acceptance. Other commenters advocated for exclusively in-person voting, and still others proposed only accepting ballots that are received by Election Day. The Postal Service also received comments recommending a narrower final rule that would retain the proposed rule's provisions concerning ballot envelope design for Federal Ballot Mail, in 705.24.3, and eliminate the rule's other substantive provisions, namely 705.24.4 and 705.24.5. Within the scope of this rulemaking, the Postal Service is making several changes in response to the concerns discussed above.

First, the Postal Service makes clear that the verification process set forth in 705.24.5 (i.e., mail sent by authorized ballot mailers) does not apply to Return Federal Ballot Mail. Many comments demonstrated a factual misunderstanding about the inapplicability of these verification procedures to return ballots. Given the widespread confusion, the Postal Service believes that clarifying the final rule will reduce voter confusion and help ensure consistent implementation of the rule. However, as noted above, for individuals transmitting Return Federal Ballot mail to be in compliance with this rule, Return Federal Ballot Mail must be mailed in an envelope that meets the requirements of 705.24.3.2. As under existing law, voters may use their residential mailbox, any retail counter, or other authorized means to transmit their compliant Return Federal Ballot Mail.

In the event a voter loses or misplaces the Return Federal Ballot Mail envelope provided by the Authorized Ballot Mailer, or if the Authorized Ballot Mailer fails to provide the voter with a compliant Return Federal Ballot Mail envelope, the voter should request a replacement envelope from the Authorized Ballot Mailer that conforms to 705.24.3.2. The Postal Service may also provide such other means as reasonably determined by the Postal Service for transmitting Return Federal Ballot Mail consistent with the requirements of this rule. This will provide visibility and scan data for these ballot envelopes when processed on the Postal Service's automated equipment.

Second, there was confusion over how the MDA review requirements would be verified and enforced, and the circumstances under which the MDA review requirements could lead to an Outbound Federal Ballot mailing being rejected. As set forth above, certification of MDA review will not be verified when an Outbound Federal Ballot mailing is presented for acceptance. Instead, prior to uploading data into the Portal, Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users will be prompted to certify that their ballot envelope design has been submitted for review by an MDA and that the MDA has provided feedback. If they do not provide such certification, Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users will be unable to upload data into the Portal. To reduce confusion and clarify the responsibilities of Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users, the Postal Service is amending the language in 705.24.3.1, 705.24.3.2, and 705.24.4.2.f, and striking 705.24.5.3.b from the final rule.

Third, the Postal Service is amending the language in 705.24.3.1.c and 705.23.3.2.c to make clear that Authorized Ballot Mailers are responsible for creating IMbs. The Postal Service is also amending the language in 705.24.4.2.b.3 and 705.24.4.2.b.4 to clarify that the unique IMb submitted into the Portal is the IMb printed on the Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes. These clarifications are intended to reduce confusion and provide clarity for Federal Ballot Mail Portal users; they do not substantively change the rule's data reporting requirements.

Fourth, the Postal Service is amending the language in 705.24.5.2 to clarify that only commercial mailings are subject to commercial mailing standards and regulations. There was confusion over whether non-commercial mailings must be entered at BMEUs or otherwise meet commercial mailing standards. The Postal Service has simplified the language in 705.24.5.2 to help avoid confusion.

Finally, the Postal Service is changing the term “Ballot Portal User” to “Federal Ballot Mail Portal User” to clarify the relationship between Federal Ballot Mail, the rule's data standards, and the Federal Ballot Mail Portal. The Postal Service's hope is that this reduces confusion about the application of rule's data-entry requirements to other ballot mail as well as confusion about data entry that needs to be performed at the state-level.

Administrative practice and procedure, Postal Service.

Accordingly, the Postal Service amends Mailing Standards of the United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), incorporated by reference in the Code of Federal Regulations as follows (see 39 CFR 111.1):

PART 111--[AMENDED]

0 1. The authority citation for 39 CFR Part 111 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552(a); 13 U.S.C. 301-307; 18 U.S.C. 1692- 1737; 39 U.S.C. 101, 401-404, 414, 416, 3001-3018, 3201-3220, 3401- 3406, 3621, 3622, 3626, 3629, 3631-3633, 3641, 3681-3685, and 5001.

0 2. Revise Mailing Standards of the United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM) as follows:

Mailing Standards of the United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM)

* * * * *

700 Special Standards

* * * * *

705 Advanced Preparation and Special Postage Payment Systems

* * * * *

[Insert after 705.23 the following:]

24.0 Ballot Mail for Federal Elections

24.1 Definitions

For the purposes of Section 705.24, the following definitions apply:

a. Authorized ballot mailer means an election official of a state or a political subdivision thereof who is responsible for sending mail- in or absentee ballots to eligible voters of that state or political subdivision; or an individual or entity, such as a mail service provider, that an election official has authorized to send mail-in or absentee ballots by mail on the election official's behalf.

b. Federal Ballot Mail Portal User means the chief election official of each state and any individual or entity, such as a mail service provider or an election official of that state or a political subdivision thereof, authorized by the chief election official to provide information through the Postal Service Federal Ballot Mail Portal as described in 24.4.2.b.

c. Mail-in or absentee ballot means a physical ballot, other than a ballot provided at a designated polling place, that may be used to cast a vote in a federal election. For the purposes of Section 705.24, a mail-in or absentee ballot does not include a ballot mailed under 703.8.8 or 703.8.9.

d. Outbound Federal Ballot Mail means any mailpiece containing a mail-in or absentee ballot for a federal election sent from an authorized ballot mailer to an individual voter.

e. Return Federal Ballot Mail means any mailpiece containing a mail-in or absentee ballot for a federal election sent from an individual voter to an election office, or an authorized recipient of ballot mail, of a state or a political subdivision thereof.

f. Federal election means any general, special, or runoff election for the office of President or Vice President; or of Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress. This definition does not include primary elections.

g. State includes all 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands.

h. Intelligent Mail barcode (IMb) has the meaning provided in 204.1.2.1.

i. Official Election Mail logo is a unique registered trademark designed exclusively for inclusion in the design of Official Election Mail. The conditions of use are provided in Publication 631, Official Election Mail--Graphic Guidelines and Logos.

24.2 Optional 90-Day Pre-Mailing Notice

A state's chief election official may notify the Postal Service, no fewer than 90 days prior to a federal election, of its intent to allow for mail-in or absentee ballots in the federal election to be transmitted by the Postal Service. This notification should indicate whether the state intends to submit to the Postal Service the information described in 24.4.2.b to the Postal Service Federal Ballot Mail Portal as set forth in 24.4.2.d.

A state's failure to provide the optional 90-day notice to the Postal Service under 24.2 will not prevent enrollment under 24.4.

24.3 Federal Ballot Mail

24.3.1 Outbound Federal Ballot Mail Envelope Standards

Outbound Federal Ballot Mail must be mailed in an envelope that:

a. Includes the official Election Mail logo;

b. Is automation compatible; and

c. Bears the voter's unique IMb, as created by the Authorized Ballot Mailer, with the Delivery Point ZIP Code embedded and a Federal Ballot Mail Service Type Identifier (STID).

Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelopes must be submitted to the Postal Service for mailpiece design review and feedback.

24.3.2 Return Federal Ballot Mail Envelope Standards

Return Federal Ballot Mail must be mailed in an envelope that:

a. Includes the official Election Mail logo;

b. Is automation compatible; and

c. Bears the voter's unique IMb, as created by the Authorized Ballot Mailer, with the Delivery Point ZIP Code embedded and a Federal Ballot Mail STID.

Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes must be submitted to the Postal Service for mailpiece design review and feedback.

24.3.3 Authorized Ballot Mailer Responsibility

Authorized ballot mailers are responsible for barcode creation under 24.3.1 and 24.3.2 as well as envelope design and printing for all ballot mail.

24.3.4 Additional Recommendations

For additional information on the Postal Service's recommendations for all ballot mail, see DMM 703.8.4.

24.4 State-Specific Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists

24.4.1 Postal Service Federal Ballot Mail Portal User Registration

To access the Postal Service Federal Ballot Mail Portal, each Federal Ballot Mail Portal User must have a registered account. Registration must be completed no later than two business days before an Outbound Federal Ballot mailing. The chief election official of each state is responsible for authorizing the Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users for their state including political subdivisions thereof.

24.4.2 Enrollment

a. Any state that intends to receive mail-in or absentee ballots from individual voters through the Postal Service must ensure that such individuals have been enrolled with the Postal Service for inclusion on the state's Mail-In and Absentee Participation List.

b. In order for an individual to be enrolled with the Postal Service for inclusion on a state's Mail-In and Absentee Participation List, a Federal Ballot Mail Portal User in that state must provide the following information through the Postal Service Federal Ballot Mail Portal:

1. Name of individual receiving a mail-in or absentee ballot;

2. Address of individual receiving a mail-in or absentee ballot;

3. Unique IMb applied on the Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelope pursuant to 24.3.1;

4. Unique IMb applied on the Return Federal Ballot Mail envelope pursuant to 24.3.2; and

5. Originating election office state.

c. An individual will be deemed enrolled with the Postal Service for inclusion on a state's Mail-In and Absentee Participation List as of the date that the information in 24.4.2.b is provided.

d. Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users must provide the information in 24.4.2.b at least 30 days before the date of the federal election, to the extent practicable, or by the date on which mail-in or absentee ballots may begin to be mailed under state law. Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users may make supplemental submissions to enroll additional individuals or modify prior submissions until the last day that ballots may be mailed out to individuals under state law. A separate submission is required in connection with each Outbound Federal Ballot mailing, regardless of the number of mailpieces in the mailing.

e. The information provided in 24.4.2.b must meet the Postal Service's technical specifications for the Federal Ballot Mail Portal.

f. Before providing the information in 24.4.2.b, Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users must certify in the Federal Ballot Mail Portal that any mail-in or absentee ballots their state's authorized ballot mailers provide to the Postal Service for mailing have been submitted for review and that they have received feedback consistent with 24.3.1 and 24.3.2 Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users will not be able to enter the information in 24.4.2.b into the Federal Ballot Mail Portal if the certification is incomplete.

24.4.3 Provision of State-Specific Lists

On or about the date of the federal election, the Postal Service will provide a state-specific Mail-In and Absentee Participant List to each state's chief election official that contains the name and address of each individual in that state who was enrolled through the process set forth in 24.4.2, along with the unique IMb associated with the Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail sent to each such individual.

24.5 Outbound Federal Ballot Mail Verification

24.5.1 Procedure

Using the information provided in 24.4.2, the Postal Service will review mailings identified as Outbound Federal Ballot Mail prior to acceptance to evaluate whether the mailing meets the standards in 24.3.1 and is being sent to individuals who have been enrolled with the Postal Service for inclusion on the state's Mail-In and Absentee Participation List, consistent with the technical specifications for the Federal Ballot Mail Portal.

24.5.2 Authorized Verification

Mailings identified as Outbound Federal Ballot Mail are verified by Postal Service employees when presented for acceptance. Outbound Federal Ballot Mail must be entered at a facility that performs business mail acceptance functions or at a Postal Service retail counter. Commercial mailings must comply with applicable requirements. Postal Service personnel are not authorized to open mail sealed against inspection, except under circumstances described in ASM 274. The Postal Service's acceptance of Outbound Federal Ballot Mail does not constitute verified compliance.

24.5.3 Noncompliance

a. Mailings that do not comply with 24.5.1 and 24.5.2 will not be accepted and will be returned to the authorized ballot mailer. The authorized ballot mailer or Federal Ballot Mail Portal User must address the error(s) before resubmitting the mailing.

b. An authorized ballot mailer may request further review by the Postal Service if Outbound Federal Ballot Mail is not accepted.

c. The Postal Service assumes no responsibility for any outbound ballot mailing presented until it is accepted into the mail. The Postal Service is not responsible for service delays when the Federal Ballot Mail Portal User or authorized ballot mailer does not meet the applicable preparation or entry standards.

d. Authorized ballot mailers must comply with all applicable postal laws and regulations governing mailability and preparation for mailing, as well as nonpostal laws and regulations on the possession, treatment, transmission, or transfer of particular matter.

24.5.4 Return Federal Ballot Mail

705.24.5 does not apply to Return Federal Ballot Mail.

24.6 Non-Interference With State or Federal Election Laws

This rule relates only to the use of the U.S. Mail. The Postal Service does not purport to alter the eligibility of any individual to vote under state or federal law. The Postal Service does not have any legal responsibility for management of state voter rolls or administration of federal elections within each state. States are fully responsible for the

contents of each State's Mail-In and Absentee Participation List. * * * * *

Colleen Hibbert-Kapler, Attorney, Ethics and Legal Compliance. [FR Doc. 2026-17238 Filed 8-21-26; 9:00 pm] BILLING CODE 7710-12-P