This chapter is about the spy agencies. It says they have become political and must be fixed. It wants the president to have more control over them. It asks for leaks to be punished hard. It wants former chiefs who talk to the press to lose their access. It also says these agencies should not watch false claims made inside the country.
The document says “should”Who acts: PresidentHow: executive orderp. 205 in the PDF
What the document says
“Executive Order 12333 should be amended to take account of the changing landscape of threats and improve the functional aspects of America’s intelligence enterprise.”
The chapter says that although the 2004 intelligence reform act has flaws, it is impossible to know what would emerge if Congress reopened it, so seeking a legislative solution might carry more risks than benefits. It asks instead that the President amend Executive Order 12333, clarifying the Director of National Intelligence's budget and personnel authority and the roles of the various cyber missions.
What the document actually says
“Executive Order 12333 should be amended to take account of the changing landscape of threats and improve the functional aspects of America’s intelligence enterprise.”
That sentence, in plain words
Change the order that governs spying. Update it for the threats we face now.
What this is about
One order from 1981 sets the rules for spying. The book says Congress should not rewrite the law. It says that is too risky. It says the president should change the order instead.
Read against the documents indexed here on August 26, 2026, and nothing was found that answers this. Nothing indexed here comes close. No candidate amends Executive Order 12333, and no document indexed on this site mentions it. The nearest candidates, the two short laws extending title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, are acts of Congress amending a statute, which is the route the chapter says carries more risk than benefit. That is a record of a search, not a finding that nothing has happened: an act this site does not hold, or one that answers the proposal in words unlike its own, would not be caught by it.
The document says “must”Who acts: President, DNIHow: internal managementp. 204 in the PDF
What the document says
“future IC leadership must address the widely promoted “woke” culture that has spread throughout the federal government”
The chapter names identity politics as part of what it is describing. It uses the term woke without defining it. The passage sits among recommendations on how a President should empower the Director of National Intelligence to lead the intelligence agencies.
What the document actually says
“future IC leadership must address the widely promoted “woke” culture that has spread throughout the federal government”
That sentence, in plain words
The people leading these agencies must deal with woke culture inside them.
What this is about
The book says a way of thinking has spread through government. It calls it woke. It does not say exactly what that means. It says intelligence leaders must deal with it.
Executive Order 14151 directs every agency head to terminate, within 60 days and to the maximum extent allowed by law, all diversity, equity and inclusion offices and positions, all equity action plans and equity related grants and contracts, and all such performance requirements, and bars those factors from federal employment practices and performance reviews. Because it runs to the whole executive branch it reaches the intelligence agencies. The fit breaks down on aim and addressee. The order names no intelligence agency, is not directed at intelligence leadership, and closes offices, positions and programs rather than addressing the culture the chapter describes, and the passage quoted sits among recommendations for empowering the Director of National Intelligence, which the order does not touch.
In plain English
The order tells each agency to end all DEI offices, plans and grants in 60 days. It covers the whole branch, so spy agencies fall under it. But no spy agency is named, and it is not aimed at spy chiefs. It shuts offices and programs. It does not touch the culture the book describes.
Each of these names the order above in its own summary, preamble or filing. That is a fact about the document, not a finding that it carries out this proposal: it is one step further away than the order is, and what it does about the proposal is a reading nobody has made here.
The document says “should”Who acts: President, CIAHow: internal managementp. 208 in the PDF
What the document says
“This includes halting all current hiring to prevent the “burrowing in” of outgoing political personnel.”
The chapter asks that the President-elect choose a Deputy Director who needs no Senate confirmation and can begin implementing the President's agenda immediately, including by halting all current hiring so that outgoing political personnel cannot convert into permanent posts. It says additional appointees should be placed in the agency as needed.
What the document actually says
“This includes halting all current hiring to prevent the “burrowing in” of outgoing political personnel.”
That sentence, in plain words
That means stopping all hiring at once. It keeps the last team from digging in.
What this is about
When a president leaves, some of his staff seek permanent jobs. Those jobs are hard to remove people from. The book says hiring should stop at once.
The memorandum of January 20, 2025 freezes the hiring of federal civilian employees throughout the executive branch from noon that day, so that no position vacant at that moment may be filled and no new position created, whatever the source of an agency's funding. That is a day one halt on hiring into vacant career posts, the route by which the chapter says outgoing political personnel burrow in. Three things break the fit. The freeze does not apply to positions related to national security, which covers much of the agency the chapter is writing about. It expressly does not limit the appointment of noncareer officials. And it names no intelligence agency, being an instruction from the President to all agencies rather than a step taken by the Deputy Director the chapter would have act.
In plain English
The memo freezes the hiring of civilian staff across the government from noon on day one. No open job may be filled and no new job made. That is the day one halt the book asked for. But jobs tied to national security are exempt. That covers much of the spy agency the book means. Political hires are still free, and no spy agency is named.
The document says “should”Who acts: CIAHow: internal managementp. 209 in the PDF
What the document says
“If senior leadership finds any program or operation to be inconsistent with the President’s agenda, the Director should immediately halt that program or operation.”
The chapter asks that the Director and Deputy Director request briefings on all agency activities and presence overseas, on all controlled access programs and on existing covert action findings without exception, and meet all directorates and mission centers, before halting anything found inconsistent with the President's agenda.
What the document actually says
“If senior leadership finds any program or operation to be inconsistent with the President’s agenda, the Director should immediately halt that program or operation.”
That sentence, in plain words
Say a program does not match what the president wants. Then the Director should stop it at once.
What this is about
The agency runs many secret programs. New leaders would be briefed on all of them. If one does not match the president's aims, it would be stopped.
Read against the documents indexed here on August 26, 2026, and nothing was found that answers this. Nothing indexed here comes close. No candidate concerns CIA programs, controlled access programs or covert action findings. Executive Order 14356 governs federal hiring and Executive Order 14152 revokes the clearances of named former officials; neither directs any agency to review its own programs against the President's agenda or to halt what does not fit. That is a record of a search, not a finding that nothing has happened: an act this site does not hold, or one that answers the proposal in words unlike its own, would not be caught by it.
The document says “should”Who acts: CIAHow: internal managementp. 209 in the PDF
What the document says
“the Director should divert resources from any activities that promote unnecessary and distracting social engineering.”
The chapter states that certain employees and offices have focused on promoting what it calls divisive ideological or cultural agendas and fostering a culture of risk aversion. It asks that promotion criteria change and that officers willing to accept high risk be rewarded over those advancing by routine.
What the document actually says
“the Director should divert resources from any activities that promote unnecessary and distracting social engineering.”
That sentence, in plain words
Some work pushes social causes. The Director should move money away from it.
What this is about
The book says some staff work on social causes. It says that is a distraction. It wants the money moved to other work.
Executive Order 14151 terminates diversity, equity and inclusion offices, positions, programs and equity related grants and contracts across the executive branch, which moves resources away from the activities the chapter describes, and its section 2(a) requires federal employment practices, including performance reviews, to reward individual initiative, skills, performance and hard work and never to consider those factors, which touches the promotion criteria the chapter raises in the same passage. It is not addressed to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, names no intelligence agency or directorate, and says nothing about rewarding officers who accept high risk or about the risk aversion the chapter treats as the other half of the problem.
In plain English
The order ends DEI offices, jobs and grants across the branch. That moves money away from such work. It also says hiring and reviews must reward skill and hard work alone. But it is not aimed at the spy chief and names no spy agency. It says nothing about rewarding officers who take on risk.
Each of these names the order above in its own summary, preamble or filing. That is a fact about the document, not a finding that it carries out this proposal: it is one step further away than the order is, and what it does about the proposal is a reading nobody has made here.
The document says “should”Who acts: CIAHow: internal managementp. 209 in the PDF
What the document says
“the Director should break the cabal of bureaucrats in D.C. by permanently moving various directorates”
The chapter names the Directorate of Support and the Directorate of Science and Technology as examples, and suggests opening campuses outside Washington where analysts and other experts could contribute virtually. It also asks for broader recruitment, faster onboarding and openness to hiring private-sector experts directly into senior posts.
What the document actually says
“the Director should break the cabal of bureaucrats in D.C. by permanently moving various directorates”
That sentence, in plain words
The Director should break up the crowd in Washington. He should move whole units away for good.
What this is about
Most of this agency sits near Washington. The book says that makes a closed circle. It wants some divisions moved far away for good.
Read against the documents indexed here on August 26, 2026, and nothing was found that answers this. Executive Order 14207 eliminates the Federal Executive Institute, a leadership training center for federal managers. It closes a program rather than relocating any part of an agency, and concerns training rather than where directorates sit. Nothing indexed here moves a CIA directorate out of the Washington area or opens a campus elsewhere. That is a record of a search, not a finding that nothing has happened: an act this site does not hold, or one that answers the proposal in words unlike its own, would not be caught by it.
The document says “should”Who acts: PresidentHow: internal managementp. 213 in the PDF
What the document says
“The President should immediately revoke the security clearances of any former Directors, Deputy Directors, or other senior intelligence officials who discuss their work in the press”
The full passage covers those who discuss their work in the press or on social media without prior clearance from the current Director. The chapter asks that agencies minimize their public presence and vigorously investigate leaks, and separately that former high-ranking officials who keep a clearance remain subject to the Hatch Act after leaving government.
What the document actually says
“The President should immediately revoke the security clearances of any former Directors, Deputy Directors, or other senior intelligence officials who discuss their work in the press”
That sentence, in plain words
Some former chiefs talk to the press about their work. The president should take away their clearance at once.
What this is about
Former spy chiefs often keep access to secrets. Some go on television to talk. The book says they should lose that access.
The order directs the Director of National Intelligence, with the Director of the CIA, to revoke the current or active clearances of 49 named former intelligence officials, among them former Directors of National Intelligence and of the CIA, over a public letter they signed during the 2020 campaign, and of John Bolton over a memoir the order says treated sensitive information recklessly. That is the President stripping clearances from former senior intelligence officials for speaking publicly, the action the chapter asks for. The fit breaks down in that the order reaches a closed list of named people on two specific grounds rather than establishing that any former official who discusses their work in the press or on social media without the current Director's prior clearance loses their clearance, and it says nothing about keeping former officials subject to the Hatch Act.
In plain English
The order strips clearances from 49 named former spy officials over a letter they signed in 2020. One more man loses his over a book he wrote. That is the step the book asked for. But it hits a fixed list on two set grounds, not every former official who talks to the press. It says nothing about the Hatch Act.
The document says “should”Who acts: DNI, CIAHow: internal managementp. 214 in the PDF
What the document says
“The ODNI and CIA should fire or refer for prosecution any employee who is suspected of leaking information, and penalties should include the removal of pension benefits”
The penalty applies to those found guilty. The chapter also asks that staff under investigation not be allowed to retire before internal investigations are complete, and that the Justice Department use all its tools to investigate leaks.
What the document actually says
“The ODNI and CIA should fire or refer for prosecution any employee who is suspected of leaking information, and penalties should include the removal of pension benefits”
That sentence, in plain words
Anyone thought to be leaking should be fired or charged. Those found guilty should lose their pension.
What this is about
A leak is when a worker gives secrets to the press. The book says anyone suspected should be fired. Those proved guilty would lose their pension too.
The memorandum of January 20, 2025 names unauthorized disclosure of executive branch deliberations first among the conduct for which career Senior Executive Service officials should be held accountable, and directs any agency head who becomes aware of such an official to take all appropriate actions, up to and including removal. That answers the firing half of the proposal for senior career officials government wide. It reaches only the Senior Executive Service, not the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Central Intelligence Agency workforces the chapter names, it concerns disclosure of deliberations rather than of classified information, and it carries none of the rest: no referral for prosecution, no removal of pension benefits, and no bar on retiring while an investigation is open.
In plain English
The memo lists leaks of inside talks first among the acts senior career staff answer for. Agency heads must act, up to firing. That answers the firing half for senior staff. But it reaches only senior staff, not the spy agencies the book names. It says nothing about charges or pensions. Nor does it bar a retirement while a probe is open.
The document says “should”Who acts: President, CongressHow: not specifiedp. 216 in the PDF
What the document says
“The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation.”
The chapter argues that such activity can slip into suppressing an opposition party's speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the agencies choose not to act. It names no instrument for the prohibition.
What the document actually says
“The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation.”
That sentence, in plain words
These agencies should not be allowed to watch false claims made at home.
What this is about
Some agencies track false claims spread online. The book says they should not watch ones made inside the country. It says that could silence people.
The order bars every federal department, agency, officer, employee and agent from acting or using federal resources in a way that would unconstitutionally abridge the speech of American citizens, in terms that name the government's work against misinformation, disinformation and malinformation, and it directs the Attorney General to investigate such activity over the previous four years. Being government-wide, it reaches the intelligence agencies. The fit breaks down in that it prohibits conduct that abridges speech rather than monitoring as such, so watching domestic speech without acting on it is not addressed. The order names no intelligence agency and creates no rule specific to the intelligence community, which is where the chapter asks the prohibition to sit.
In plain English
The order bars federal staff from acts that cut off free speech, and it names work against false news. It covers the whole government, so spy agencies fall under it. But it bars acts, not watching. Watching speech at home is left alone, and no spy agency is named.
The document says “should”Who acts: Congress, PresidentHow: legislationp. 215 in the PDF
What the document says
“Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage.”
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act allows the targeting of non-US persons abroad when their communications pass through the United States. The chapter says it provides much of the intelligence in the President's Daily Brief and that an independent oversight board found it was not abused, while asking Congress to review that board's report to determine whether reforms are needed. It separately criticizes the handling of the Carter Page applications and asks for reforms against partisan abuse.
What the document actually says
“Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage.”
That sentence, in plain words
This power should be kept. It helps fight terror, hackers and Chinese spying.
What this is about
One law lets spies watch people abroad. Some of those messages pass through America. The book says that power should be kept. It also says past abuses should be fixed.
Signed April 30, 2026, the law moves the repeal date of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which contains Section 702, from April 30, 2026 to June 12, 2026, so the authority stayed in force rather than lapsing. Public Law 119-84 of April 18, 2026 had set the April 30 date in the same way. Congress kept the tool, which is what the chapter asks. The fit breaks down in that both laws are extensions of weeks that change only dates and cross references: neither settles the authority for the long term, and neither addresses the oversight board report the chapter asks Congress to review or the reforms against partisan abuse of the surveillance statute that the chapter raises alongside.
In plain English
A law signed April 30, 2026 moves the end date of the surveillance title from April 30, 2026 to June 12, 2026. The power stayed in force rather than lapsing, which is what the chapter wants. But this is a stretch of weeks that changes only dates. It settles nothing for the long term and takes up none of the reforms the chapter raises.
The document says “should”Who acts: President, NSCHow: internal managementp. 211 in the PDF
What the document says
“the President should task the NSC’s Senior”
The full passage asks that immediately after inauguration the President task the National Security Council's Senior Director for Intelligence Programs with a 60-day review of current covert action findings and their effectiveness, evaluating new covert actions that may be needed, conducted independently of the agencies responsible. The chapter says the review should identify which agency is best equipped for each objective, and that careful thought should be given to how effectiveness is measured, to guard against covert action being used with little scrutiny in ways inconsistent with overt policy.
What the document actually says
“the President should task the NSC’s Senior”
That sentence, in plain words
The president should give this job to a senior White House official.
What this is about
Covert action is secret work approved by the president. The book says all of it should be reviewed. The review would take 60 days. It would be done by people outside the agencies involved.
Read against the documents indexed here on August 26, 2026, and nothing was found that answers this. Nothing indexed here comes close. No candidate concerns covert action, and no executive order, memorandum, notice or determination indexed on this site mentions covert action findings. A review of the kind the chapter asks for would be run inside the National Security Council and would not normally be published, so its absence from these records is not evidence either way. That is a record of a search, not a finding that nothing has happened: an act this site does not hold, or one that answers the proposal in words unlike its own, would not be caught by it.
The document says “should”Who acts: DNI, CIAHow: internal managementp. 211 in the PDF
What the document says
“Senior officers should be required to sign mobility agreements that allow ODNI and CIA leadership to move them within the IC every two years if necessary.”
The chapter says some long-serving generalist officers no longer perform at a high level, are management driven and limit junior officers' prospects. It asks that agencies work with the Office of Personnel Management on voluntary separation buyouts to reduce what it calls bloat and underperforming cadre.
What the document actually says
“Senior officers should be required to sign mobility agreements that allow ODNI and CIA leadership to move them within the IC every two years if necessary.”
That sentence, in plain words
Senior officers should sign a deal. It would let leaders move them to a new post every two years.
What this is about
Senior officers often stay in one post for years. The book says leaders should be able to move them. It would happen as often as every two years.
Read against the documents indexed here on August 26, 2026, and nothing was found that answers this. The Office of Personnel Management rule widens agency authority to waive the normal payment limits on recruitment and relocation incentives and lets agencies set shorter service periods. It makes paying for a move easier, but the incentives are voluntary and individual. It does not require senior intelligence officers to sign mobility agreements, gives leadership at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the CIA no power to reassign them every two years, and does not address the separation buyouts the chapter asks for. That is a record of a search, not a finding that nothing has happened: an act this site does not hold, or one that answers the proposal in words unlike its own, would not be caught by it.
The document says “should consider”Who acts: PresidentHow: not specifiedp. 210 in the PDF
What the document says
“the President should consider whether DOD’s complete set of capabilities should be used to support potential covert actions.”
The chapter notes that certain Defense Department clandestine capabilities under Title 10 can generally be used outside a combat theatre only if they count as traditional military activities, which in practice means many capabilities in the space and cyber domains can be used only after armed conflict begins. It raises using them for covert action as something to consider rather than as a recommendation.
What the document actually says
“the President should consider whether DOD’s complete set of capabilities should be used to support potential covert actions.”
That sentence, in plain words
The military has secret tools of its own. The president should think about using them for secret work.
What this is about
The military has secret abilities. Rules limit when it can use them. Usually a war must have started. The book says the president should think about changing that.
Read against the documents indexed here on August 26, 2026, and nothing was found that answers this. The chapter raises this as something for the President to consider rather than as a recommendation, so there is no definite proposal to answer. Nothing indexed here addresses the use of Defense Department clandestine capabilities under Title 10 to support covert action. The nearest candidates are two notices continuing an emergency over foreign advancement in sensitive technologies, which restrict investment and do not touch military authorities. That is a record of a search, not a finding that nothing has happened: an act this site does not hold, or one that answers the proposal in words unlike its own, would not be caught by it.
The document says “should”Who acts: CongressHow: legislationp. 218 in the PDF
What the document says
“The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities.”
The Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 governs the national counterintelligence structure. The chapter asks that it be updated to cover foreign espionage aimed at universities, that the National Counterintelligence and Security Center's role be amplified, and that the FBI receive significant additional resources and legal authorities as the lead operational counterintelligence agency. It states that China steals at least $400 billion to $600 billion in intellectual property each year.
What the document actually says
“The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities.”
That sentence, in plain words
Update this law. Make it cover foreign spying aimed at universities.
What this is about
Other countries try to steal research. Some of it is done at universities. The book says the law should cover that.
Executive Order 14282 treats foreign money on American campuses as a national security problem and directs the Secretary of Education, working with the Attorney General, to enforce the foreign funding disclosure requirement of section 117 of the Higher Education Act, to require disclosure of the true source and purpose of the funds, to conduct audits and investigations, and to withhold federal grant funds from institutions that do not comply. It goes at foreign penetration of universities by a different route than the one asked for. It amends no statute and leaves the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 untouched, it concerns disclosure of money rather than espionage, and it gives the work to the Education Department and the Attorney General rather than to the National Counterintelligence and Security Center or the FBI, whose role and resources the chapter would expand.
In plain English
The order goes after foreign money on campus. Schools must report where the funds come from or lose grants. The chapter wanted a 2002 law changed to cover spying at schools. That law is untouched, and the spy agencies get no new role here.
Dustin J. Carmack, “Intelligence Community,” in Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise, edited by Paul Dans and Steven Groves (The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 201-234. https://static.heritage.org/project2025/2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.pdf
This page
“Intelligence Community,” Project 2025, chapter 7. Read the Mandate, https://readthemandate.org/project-2025/chapter-7/ (retrieved October 7, 2026).
Cite the document when the claim is about what the document says. Cite this page when the indexing, the wording or the record of what has happened is what is being relied on.
What This Page Covers, and What It Leaves Out
Recommendations on the structure and authority of the Director of National Intelligence, the CIA, covert action, politicization and leaks, surveillance law, counterintelligence and personnel.
The chapter's account of past controversies, its discussion of analytic tradecraft, and its extended argument about norms of political neutrality, which sets out expectations for intelligence leaders, Congress and the President rather than asking for a specific change.
Several passages here describe norms the chapter wishes to see observed rather than actions to be taken. Those are not indexed as proposals, though they occupy a substantial part of the chapter.
